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Abstract
late 14c., originally in grammar (in reference to certain nouns that do not name concrete things), from Latin abstractus
"drawn away," past participle of abstrahere "to drag away, detach, pull away, divert;" also figuratively, from assimilated
form of ab "off, away from" (see ab-) + trahere "to draw," from PIE root *tragh- "to draw, drag, move."
“To drag away” I find particularly evocative.

“The candidate must ensure that the abstract refers to all the elements that
would make the thesis worth consulting.”
I find this, of course, to be a paralyzing requirement. This thesis is not worth “consulting,” I don’t think.
It’s more something you endure. Ideally, it’s something you enjoy. If you, dear reader, are reading this
abstract right now, you can likely surmise what you’d be getting yourself into if you decided it was worth
your attention. It’s a eulogy to my friend Whitney Mah, an emblem of my mourning, a book report on
Jacques Lacan’s third and 17th seminars, some speculations about the ways psychoanalysis can help us
reimagine what teaching is and can be, a mutilation of a pretty obscure short story by the pretty obscure
writer Donald Barthelme, and a swaying plainscape within which some of the finest sentences of my life
have taken root.
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Here is the first of several attempts I make in this project to contextualize and frame. As is often the
case with introductory or prefatory remarks, this is being written near the end of the project’s lifespan. So while
it is being read by others with fresh eyes setting out on a long path, it is being written in the spirit of conclusion,
of mourning coming to an end. I am moving on.
It is easy enough to describe what I have made: the sprawling document I have always wanted to
make, that I did not think I could make, the document I knew I could make specifically at the Centre for the
Study of Theory and Criticism. I wanted to write something that I felt was impossible to write, and what follows
is my attempt, my essai. In its details it’s nothing like I imagined it would be, but in its spirit of experimentation,
of wandering, of lusting, and of sincerity it satisfies me.
This, however, raises the question as to whether my satisfaction bears any significant relation to the
satisfaction of the university, which holds the power of designating this document as acceptable or not. I
personally hope the university has a problem coming to a decision about this. Moments of crisis always help to
clarify matters at the elemental level; this document is, in my opinion, critical insofar as it attempts to lift the
curtains covering the scaffolding, revealing the machinery comprising the behemoth. This I do not do in anything
like a grandly demystifying spirit, since anyone worth their salt in the university is already perhaps thoroughly
demystified. I do it in a spirit of playfulness, and I hope ultimately in a spirit of reconciliation, a longing that I
despise in myself but must admit exists: to be accepted here in the academy. And anyway it is not the scaffolding
itself that I believe to be dangerous about the university, it is the possibility that all curtain-raising might one day
come to an end.
What do I mean specifically by curtain-raising? I mean exposing the dozens of tiny tics and habits
and routines that are perpetuated in the university classroom and in scholarly writing that serve to reinforce
power and destroy or degrade desire. One of the supreme mythical scenes of Pedagogy is Socrates “teaching”
the slave how to determine the square on the diagonal using questions that do not teach so much as place the
slave in a certain position with respect to episteme, which itself is only a certain orientation of the symbolic to the
real. In this context it is necessary for the slave to be represented by his ignorance, to be nothing other than
ignorant, in order for Socrates’ demonstration to unfold. But it’s questionable that the slave learns anything, and
it can’t be denied that he remains a slave. This specific arrangement of the one-who-knows to the ignorant is
not an accident of the teaching scene; it constitutes that scene. The teacher is always already in a position of
power over the student. This document does not wish to point that out or outline any nefarious consequences
(there are plenty of manuscripts that already do so), but rather to speculate as to how, or even whether, that
power can be abnegated, redistributed, filtered, alchemized, and made available to the student to use in
accordance with her desire.
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My analog for this procedure is the psychoanalytic scene as it is described by Jacques Lacan.
Application of this method, however, is possible only indirectly. Any pedagogy that is too explicit about its tactics
or too stringent in its implementation risks repeating the mistakes of the ego-psychologists, whose method places
the analyst in a position of knowledge or clarity regarding the “real” world while viewing the experience and
discourse of the patient as unhealthy, delusional, or incoherent. I outline Lacan’s critique of ego-psychology in
the first part of the document, which is entitled “Perish.”
Why Perish? It isn’t only because during the writing of this document I spent many weeks and months
watching a friend die. It is because death is the final punctuation, the closing of the stitch Lacan calls the point de
capiton, the gesture that causes meaning to crystallize. As punctuation, death is structurally allied with language;
though much regarding death is ineffable, death itself is grammatical. I attempt to depict these claims in the
margins of Part I, in a way that is perhaps violent to the reader. This violence, which is stylistic, is meant to be
abrupt, intrusive, mystifying, passionate, oneiric, wild, etc. As I wrote these marginal intrusions I made an effort
to distance my style and my discourse as much as possible from the academic, since it is the purpose of academic
discourse precisely to circumscribe and in a way conquer. There is nothing about Whitney Mah’s death that I
wish to conquer. I wish it rather to remain unleashed.
The “other half” of Part I is more or less a summary of Lacan’s early work up to his third seminar
on psychosis and the introduction of the quilting point, which then concludes with a brief analysis of his 17th
seminar. Over the course of this summary I make the perhaps dubious analogy between the discourse of the
psychotic and literature. While there are some interesting observations to be made on this front I don’t follow
the path very eagerly, since I’m not interested in, or capable of, providing the necessary qualifications one would
need to provide to make the claim seem tenable, let alone persuasive. Some literary examples have more in
common with psychotic discourse than others, but every literary example has something hallucinogenic about
it, something like the palpable force of an alternate reality to it, and insofar as literature constitutes an aged and
sophisticated academic discipline it’s worth dwelling on how exactly the literature professor distills insight or
knowledge from this object with such peculiar standing in relation to the “real” world. The time I spend with
Lacan’s third seminar does yield some interesting speculations about new pedagogical approaches to teaching
literature, though none of them have been “tested” yet by me.
What I find to be marvelous about literature is that it animates a battery of associations in the reader,
and these associations follow a course that is only partly determined by the literature – it is also determined by
the specific topography of the reader’s unconscious. Why one image or scene persists for a reader while another
goes unnoticed is what fascinates me as a teacher. Why one poem is enjoyed and another discarded is a question,
in the end, of desire. And of course my desire is just as present in the classroom as the students’.
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I introduce the second part of the document, entitled “Paracite,” later. If I had but world enough and
time I would have included paracitations of Franz Kafka, Ben Marcus, and Anne Carson. Instead there is a rather
obscure short story by Donald Barthelme, which I acknowledge was chosen more or less at random. More or
less – not entirely, of course. I was perhaps attracted to the absurdity of the story and the school setting. I hope
by the end of the document it is clear why that would appeal to me.

*

*

*

Are things “real” here in the introduction? Is this my chance to wipe off all my makeup, take out a
cigarette, lumber home anonymously with my costume in my briefcase, ready to tell you the truth about my day?

Ha ha. What home.

vii

1

Part I: Perish

2

In addition to remembering things that one does not know how one remembers, one would also appear to
remember things that one has no idea how one knew to begin with.
What happened after I started to write about Achilles was that halfway through the sentence I began to
think about a cat, instead.
The cat I began to think about instead was the cat outside of the broken window in the room next to this
one, at which the tape frequently scratches when there is a breeze.
Which is to say that I was not actually thinking about a cat either, there being no cat except insofar as the
sound of the scratching reminds me of one.
As there were no coins on the floor of Rembrandt’s studio, except insofar as the configuration of pigment
reminded Rembrandt of them.
As there was, or is, no person at the window in the painting of this house.
As for that matter there is not even a house in the painting of this house, should one wish to carry the matter
that far.
Certain matters would appear to get carried certain distances whether one wishes them to or not,
unfortunately.
In any case the house that I am dismantling contains almost no furniture at all. In fact it is quite indifferently
built.
The only tool I have needed for any of the work is a crowbar, which I took from beneath the same seat in
the pickup truck.
Well, there is also the saw, which I came upon in the house itself.
Then again I do not really think of the saw as a tool for dismantling. Rather I think of that as a tool for
turning dismantled lumber into firewood.
After it has been dismantled.
Although perhaps this distinction is no more than one of semantics.
At any rate I have no idea why the house should have been constructed so indifferently.

3

One can only guess that it had been built to be rented, perhaps rather than to be lived in, which is sometimes
the case with houses along a beach.
The world is everything that is the case.
I have no idea what I mean by that sentence I have just typed, by the way.
For some reason I seem to have had it in my head all day, however, although without the vaguest notion
about where it might have come from.
Such things can happen. One morning not too long ago all I could think about was the word bricolage, which
I presume is French, even though I do not speak one word of French.
Well, perhaps I did not think about it all, in the usual sense of thinking.
Still, when I went for my walk along the beach, or was picking up shells as I sometimes do, I must have said
the word bricolage to myself a hundred times.
Eventually I stopped saying it. So today what I have been saying is that the world is everything that is the
case, instead.
Oh, well.1

1

David Markson. Wittgenstein’s Mistress (London: Dalkey Archive, 2012), 64 & 78.

What is it about a footnote? This alluring place where it seems secrets are so easily hidden. Isn’t it the
perfect place to free up one’s voice? I’ve struggled so much to give my assemblage of writing a life of its own
that perhaps I can finally comment on it now as though it were some independent beast, stumbling in the distance.
This Markson quotation I remember liking so much for its desultory form, its insistence on demonstrating that
words and thoughts have a way of producing a kind of unifying coherence despite one’s negligence or even
disdain of that coherence (“certain matters would appear to get carried certain distances whether one wishes
them to or not, unfortunately”). Obviously I’ve taken more than a little inspiration from Markson’s technique.
Imagining for a minute that Markson’s novel could be taken as a totally “legitimate” academic tract on
Wittgenstein’s famous Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (a work that has received more than its fair share of more
conventional academic commentary), an intervention that might reveal something about the Tractatus that is
missed by other approaches, despite how apparently unrelated it is to anything relevant to Wittgenstein’s work.
My work is grounded in this fantasy and committed to exploring it: that there is a mode of writing that belongs
in the academy that frustrates, that seduces, and that vanishes in such a way that new dimensions of the work
appear, not then to be ambushed and territorialized, but regarded – out of the corner of the eye only, perhaps.
The narrator is captivated by the word bricolage, with no explaining it. I think it’s already apparent that I
am also captivated by it as a technique; a way of producing a completely unanticipated coherence out of whatever
thoughts, words, associations, or texts are at hand. I have adopted this mode specifically as one of academic

4

At about the same time some of my ribs were sometimes temporarily smashed, always with the result that
what had been destroyed was re-formed after a time. One of the most horrifying miracles was the so-called
compression-of-the-chest-miracle, which I endured at least several dozen times; it consisted in the whole chest wall being
compressed, so that the state of oppression caused by the lack of breath was transmitted to my whole body. The
compression-of-the-chest miracle recurred several times in later years; but like the other miracles described here, it
belongs mainly to the second half of the year 1894 and perhaps the first half of the year 1895.2

Things take shape of their own accord, language speaking itself.

The subject is unconscious of this need for recognition, and this is why it is essential for us to situate this
need for recognition in an alterity the quality of which we had not known until Freud. This alterity is rooted in the
place of the signifier, whereby being is split from itself.
The human subject is essentially bound in a relationship with his sign-of-being [signe d’être], which is the
object of all manner of passions and which, as it develops, makes death present. In being tied to the signifier the
subject is effectively detached from himself enough to have this relationship to his own being; one that is unique, it
would seem, among creatures: it constitutes that last form of what we call in analysis masochism, that is to say that
whereby the subject apprehends the pain of existence.
In existing, the subject finds himself from the outset constituted by a division. Why? Because his being must
be represented elsewhere, in the sign, and the sign itself is in a third place. It is there that the subject is structured in

literary criticism in order to offer something that cannot be offered by other methods, something wild and playful
and horrible.
2

Daniel Paul Schreber. Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, trans. Ida Macalpine & Richard A. Hunter (London:
WM Dawson & Sons, 1955), 133.
What I like most about Schreber is his sincerity. I like his commitment to observing his neurosis as though
it were an intelligent animal, the meaning of whose gestures he seeks to understand. Not unlike my own
independent animal – the stumbler from above.

5

this decomposition – this division – from himself without which it is impossible for us to determine anything at all
about the unconscious.3

One begins anywhere.

Hailey allways around. A sweet comfort

someone dear.

between something ever effortless:

the irreparable loss of holding
Because I’m slower here.

personal costs of loving her beyond

European Hornbeam panic.

her. Though nothing’s beyond her.4

168

and me outlasting all

Because I feer

The Losses of all Lost

On we ride. Slowly.

Jacques Lacan. Le séminaire, livre V: Les formation de l’inconscient (Paris: Édition de Seuil, 1998), 255-256.
My translation.
3

So much of Lacan’s work is marvelous for its depth, and so much more of it is marvelous for its beauty.
My relationship to his writing and thinking is complicated – my reverence for it does not also inspire in me any
desire to comment or challenge, even if that is de rigueur whenever his writing appears in the context of
academic discourse. For him, problems in the clinic stem from the elements of human life that give that life its
very structure, the elements by which it can be characterized specifically as human. I want for myself, as a
teacher, to share that same scope.
4

Mark Z. Danielewski’s Only Revolutions by Sam and by Hailey (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 193 &

Is there a place for love in the academy? For my love, for my anguish? “Loving her beyond her…”
There are lessons in my life that are like an oar plunged into the clay of the plains or the rocks of the wastes,
places where I have taken myself with no guide and no legend only to be stopped by a mysterious figure who
roams these places and who reveals to me that I am farther from my home than I have ever been, and that my
hands and my cunning and my means are unknown here and useless. And here at the extreme of loss and
solitude one plants one’s oar and returns, death awaiting. Can these be the lessons we teach?
In Danielewski’s poem the fates of the story’s two narrators spiral against one another like a helix while
a calendar of events lists history’s “significant” moments, unfolding endlessly into the future. The chaos of a

6

What have you already brought here?

“Many times that reading drew our eyes together, but one point alone it was that mastered us: when we read
that the longed-for smile was kissed by so great a lover. A Galeotto was the book and he that wrote it; that day we
read in it no farther.”
While the one spirit said this the other wept so that for pity I swooned as if in death and dropped like a
dead body.5

In order to go to the School of Dreams, something must be displaced, starting with the bed. One has to get
going. This is what writing is, starting off. It has to do with activity and passivity. This does not mean one will get
there. Writing is not arriving; most of the time it’s not-arriving. One must go on foot, with the body. One has to go
away, leave the self. How far must one not arrive in order to write, how far must one wander and wear out and have
pleasure? One must walk as far as the night. One’s own night. Walking through the self toward the dark.6

love bores its way into a stream of time that passes above it, all around it, love convoluting in a node that
becomes infinitely dense, time flowing along a line infinitely long, both at once.
5

Dante Alighieri. The Divine Comedy, trans. John D. Sinclair (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 79.

Who is Galehaut (Galeotto)? The man’s life is marked by an overpowering love for Lanceleot, a love that
can never be requited entirely since it is marked by Galehaut’s self-denial, his renunciation, his sacrifice of his
own love for Lancelot so that Lancelot may have his glory and, in this case, Guinevere. That is what a book is:
something for you that helps you take the thing you want. And wanting is to allow oneself forever to be battered
by the winds and dust. Books are the axe, and beneath the ice, a dark sea.
6

Hélène Cixous. Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing, trans. Sarah Cornell & Susan Sellers (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993), 65.
School, dreams, writing. I am trying to take Cixous’s description of writing as a model for my own.
Writing is not arriving, she says. It is not the same thing as arriving – at some mythical closure of meaning, for
example, or some rhetorical monolith – writing is wandering. If it is not wandering, it is defending. How far
must one wander and wear out and have pleasure, she asks. Writing into the darkness, without direction,
following nothing but the winds of one’s desires, discovering them. Yes, one walks through the self – the
masques, the alibis – toward the dark, the secret heart.

7

This is why I am given to guiding my students to the places where logic is disconcerted by the disjunction
that breaks through from the imaginary to the symbolic, not in order to indulge in the paradoxes that are thus
generated, or in some supposed crisis in thought, but, on the contrary, to redirect their fake shine to the gap they
designate – which I always find quite simply edifying – and above all to try to create a method from a sort of calculus
whose very inappropriateness would flush out the secret.7

We look to the East for a wisdom that we shall not use – and to the sleeper for the secret that we shall not
find. So, I say, what of the night, the terrible night? The darkness is the closet in which your lover roosts her heart,
and that night-fowl that caws against her spirit and yours, dropping between you and her the awful estrangement of
his bowels. The drip of your tears is his implacable pulse. Night people do not bury their dead, but on the neck of
you, their beloved and waking, sling the creature, husked of its gestures. And where you go, it goes, the two of you,
your living and her dead, that will not die; to daylight, to life, to grief, until both are carrion.8

What is one’s own night? Is the night a place of terrors, or simply of mysteries? Some secret room we
visit only in our moments of great shame? A place without function, a place completely outside the fortress, a
place whose heartbeat can only be detected by the dream, transmitted through that bewildering static? Some
terrible beauty allures you.
Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” from Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink
(New York: Norton, 2006), 695.
7

Another model for teaching, an offering worth speculating about. We know that literature is marked by
aporia, by différance, by ambiguity – we are beyond simply noting that. And facts are everywhere. What I am
attempting to construct is a teaching that produces a response in the key of a student’s desire.
8

Djuna Barnes. Nightwood (New York: New Directions Books, 1961), 88-89.

Warm with rot, some horrid life defying the implacable decay attending your loss, not only of your
lover but of yourself in him – the star finally succumbing to quiescence. One longs to discover a truth amid the
gore, a tooth or bone incorruptible. Night people, they stoop to their burden at the call of a distant voice that
promises to destroy them. Love. It is suffused through this luxurious darkness, cold and sweet. Stoop, and in
the expanse you hear your joy spring to life and vanish, the holy bird, the mirror.

8

There are impossible stairs at the Loretta Chapel, built by a wandering tinkerer, they say – some angel. I am
standing at them as they spiral up and in the empty heart a beam of sun touches up the falling dust, falling like scales
in the tideless sea and all around me a voice sings out in the vault. The human voice, full of the ghosts of itself
meeting in distant corners even of the transept, quivering to life above the pews, she turns and sings into the apse
and like a heaving storm it is all around me clutching at my breath like a demon.
You don’t know it, but you conjured this memory of mine and I give it now as a gift I know you can never
recognize. It is poised here in the uncertainty between legibility and erasure.

The supreme secret must be told to the Cabinet; first that trees are alive; next there is no crime; next love,
universal love, he muttered, gasping, trembling, painfully drawing out these profound truths which needed, so deep
were they, so difficult, an immense effort to speak out, but the world was entirely changed by them for ever.9

What makes writing effective depends on the purpose of the audience, so to write well you must understand
that purpose.10

9

Virginia Woolf. Mrs. Dalloway (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1925), 102.
Septimus, destroyed by truth.

10

Paul Headrick. A Method for Writing Essays about Literature (Toronto: Nelson Education, 2012), 2.

The audience sits out there somewhere, in some great hall of fantasy, expecting something. The Audience.
The purpose of the Audience, from this perspective, is to polarize or direct the intentions or desires of the writer.
The Audience demands something that can never be made completely explicit. Why do students and professors
make such a point of emphasizing the completely irrelevant parts of the writing? The page count, the font size,
the style of citation, the placement of the page numbers, the placement of the staple, the number of paragraphs
– students and professors attempt to domesticate the uncertainty of the whole exchange with trifles of propriety.
These details of hygiene, one remarks with relief, can be made clear. One can even go as far as telling students
what to write about, but the uncertainty remains. There is a universe within this uncertainty, and I want to live
in it.
There may be a method for writing essays about literature, but all it can produce are observations noted
from beyond the cage.

9

The dominant male culture, in separating man as knower from both woman and from nature as the objects
of knowledge, evolved certain intellectual polarities which still have the power to blind our imaginations. Any
deviance from a quality valued by that culture can be dismissed as negative: where “rationality” is posited as sanity,
legitimate method [and] “real thinking,” any alternative, intuitive, supersensory, or poetic knowledge is labeled
“irrational.” If we listen well to the connotations of “irrational” they are highly charged: we hear overtones of
“hysteria”, of “madness,” and of randomness, chaotic absence of form.11

I am not just trying to understand repetition, I am trying to understand my repetition. These returns to the
beginning, to what beginning.
There is a secret heart.
It was the abyss of human illusion that was the real, the tideless deep.12

In the afternoon when school was out and the last one had left with his dirty snuffling nose, instead of going
home I would go down the hill to the spring where I could be quiet and hate them.

Adrienne Rich. “The Kingdom of the Fathers” in Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and
Institution (New York: Norton, 1976), 46.
11

Fear of what cannot be appropriated by a certain discourse or narrative. Fear of witches. Of death.
Henry James. “The Middle Years” in Collected Stories, Volume II (1892 – 1910) (New York: Knopf, 1999),
103.
12

Façades, conjurations, hallucinations, fantasies, personae – is it even possible to assume that anything
like a shared world exists between we shifters? The edifice of facts appears at the horizon from every vantage
like an enchanted monument, keeping our eyes distracted from the cascading sands beneath our feet.

10

It would be quiet there then, with the water bubbling up and away and the sun slanting quiet in the trees
and the quiet smelling of damp and rotting leaves and new earth; especially in the early spring, for it was worst then.
I could just remember how my father used to say that the reason for living was to get ready to stay dead a
long time.
to stay dead a long time.
was to get ready to stay dead a long time.
And when I would have to look at them day after day, each with his and her secret and selfish thought, and
blood strange to each other’s blood and strange to mine, and think that this seemed to be the only way I could get
ready to stay dead, I would hate my father for having ever planted me.
I would look forward to the times when they faulted, so I could whip them.
When the switch fell I could feel it upon my flesh; when it welted and ridged it was my blood that ran, and
I would think with each blow of the switch:
Now you are aware of me!
Now I am something in your secret and selfish life, who have marked your blood with my own for ever and
ever.13

13

William Faulkner. As I Lay Dying (New York: Norton, 2010), 98. Text and punctuation modified.

From the chapter attributed to the dead Addie Bundren. A novel so full for me of enduring allure. The
dead woman speaks of her anguish, her isolation, his disappointment, her love; the heart of maternal love beating
hard within her but no less mystifying for its ardor, like an animal or parasite within her lusting after her son
Jewel the scornful, the lover of beasts.
Addie’s life is punctuated in advance by this pronouncement of her father’s: the reason for living is to get
ready to stay dead a long time. Passing her days as a schoolteacher, surrounded by children whose thoughts and
desires and blood escape her, to be claimed only by the whip.
A teacher.

11

…remembering things that one does not know how one remembers. They are echoes with no voice. My
destiny as a writer, I know where it began. But I’ve lost all the words to say it.
Never had them, rather.
I am looking for you, and I know you aren’t there. That’s that. You’re somewhere beneath these filthy
clouds, in the gray light, I hear your pulse and see it, as in a fish. Or in the air. You are the ghost and the angel, both
of you.
What am I.
Some fragile thing, whose visions are so changeable. In the black eyes of my stranger, my captive, my
monster vanishing at my touch, you suddenly are there alive and like that, just, you are both gone but for this pain
like a stone, this pendant at my neck. Cold and radiant.

During the years when I found it necessary to revise the circuitry of my mind I discovered that I was no
longer interested in whether the woman on the ledge of the window of the sixteenth floor jumped or did not jumped,
or in why. I was interested only in the picture of her in my mind: her hair incandescent in the floodlights, her toes
curled inward on the stone ledge.
In this light all narrative was sentimental. In this light all connections were equally meaningful, and equally
senseless.14

THE STYLE OF SPACE

The distinctive way space opposes us, useful because

it frames and highlights the material our hands would make. Space being
mobile and persons being static, the spatial style is more energetic,
animated, even pictorial. True spaces, clusters not falsified by our

14

Joan Didion. The White Album, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 44.

Not long after her mastectomy, she told me this was the body she felt she was always meant to have. A
perishing one. Some dark beast stole her, or her heart simply stopped beating. You choose.

12

occupation, are as rare as true words and cannot be acquired through the
routine channel of desire, nor may accidents deliver them from use. Words
have as little individuality as people – there are moments when any of them
will do, provided the parts allow for thrusting enunciation. The proper use
of space is to find out the things we have not said, and how our hands might
make sure they stay that way.15

Now, what I want is, Facts.16
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Ben Marcus. The Age of Wire and String (Champaign: Dalkey Archive, 1998), 94.
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Charles Dickens. Hard Times, For These Times (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 1.

Why was Edmund Husserl so wary of facts, wary enough to warn that “merely fact-minded sciences make
merely fact-minded people”? Referring to the second half of the 19th century – precisely when Dickens’ book is
published – Husserl claims that “the exclusiveness with which the total world-view of modern man let itself be
determined by the positive sciences and blinded by the ‘prosperity’ they produced, meant an indifferent turningaway from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity” (Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1970), 5-6). What are these questions today, and does it even occur to us to ask them in school?
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One begins anywhere. At any moment one is surrounded not only by phrases or images in their erratic
orbits in and out of time but also constrained by a certain physics of syntax, laws of locution at odds – with what?
With desire? With whose? – at odds with that bellowing in one’s chest, an alien gravity leaving one panicked and
inert as in a dream.
At odds. My figures of desire, precious as the spirits of the dead, seem blasted by a punishing wind like
Dante’s lovers. Invisible, ineluctable. You.

…the platitudes we circulate like coins tallying a meaningless balance.

You must understand that purpose, to write well. Understand it means: invent it.

You don’t tell a story only to yourself. There’s always someone else.
Even when there is no one.17

It is in the place where the subject has sought to articulate his desire that he will encounter the desire of the
Other as such.18
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Margaret Atwood. The Handmaid’s Tale (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1985), 44.
And you all have been there for me these thousands of pages.
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Lacan, Séminaire V, 395.

And this labyrinthine desire reconfigures one’s own in such impossible and unforeseen ways – and one is
off; off on the career of language, into the slaughter, as Cixous writes. This writing, my writing, is that. The
place where I have sought to articulate my desire encounters all around it the empty chamber of the Other’s
desire, dark and resonant. One screams, one scratches at the walls, one begs. What do you want from me, my
eternal question. And slowly one comes to learn that no answer will emerge from the stone but for the echoes,
and we are Narcissus.
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Without actually inscribing his work as a text, the patient does something similar to the work of the writer,
who understands from his anxieties and dreams enough to renew his writing and thus to give status to that which
haunts his sleep.19

There is a secret heart.
There is.
*

*

*

Beyond the Cage

Every project has its presuppositions. Here I am imagining an audience that ranges from veritable
experts in Lacan’s work to educators who have had as little as no exposure to Lacan. This particular orientation
structures the possibilities of the project in advance: an intenser granularity of analysis must be sacrificed for a
generalized breadth of summary, a certain amount of belaboured contextualization is necessary, et cetera.
Additionally, my familiarity with the established discourse of education as an academic discipline is very slight,
which is why throughout the project I can refer to education only in its more abstract features and not at all in
quantitative, social scientific, administrative, or policy-based terms, though I do hope that my insights are
accessible enough to be incorporated into those discourses. Education has long been a domain that has attracted
the attention of psychologists, cognitive scientists, and analysts of behavior, but since psychoanalysis ultimately
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François Roustang, psychoanalysis never lets go, trans. Ned Lukacher (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1983), 137.
All I have are my dreams, I’ve often felt. Because in them I have died, and in them I will rediscover the
truth of death as it arrives to punctuate it all, to silence it all.
*

*

*
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differs profoundly from these disciplines it is unavoidable that much of what I present here will not harmonize
with the work and method of these other disciplines. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, my efforts in this
project are directed first toward synopsizing Lacan’s work insofar as it profoundly restructures the possibilities
of teaching; and second, I speculate about the consequences Lacan’s work – and psychoanalysis more generally
– has for a kind of teaching one might call literary. “Literary” here refers both to the style of teaching (a style
Shoshana Felman named “poetic”20) as well as the content of the teaching, i.e. literature. Freud famously claimed
that the study of literature was essential training for the analyst,21 and I add to this claim that the study of
psychoanalysis is essential for the training of teachers in general, but especially teachers of literature. This is not
because I believe that studying the teachings of Freud or Lacan improves one’s ability to interpret literature but
because I believe the function of literature is, as Kafka writes, to be the axe for the frozen sea inside us. 22 The
teacher of literature presides over the hacking, and she hacks herself, and psychoanalysis provides a vantage
from which we may view whatever lies beneath.
Before advancing my introductory remarks it’s worth it to reflect on Kafka’s claim, especially on what
it implies is involved in teaching literature. “We need books that affect us like a disaster,” he claims, “like the
death of someone we loved more than ourselves.” This claim, in my opinion, makes the stakes for teaching clear
in all their risks – Kafka advocates for a literature that has some traumatic kernel. This is not to say that he
necessarily champions literature that has trauma as its theme – narratives of war or slavery or injustice, for
example – but that is traumatic, that affects the reader directly, that displaces the reader into an atmosphere of
almost paranoid isolation, distanced from the ways and routines of civilization (“banished into forests far from
everyone”). “We need books that affect us … like a suicide,” is his belief. Not only terrible in the way that news
of a suicide is terrible, but terrible in the way that one’s own, personal longing for death is terrible – the terror
of acknowledging one’s own constant enframement by death.

Shoshana Felman, “Psychoanalysis and Education: Teaching Terminable and Interminable”. Yale French
Studies 63 (1982), 21–44.
20

“Analytic instruction would include branches of knowledge which are remote from medicine and which the
doctor does not come across in his practice: the history of civilization, mythology, the psychology of religion,
and the science of literature” (the word Freud uses here is Literaturwissenschaft, which we might translate
today as “literary theory”). Freud, Sigmund. “The Question of Lay Analysis”, The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XX, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press,
1959), 246.
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“…we need books that affect us like a disaster, that grieve us deeply, like the death of someone we loved
more than ourselves, like being banished into forests far from everyone, like a suicide. A book must be the axe
for the frozen sea inside us. That is my belief.” Franz Kafka. Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors, trans.
Richard & Clara Winston (New York: Schocken Books, 1977), 16.
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From a more general perspective we can simply follow Lacan’s words on the importance of Freud’s
work not only for educators but for everyone: “Freud’s discovery calls truth into question, and there is no one
who is not personally concerned by truth.”23

O love! O love! This refrain. It returns to me from out of the silence like a
waking bird. Do you remember that wet October morning in the apple
orchards? Us stooping to collect the peridot fruit poised on the cold
grass, and in the distance you and I saw one fall by the simple power of
its own ripeness; something miraculous about this. Rows and rows of
trees hunched and jagged like witches, covered in apples quivering like
pendant tears. From among the thousands of apples lying here, how
does one choose?

To be clear, I will not be using Lacan’s or Freud’s work as a method for reading or interpreting literature.
I will be using psychoanalysis as a way of understanding what can happen when we read literature together in a
context that, in the end, is oriented by a certain Protean fantasy, a fantasy that is irreducible to objectives or
methodologies or outcomes because it is structured by a desire that always outstrips us. “It is to a fantasy, spoken
or unspoken, that the professor must annually turn at the moment of determining the direction of his journey. He
thereby turns from the place where he is expected, the place of the Father, who is always dead, as we know. For
only the son has fantasies; only the son is alive.”24 In turning from the place of the Father, the professor abjures,
by means of a certain style that I will discuss later, her place as the seat of knowledge, power, or mastery. From
this new position bereft of the trappings of satiety the professor confronts the anguish and the joy of her desire,
her desire utterly outside the context of education, a desire that thrives even if there are no students to teach.
Psychoanalysis reconfigures education to be no longer a matter of facts, but a matter of desires; and literature
quickens these desires to life.
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Jacques Lacan, “The Freudian Thing,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2006), 337.

Roland Barthes, “Lecture in Inauguration of the Chair of Literary Semiology, Collège De France, January 7,
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Before going any further I want to locate a few concepts that are conflated or elided here: teaching,
psychoanalysis, writing, reading, research, and literature. I offer this list not in order to establish borders between
these terms, but rather to emphasize the porosity of their boundaries. In many instances throughout this work it
will become difficult to articulate the difference between teaching and analysis, as well as the difference between
the teacher and the analyst. Or again, when, if at all, does the presentation of research become a teaching or a
writing? How, as Derrida asked, can we distinguish the difference between writing as travail and writing as
oeuvre?25 What effect does writing about literature in a style that will sometimes become itself literary have on
our notions of what teaching, writing, learning, and reading are? By what criteria can we assess the value of
syntactical and grammatical experimentation in a context where writing is meant to be didactic or expository?
Desire, present like a hawk, whose is it?
A few days before you died, you stopped speaking. Later, we learned
that blood was pooling in your skull, itself speckled with cancer,
pressuring your brain, causing the aphasia. By that time, Whitney, your
body was so ravaged – no breasts, cancer on your bones, your liver, your
belly swollen, not even healthy enough to be treated with more
chemotherapy. I stood next to you and made jokes and my god you
laughed.

These questions are a way of broaching what, for me, is the always-unavoidable and indissoluble
problem of writing (especially the writing expected in a document such as this): expository, didactic,
transactional writing, let’s say. Some words are coins, but some are seeds. In her essay “How Does One Speak
to Literature?” Julia Kristeva writes:
behind substantified, opaque linguistic categories and structures, there functions a scene where the
subject, defined by the topos of its communication with an other, begins by denying this
communication in order to formulate another device. As negative of the earlier so-called “natural”
languages, this new “language” is consequently no longer communicative. I shall call it
transformative, or even mortal, for the “I” as well as for the “other”: it leads, in borderline

Jacques Derrida. “The University Without Condition” from Without Alibi, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2002), 209.
25
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experiences, to an antilanguage (Joyce), to a sacrificial language (Bataille), indicating in other
respects but simultaneously a disrupted social structure. 26

One looks into the kaleidoscope of Finnegans Wake and sees these transformative or mortal
configurations glistening on every page, convoluting every traditional literary or discursive category with a
gleeful abandon – an antilanguage because it seems to have isolated itself in its own universe, in communication
only with itself, as Shem and Shaun are, for example. Shaun says, at one point, to his halfbrother, “my
shemblable! My freer!”27 the allusion to Baudelaire’s famous poem “Au Lecteur” now implicating the reader
(the lecteur) in this universe that both solicits and is indifferent to her attention (and is especially recalcitrant to
attempts at ordering or explaining the text, thus preserving a certain kind of literary freedom). Shem replies, “as
you sing it it’s a study. That letter selfpenned to one’s other, that neverperfect everplanned?” The letter
selfpenned to one’s other seeks to arrange a moment of arrival or reunion and yet can never quite be articulated,
and in any case never posted.
This mortal language, how might it function in the classroom? As a means by which language can
become unhooked from the imperative to communicate Husserlian phenomenological idealities – i.e. “facts” –
mortal language clears the space for an entirely different mode of communication. Kristeva writes,
although [mortal language] is still understood as signifying, this other scene is only partially
linguistic. That is, it only partially depends on the idealities established by linguistic science, since
it is only partially communicative. On the contrary, it has access to the formative process of its
linguistic idealities by unfolding their phenomenal substance. […] Displacements and facilitations
of energy, discharges, and quantitative cathexes that are logically anterior to linguistic entities and
to their subject mark the constitution of the movements of the “self,” and are manifested by the
formulation of symbolic-linguistic order. Writing would be the recording, through the symbolic
order, of this dialectic of displacement, facilitation, discharge, cathexis of drives (the most
characteristic of which is the death drive) that operates/constitutes the signifier but also exceeds
it; adds itself to the linear order of language by using the most fundamental laws of the signifying
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Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Art, trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and
Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 102.
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James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (New York: Penguin, 1977), 489.
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process (displacement, condensation, repetition, inversion); has other supplementary networks at
its disposal; and produces a sur-meaning.28

This kind of language is punishing,29 frightening,30 excessive, wondrous. Kristeva, in essence, is describing
writing as a language inhabited by the unconscious as it makes itself felt in the displacements and cathexes
permanently circulating in human speech. The sur-meaning is elevated to this status by the radiance of desire.
Additional pertinent questions are: how does one write about literature? What is the relationship
between teaching and writing? Are teachers writers? What is their relation to Kristeva’s mortal language, or to
the unconscious? What more can teaching be?
But you could still write. I gave you my notebook to scribble in – answer
questions. We asked if you needed anything, how you felt. You struggled
to write “ondansetron.” Jagged marks all over the page, you smiling in
bewilderment or maybe embarrassment at your body’s heavy ineptitude,
your brain newly crippled within its decaying house. Nothing in the
notebook is really clear except one phrase: “Whitney Mah isn’t.” That’s
what you wrote, laughing silently.

Near the end of his inauguration lecture as the Chair of Literary Semiology at the Collège de France,
Barthes writes,
what I hope to be able to renew, each of the years it is given me to teach here, is the manner of
presentation of the course or seminar, in short, of “presenting” a discourse without imposing it:
that would be the methodological stake, the quaestio, the point to be debated. For what can be
oppressive in our teaching is not, finally, the knowledge or the culture it conveys, but the
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Kristeva, quoting Barthes: “Writing is rooted in something beyond language […] it manifests an essence and
holds the threat of a secret, it is an anticommunication, it is intimidating.” Roland Barthes. Writing Degree
Zero, trans. Annette Lavers & Colin Smith (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 20.
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“All use of language incurs fright.” Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses,
trans. Russell Grigg (New York: Norton, 1993), 227.
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discursive forms through which we propose them. Since, as I have tried to suggest, this teaching
has as its object discourse taken in the inevitability of power, method can really bear only on the
means of loosening, baffling, or at the very least, of lightening this power. And I am increasingly
convinced, both in writing and in teaching, that the fundamental operation of this loosening
method is, if one writes, fragmentation, and, if one teaches, digression, or, to put it in a preciously
ambiguous word, excursion.31

The relationship between teaching and oppression is, currently, one of the central nodes around which education
scholarship collects, resonant with the words diversity, inclusion, bullying, tolerance, microaggression, social
justice, etc., and in recent years we are not at a loss for examples of the tension between teaching (or, perhaps
more accurately, the figure of the university at large) and oppression coming to a head. Barthes, however, does
not locate the source of this tension at the level of, say, course content or administrative policies, but instead at
the level of style and discourse. In this regard Barthes is reinforcing some of the claims Lacan makes in his 17th
seminar, delivered the year after Barthes delivered his inaugural lecture. In this seminar Lacan isolates four
discourses, all of which express a certain dimension of the social bond that is implied by the fact of speech
between subjects. Lacan does suggest that there are more than four, and other commenters have added one or
two, but primarily there are four: the master’s discourse, the university discourse, the hysteric’s discourse, and
the analyst’s discourse. Each discourse is itself comprised of four algebraic elements, meaning their value can
vary depending on its position in the equation of the discourse. These elements are written and summarized
(cursorily; by no means exhaustively) as follows:
1) S1: represents the master signifier, the signifier without which there can be no
signification.
2) S2: represents the body of all other signifiers that follow from the existence of the first.
This body of signifiers is also referred to as knowledge, generally.
3) a: represents the lost object, the lack fueling signification, the object and cause of desire,
and surplus jouissance.
4) $: represents what Lacan calls the “split subject.” This subject is the consequence of
language, a subject whose access to a perfectly univocal subjectivity is barred by the
existence of the unconscious.
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In this brief summary of the seminar I will concentrate on the first two discourses: the master and university.
They are written:

The Master’s discourse takes its name from the famous master/bondsman dialectic in Hegel’s Phenomenology
of Spirit.32 In this text Hegel imagines the historical development of human self-consciousness to begin at the
level of struggle between subjects who have each staked their life in a violent effort to appropriate the being of
the other so as to reaffirm the univocality of their own. For Hegel this struggle culminates not in the death of
one but rather the subjugation of one to the other, this subjugation giving the dialectic its name
“master/bondsman”. As master, the master compels the bondsman to work, and it is the fruit of the bondsman’s
work that the master consumes and enjoys. The act of work, however, means the bondsman leaves his or her
mark all over the things he or she is making, and this token of engagement with the world serves both to affirm
the subjectivity of the bondsman as well as alienate her from the objects with which she identifies. Via Marx
this dialectic takes on an historical incarnation, representing the alienation of labour that commences with
feudalism and continues unabated today in modern capitalism.
This myth gives us a nice opportunity to develop Lacan’s formulae, adding that each sector of the
equations stands for a certain operation. This can be written as:
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T
In this instance it is relatively easy to interpret the equation of the master’s discourse to mean: the master (S1)
stands in a relation of dominance to the slave (S2) who in turn produces things (a) for the master’s consumption
and enjoyment but which mask a fundamental truth, which is the existence of the split subject (i.e. that all
subjects are split as a consequence of their relationship with the signifier, including the master, despite the
completeness he assumes he has achieved as a result of his dominance over the slave).
In the case of the university discourse we can see that here the motivating agent is S2, the general body of
all knowledge, which seeks endlessly to appropriate everything that lies outside its purview (and is thus
desirable), (a). In this case, however, what is ultimately produced is more and more signifiers, all of which
fracture the subject further and further. Finally, the masked truth of this discourse is that knowledge is founded
in a guarantee that cannot itself be incorporated into S2, and this is the S1 of the master signifier. Knowledge
does not and will not free the slave. In the context of the University discourse the slave is conflated with the
proletarian/student, and to recompense the slave for all that has been taken from him knowledge is given, but
“capitalist exploitation effectively frustrates him of his knowledge by rendering it useless.” 33 And in a sort of
ironic twist, “what, in a type of subversion, gets returned [to the student] is … master’s knowledge. And this is
why all he has done is change masters.”34 From this vantage one can see more clearly why Barthes so firmly
stressed the need for a baffling of language or a reconfiguring of the ritualized methodologies of the university.
We can add any number of nuances to these formulae in order to situate them in different contexts. For
example, the discourse of the university will vary slightly depending on several factors specific to that university
or the historical epoch within which the university is being considered. In our contemporary setting the university
discourse, Slavoj Žižek writes, “has two forms of existence in which its inner tension is externalized: 1)
capitalism, its logic of the integrated excess, of the system reproducing itself through constant selfrevolutionizing, and 2) the bureaucratic ‘totalitarianism’ conceptualized in different guises as the rule of
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technology, of instrumental reason, of biopolitics, as the ‘administered world.’”35 The capitalist integration of
excess can be seen in the explosion of new degrees, diplomas, and certificates that purport to provide specific
training for the job market but actually serve to keep students in school longer while simultaneously narrowing
the scope of their learning and, of course, charging them money. As for bureaucratic totalitarianism, we can see
its effects clearly enough in the valorization of professional and technical knowledge, which ultimately
transforms knowledge and thinking into fungible tokens destined to be exchanged for a salary. The activity of
the university is, borrowing another term from Derrida, conditioned, qualified or restricted by its usefulness, and
this usefulness is determined primarily from the vantage of capitalism or the master, i.e. the one who desires that
things simply work. A critical intervention on this front would amount, again using Derrida’s terms, to
permanently allowing professors and students the right to deconstruct to the university. In particular the
Humanities must be capable of taking on the task of deconstructing its own history, its own principles, and its
own axioms and free the university to oppose the other limiting institutions with which it is so frequently
complicit: state powers, economic powers, media powers, ideological powers, religious powers, etc.36
The university discourse has become the hegemonic discourse of 21st century modernity. Knowledge has
been completely co-opted by capitalism to such an extent that its value is measured almost exclusively in
economic terms. Science has more or less become the guarantor of truth, which in turn has led to the valorization
of “studies” whose worth is determined far less by their insight than by the degree to which they are covered in
the trappings of scientific discourse. The same is true for the technologization of the contemporary classroom,
which succumbs more and more to the fantasy that technological prostheses are indispensable to pedagogy, as
if their value were innate. This fetishization of the technological object of course only re-incorporates education
into the self-revolutionizing of capitalism perpetually attaining the goal of the consolidation of capital, the
alienation of workers, and interminable consumption.
In the face of these circumstances we have Barthes’ prescriptions, centered on the notion of a method
that baffles: a fragmentary writing and a digressive teaching. What do they achieve in the contemporary context?
In both Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes and A Lover’s Discourse Barthes submits his writing to the
vagaries of the fragmentary as a way of protecting against the unifying impulse of what he calls “the great
narrative Other.” In A Lover’s Discourse, he writes,
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every amorous episode can be, of course, endowed with a meaning: it is generated, develops, and
dies; it follows a path which it is always possible to interpret according to a causality or a finality
– even, if need be, one which can be moralized […]: this is the love story, subjugated to the great
narrative Other, to that general opinion which disparages any excessive force and wants the subject
himself to reduce the great imaginary current, the orderless, endless stream which is passing
through him, to a painful, morbid crisis of which he must be cured, which he must “get over” […]:
the love story (the “episode,” the “adventure”) is the tribute the lover must pay to the world in
order to be reconciled with it. 37

(As an aside: is teaching complicit with the domesticating tendencies of the love story? Does the very
notion of a fact, a unit of pedagogical value, give evidence of this domestication?)

Why was it you who died, when I’m the hateful one, the resigned and
contemptuous one? You, who loved the dancers in the street, you, who
simply sat with others, you, on the lakebeach with a lapful of
strawberries, you, your miracle smile, your sense of all you were leaving
behind.

Contrasted with the love story, with the horrible-yet-tidy pain our heart passes bravely like a kidney
stone, with the wound we dress in the salve of cooing platitudes in order to return to the daily business of
forgetting, there is what Barthes identifies as the soliloquizing discourse that accompanies the lover’s story
without ever knowing it. It is this discourse, this discourse beyond the reach of officious moralizing, beyond the
light of happiness, that interests Barthes. Representing it requires a certain method. He writes,

it is the very principle of this [soliloquizing] discourse (and the text which represents it) that its
figures cannot be classified: organized, hierarchized, arranged with a view to an end (a settlement):
there are no first figures, no last figures. To let it be understood that there was no question here of

37

Barthes, Roland. A Lover’s Discourse, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 7.

25

a love story (or of the history of a love), to discourage the temptation of meaning, it was necessary
to choose an absolutely insignificant order.38

An absolutely insignificant order not only confounds the great narrative Other but also produces otherwise
unimaginable affinities and associations. The insignificant order is an invitation to the reader not to decipher a
text but to introduce her desire into it, or to find it there already, perhaps for the first time. Barthes states clearly
that this enlivening of desire is the heart of the professor’s fantasy, mentioned above:

a fantasy (at any rate, what I call a fantasy): [is] a resurgence of certain desires, certain images that
lurk within you, that want to be identified by you, sometimes your whole life, and often only
assume concrete form thanks to a particular word. That word, a key signifier, is what leads from
the fantasy to its investigation. To mine the fantasy through snatches of knowledge = research.
The fantasy is thus mined like an open quarry. 39

As an experiment, or as an adventure, I am following Barthes. For the sake of adventure I am a champion
of the fragment and the excursus. Here, in a moment of writing that is also a teaching, a moment of writing that
is my quarry and yours, there is a heart of desire. It vies with a rage for order emanating from the institution that
houses my work and myself; we will let them vie.

What I want is ancient – to sing of love and death.

Through the Bars
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What follows will be synoptic, a kind of writing guided by what Lacan calls “an ideal of
straightforwardness,”40 a presentation of my reading of Lacan in order to provide a vocabulary and a context for
those unfamiliar with his work. It is to make of Lacan’s work a love story. But elsewhere, at the periphery, there
is a seductive desire haunting the grounds, some tree or voice at the horizon of the work, beyond it, where
certainly I see my destiny as a teacher and it is marked with Barthes’ words: “no longer to desire the work but
to desire one’s own language.”41
After you died I moved in to your old apartment. Your things were a
chaos of relics – your mittens, your bicycle, your spices – and your
lover scattered there as well, completely ruined.

There are dozens of texts in English that introduce Lacan’s work to the unfamiliar or bemused reader, and
there are hundreds and hundreds more that apply his insights to topics ranging from film, literature, politics,
ethics, mathematics, philosophy, feminism, religious studies, and more. There are only two books in English I
know of devoted to a consideration of Lacan’s work specifically vis-à-vis education,42 though there are several
monographs and edited collections on the relationship between education and psychoanalysis more generally. 43

40

Jacques Lacan. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anxiety, trans. A. R. Price (Malden: Polity Press,
2014), 21.
41

Roland Barthes. Criticism and Truth, trans. Katrine Pilcher Keuneman (London: Athlone Press, 1987), 94.

42

These are Jacques Lacan and Education: A Critical Introduction by Donyell L. Rosboro (Rotterdam: Sense,
2008) and Psychopedagogy: Freud, Lacan, and the Psychoanalytic Theory of Education by K. Daniel Cho (New
York: Palgrave, 2009)
There was an especially optimistic period in the early 20th century where Freud’s teaching seemed to offer so
much for the field of education. Several analysts and acolytes sought to apply Freud’s theories in already existing
educational settings or in experimental schools, not least among them Freud’ daughter Anna, whose work with
children deserves special attention for its sheer breadth. In addition to her theoretical work she established
nursery schools for children from impoverished or war-torn families where she applied psychoanalytic insights
to child-rearing and early education. A synopsis of her findings can be found in “Four Lectures on
Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents” in the first volume of The Writings of Anna Freud: Lectures for Child
Analysts and Teachers (New York: International Universities Press, 1974). Additional texts from this early
period include August Aichhorn’s Wayward Youth, first published in 1925, which was printed with an oft-cited
foreward by Freud himself (New York: Viking, 1963). Finally I will mention Siegfried Bernfeld’s compelling
and prescient Sisyphus, or, The Limits of Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). For
contemporary examples I will cite all of Deborah Britzman’s books: Practice Makes Practice (1991), Lost
Subjects, Contested Objects (1998), After-Education (2003), Novel Education (2006), The Very Thought of
Education (2009), Freud and Education (2010), and A Psychoanalyst in the Classroom (2015). No theorist has
so thoroughly and persistently argued that psychoanalysis helps teachers orient themselves in the most basic
problems of learning and knowledge. Her books also serve as excellent expositions of the work of Freud, Anna
43
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As five more of Lacan’s works have been edited, translated, and published in the last decade,44 however, the
research on his relationship to education stands to be extended, sharpened, and rejuvenated.
The problem is how to begin. I am beginning with a fantasy, a fantasy that has accreted to what Barthes
above called “a key signifier”. That signifier is the centerpiece of Lacan’s third seminar on psychosis, and it is
psychosis that will ground my initial reflections on education while simultaneously enlivening the topic that will
serve as my final reflection: the hysteric’s discourse.

*

*

*

The Ego and the Imaginary

Lacan’s analysis of psychosis begins in his third seminar, but there is a fundamental context that must
be traced out before approaching his work there. Though it is never easy to determine where to begin with Lacan,
most authors have chosen to start with his essay “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed
in Psychoanalytic Experience,”45 which serves as the grounding of Lacan’s notion of the Imaginary and of the
subject as fundamentally split, fragmented, alienated from itself. The phenomenon under question is what
Wolfgang Köhler describes as the Aha-Erlebnis, common to humans and animals (Köhler worked with birds
and primates), which involves the subject apprehending, suddenly, certain objects or patterns that then crystallize
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Desire: Authority, Seduction, Transference, and the Question of Ethics, ed. Jan Jagodzinski (Westport: Bergin
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(New York: Routledge, 2012).
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into a situation or solution to a problem. This Aha-Erlebnis is observed in humans when the subject sees himor herself in a mirror and, unlike the monkey (who eventually loses interest in the mirror), the human child
“playfully experiences the relationship between the movements made in the image and the reflected
environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it duplicates – namely, the child’s own body, and
the persons and even things around him.”46 That is, the child is fascinated not only by the image, but by how this
image bears a relationship to the world around him, to his own body especially, but additionally to any others
who may be with the child.47 In time, at around 18 months, the child identifies with the image – this foreign,
specular thing. That is, the child acknowledges that the exterior image is a substitute for or double of him/herself.
This manner of identification amounts to a transformation, a kind of ascension, which “takes place when the
subject assumes an image,”48 takes one up, for the first time, as his or her own, but the gap between the “I
function” and image is permanent. This crucial moment of identification/transformation, which Lacan insists is
specific to humans, presents us with an important split between the I and the ideal-I. The ideal-I is so called in
this context only because it will serve as the “rootstock” of secondary identifications – identifications that
typically originate in what the child internalizes as its parents’ ideals – not because it represents some fantasy of
a perfect self. This split, again, is irreparable: the subject will never be completely reconstituted but will instead
maintain a permanently ambiguous relationship between his ego and his image. Lacan concludes, “the function
of the mirror stage thus turns out, in my view, to be a particular case of the function of imagos, which is to
establish a relationship between an organism and its reality – or, as they say, between the Innenwelt and the
Umwelt,”49 and this relationship to reality is marked by a gap.
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To strengthen one’s understanding of the imaginary it is helpful to apply it to animal ethology. In “The
Mirror Stage” Lacan gives the example of the female pigeon who depends on the image of another pigeon for
the development of her gonads; also the locust, whose catastrophic sociality can be triggered simply by
encountering an image similar to itself. Elsewhere Lacan mentions the male stickleback, which can be induced
to perform his mating parade for a female presented to him in a jar, or a replica of a female stickleback, or even
a poorly made representation so long as it bears similar coloration to the female. Obviously one could multiply
these kinds of examples, but they all serve to demonstrate the influence of the imaginary in animal life in general.
I mention them here to demonstrate how the imaginary, so prevalent in animal behavior, is preserved in the
human dimension even as the human dimension is further conditioned by the symbolic. For humans, for
example, the imaginary speaks to “the question of the meaning of beauty as formative and erogenous,” 50 or,
again, provides a means of understanding the function of narcissism.

You would have wept last night to see us prowling, see us arch-backed,
circling. Some tangled and bitter curse taking root between us, your
former loves. You would have wept to see us, two frightened wildcats,
breathless, smelling blood, ecstatic claws in one another’s skin who
were once each other’s only haven. We scratch about in the corners of
the house now, silent and wounded, scars taking root at our throats.

In the early stages of development, however, when the child feels himself to be uncoordinated and
obstructed in relation to the image that, on the contrary, seems whole, his or her reality is marked by an “organic
inadequacy” that longs for an impossible reparation. The very notion of “development” as understood as a kind
of teleology of the organism is in fact, for humans, an endless stitching-together of fragments with the threads
of fantasy:
the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency to
anticipation – and, for the subject caught up in the lure of spatial identification, turns out fantasies
that proceed from a fragmented image of the body to what I will call an “orthopedic” form of its
totality – and to the finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental
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development with its rigid structure. Thus, the shattering of the Innenwelt to Umwelt circle gives
rise to an inexhaustible squaring of the ego’s audits.51

Important to note here is the universality of the experience undergone by the child. “Normal” development
consists precisely in navigating the gap between ego and imago until a more or less permanent line of approach
can be adopted, one, however, which is asymptotic to the image, giving the impression of a closer and closer
unity but harboring a permanent abyss.
Up to this point I have only been presenting Lacan’s views on the infant’s relationship to his or her own
reflection, and now I will elaborate on how this specular identification is projected onto others, which is
primarily, or at least initially, in the form of aggression (recall here the parameters of Hegel’s master/bondsman
dialect). Lacan refers consistently in his work to Saint Augustine’s observation of an “all-consuming,
uncontrollable jealousy which the small child feels for his fellow being, usually when the latter is clinging to his
mother’s breast.”52 This example is one among many others to which Lacan consistently refers regarding the
difficulty young children experience in differentiating themselves from their peers: upon hitting another child,
the perpetrator might wince or cry; upon seeing another child fall down, the observer might cry, etc. The case of
jealousy is a specific instance of aggression, one where the child not only identifies with another but, in that very
identification, sees his or her desire objectified, which is why this imaginary relation is far from being
conciliatory. Once the subject sees himself in the other, his desire is projected outside of himself, thereby
initiating a drive to reincorporate the object of desire. This murderous impulse (Lacan calls it “the unspecified
wish for the destruction of the other as such”53)

tips the whole of human knowledge into being mediated by the other’s desire, constitutes its
objects in an abstract equivalence due to competition from other people, and turns the I into an
apparatus to which every instinctual pressure constitutes a danger, even if it corresponds to a
natural maturation process.54
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Of course, this recognition of the I in the other can only ever be a mis-recognition, which is reflected in the
turbulent “formation” of the I, which is never at rest and must be content to have its social relations be mediated,
or softened, by what Lacan calls empty or fictional speech, the means by which the social relation is prevented
from becoming blankly violent.
Perhaps it is also worth repeating: the murderous impulse tips the whole of human knowledge into being
mediated by the other’s desire. Wanting means wanting a secret, some hidden truth guarded or enjoyed by the
other.
Finally, the function of the imaginary within the real constantly unsettles the subject’s relationship with
“reality” – the “shared” reality one has with other subjects. This is why Lacan insists that “the subject’s
[imaginary] capture by his situation gives us the most general formulation of madness – the kind found within
the asylum walls as well as the kind that deafens the world with its sound and fury.”55 What this means, among
other things, is that the complexities of the mirror stage never vanish in human experience, that they are only
deepened – even as they are negotiated – by speech, by sexuality, by dreams, by symptoms.

Not a week after you died I saw your ghost. I was walking with the
dog, turning north toward home and you passed me, the dog sniffing
in your direction as if out of obligation. The three of us were
completely alone on the sidewalk, covered that time of year with
yellow maple flowers, walking in the shadows cast by the falling
afternoon sun, and you were heading south and you were exactly the
way I knew you would be if you had lived to 52 – short hair still, now
with strands of gray throughout, same dancer’s gait keeping an
effortlessly rapid pace, same bee pendant around your neck, blueframed glasses, skin like smooth wet clay, alive in another universe
sharing only this brief intersection with mine.
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I have begun with this brief analysis of the mirror stage because it represents a kind of ground zero for
human experience; in many ways it is the inaugural moment of human learning since it is the initiation into a
structure that is specifically human and permanent. As a founding moment of learning, the mirror stage teaches
us that a moment of education is precipitated alongside the appearance of a gap. One might find this tritely
obvious: if there is no gap or lack or shadow in our experience then there is nothing that is obscure or hidden
and thus no need of any educative intervention to repair or fill in or illuminate. But it is precisely this experience
that is in question in this scene: one’s involvement with “reality” is always complicated by the fissure that opens
up in the mirror stage, and it is the degree to which this fissure is entrenched in human experience that makes
the very notion of education understood as an illuminating or filling-in so misleading. The fantasy of reparation
or total order is a form of madness at the most elemental level, the font of the genius and chaos of myth.
Education, and this is all I really wish to point out, is founded in a mythological belief in wholeness and order
but does not recognize its own foundation as mythological, simply because it is so deeply satisfied with the order
it produces. Alongside Barthes I am convinced that to protect education from being consumed by its own rage
for order one is obligated to stand up for one’s fragmentary, wayward position; not in order ultimately to turn
this position itself into an instance of order but to curate absences, aporia, and ambiguities whose function is to
house the desires of the others, the amateurs, the students.

Teachers, Egos.
A large part of what Lacan posits in “The Mirror Stage” is
consolidated in the “L-Schema,” which first appears in Seminar II: The
Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis. In both
seminars I and II, as the titles indicate, Lacan focuses on the problematic
notion of the ego as it was understood in the early 1950s, especially the
notion of the analyst’s ego. The analyst, according to the tenets of ego-psychology, acts as a representative of
the “good” or “healthy” ego in order to educate or heal the patient’s sick or distressed ego. At the forefront of
this conception of psychoanalysis is Freud’s daughter Anna,56 though aspects of it can be seen in Freud’s own
work, as at the end of his essay “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” where he writes:

Lacan, in Seminar I: “We should note first of all that we hear the ego spoken of as the ally of the analyst,
and not only the ally, but the sole source of knowledge. The only thing we know of is the ego, that’s the way it
is usually put. Anna Freud, Fenichel, nearly all those who have written about analysis since 1920, say it over
56
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it is reasonable to expect of an analyst, as a part of his qualifications, a considerable degree of mental
normality and correctness. In addition, he must possess some kind of superiority, so that in certain
analytic situations he can act as a model for his patient and in others as a teacher. And finally we
must not forget that the analytic situation is based on a love of truth – that is, a recognition of reality
– and that it precludes any kind of sham or deceit. 57

This is precisely the sort of perspective that motivates much of Anna Freud’s work, with its emphasis
on the teaching and rearing of children at home and in educational institutions. From Anna Freud’s perspective,
the analyst, equipped with an understanding of the instincts and sensitive to the potential damage caused by their
being forbidden and repressed, engages with the patient at the level of the patient’s reasonable ego, explaining
to the patient, for example, that his or her repression of a certain memory or desire is causing the inhibiting
symptoms. By taking up a position of superiority at the level of the ego, the analyst attempts to communicate
with the patient at the level of the ego in order to help the patient adjust to the reality that, it is assumed, is
accessible to both. This method places all the faith in the health of the analyst’s ego, achieved by a training
analysis (whose adequacy does not guarantee perfection) and in the relationship of this ego to reality, prompting
Lacan to point out that “one really ought to find out if it is the analyst’s ego which offers the measure of the
58

real.”

I will pause here for a moment to ask: is it always already the case that the teacher is presumed to occupy
a knowing position with respect to the real? What strategies does the teacher have at her disposal to baffle this
position?
I have already noted the degree to which the imaginary determines the subject’s apprehension of the
real, but also how this apprehension is characterized by its quality of being stitched together by the threads of
fantasy. This sartorial dimension of human experience makes the notion of a “healthy” ego – i.e. one whose
perspective on the real is “true” or “complete” – problematic, and Lacan will ultimately dismiss the notion as an

and over again – We speak only to the ego, we are in communication with the ego alone, everything is
channeled via the ego.” (16).
Sigmund Freud, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXIII, trans. James Strachey London: Hogarth Press, 1964), 248.
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illusion.59 Anticipating my exegesis a little bit, I will note here that Lacan does not locate the analyst at a or a’,
but at A, where, ideally, the ego disappears completely.60
The line of the imaginary relation, then, extends exclusively between a and a’ and epitomizes the
experience of the mirror stage as it shapes inter-human relations throughout life. It is a little misleading to
characterize this relation as inter-human, however, since the a’ is apprehended by the ego as an object and,
moreover, includes the world of objects. Lacan, at one point, simply calls a’ the place of the ego’s objects and a
as the subject’s form as reflected in these objects,61 which is why the vector moves from a’ to a, indicating that
the ego is constituted by this reflection, which includes the original reflection in the mirror as well as the
consequent constitutive reflections emanating from the world of objects and others as objects.
Freud himself left behind a piece of writing that illuminates the importance of these infantile
identifications for education, for the destinies of students as they aspire to become this or that. He writes,
reflecting on his and his peers’ experiences in their first years of school:
it is hard to decide whether what affected us more and was of greater importance to us was our
concern with the sciences that we were taught or with the personalities of our teachers. […] We
courted them or turned our backs on them, we imagined sympathies and antipathies in them which
probably had no existence, we studied their characters and on them we formed or misformed our
own. They called up our fiercest opposition and forced us to complete submission; we peered into
their little weaknesses, and took pride in their excellences, their knowledge, and their justice. At
bottom we felt a great affection for them if they gave us any ground for it, though I cannot tell how
many of them were aware of this. But it cannot be denied that our position in regard to them was a
quite remarkable one and one which may well have had its inconvenience for those concerned. We
were from the very first equally inclined to love and to hate them, to criticize and respect them. 62

The relationship between Lacan’s mirror stage and the experience of education is all but summarized
here by Freud:
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Most famously in the example of the talking lectern (“The Freudian Thing,” Écrits, 353).

“[The analyst] must not identify with the subject [i.e. enter into the couple a, a’], he must be dead enough
not to be caught up in the imaginary relation [a > a’].” Sem. III, 162.
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for psychoanalysis has taught us that the individual’s emotional attitudes to other people, which are
of such extreme importance to his later behavior, are already established at an unexpectedly early
age. The nature and quality of the human child’s relations to his own and the opposite sex have
already been laid down in the first six years of his life. He may afterwards develop and transform
them in certain directions, but he can no longer get rid of them. The people to whom he is in this
way fixed are his parents and his brothers and sisters. All those whom he gets to know later become
substitute figures for these first objects of his feelings. (We should perhaps add to his parents any
other people, such as nurses, who cared for him in his infancy). These substitute figures can be
classified from his point of view according as they are derived from what we call the “imagos” of
his father, his mother, his brother and sisters, and so on. His later acquaintances are thus obliged to
take over a kind of emotional heritage; they encounter sympathies and antipathies to the production
of which they themselves have contributed little. All of his later choices of friendship and love
follow upon the basis of the memory-traces left behind by these first prototypes. 63

Our earliest encounters with those around us – where need is transformed into demand and ultimately
into desire, where love and hate are born, where the defensive measures of the ego are initiated and bolstered,
where the uniquely human baptism into the symbolic occurs – are imprinted and preserved in us, persisting like
ghosts in all our subsequent encounters with others. And one of the most significant of these others, Freud points
out, is the teacher. This is the primary reason why the teacher so frequently gets entangled in a transferential
relation to the student, whether either party is aware of this or not.
This summary is only meant to highlight the importance of the image in Lacan’s description of human
development, specifically insofar as it is the stage for the fundamental misrecognition that forever characterizes
the subject as split. This misrecognition provides the condition for the identifications with others that so
profoundly cast desire as desire of the other. I will continue my elaboration of the terms of the L-Schema in the
context of Seminar III, where Lacan introduces the problem of the Other as it functions in psychosis, which will
entail a description of how it functions generally. Moreover, by following the threads of this particular seminar
we are compelled to consider the role of speech in the analytic relation and in inter-human relations generally.
Finally, this seminar marks Lacan’s earliest efforts to articulate the functions of the signifier, metaphor, and
metonymy in human experience, and provides the “elementary cell” of the graph of desire, which Lacan calls le
point de capiton.
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Perhaps you know you love someone (loved someone) when in the
charm of Saturday morning in Spring your heart empties out as you
conjure stories about the passersby that you know you’ll never tell.
Today, across the road from your house a man, deftly, even hubristically,
paints the façade of the beauty supply shop, climbing his ladder as it
quivers beneath his steps, morning sun catching the sweat on his neck
and brow, extending his roller to preposterous lengths – I look up one
moment and he’s sitting like a gargoyle scraping old paint, feet hanging
off the rooftop, another moment he rolls a coat of beige in gestures of
a zealot genuflecting. Finally he stands looking up at the window, as if
in search of his ghosts.

Working through the second half of Seminar III will bring these terms to the foreground and contextualize
my presentation of the point de capiton, but I want to note at the outset that proceeding in this manner leaves
out several important features of this seminar of which I wouldn’t want reader to be unaware. These include the
function of the imaginary in relation to the body; the place of the analyst in the analytic relation; the structure of
repression; and, given that the topic of the seminar is psychosis, the problematic nature of reality as it contends
with the workings of hallucination, delirium, paranoia, and the unconscious – what Lacan highlights as the
distinction between reality and certainty.64 Each of these different features bears on Lacan’s exposition on the
signified, signifier, metaphor, and metonymy, and it is important to me that I stress that Lacan’s teaching only
bears so much extraction before the integrity of his terms starts to erode. That is, if the literature teacher finds
Lacan’s work on metaphor or the signifier helpful in this or that aspect of her teaching, then it is also crucial to
consider the lineage of those terms and all of their analytic implications since it is these very implications that
help to justify the rethinking of the teaching position that I am trying to offer here. Psychosis, the ostensible

“Reality is not at issue [for Schreber, the psychotic]. The subject admits, by means of all the verbally expressed
explanatory detours at his disposal, that these [delusional] phenomena are of another order than the real. He is
well aware that their reality is uncertain. He even admits their unreality up to a certain point. But, contrary to the
normal subject for whom reality is always in the right place, he is certain of something, which is that what is at
issue – ranging from hallucination to interpretation – regards him. Reality isn’t at issue for him, certainty is”.
(Lacan, Seminar III, 75).
64
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primary concern of Lacan’s third seminar, may seem like a subject far outside the purview of education, yet isn’t
one of the fundamental myths of education that it teaches others the truth about the real world? What real world?
Who am I, that your dying has so ruined me?
Psychosis

Lacan’s third seminar begins with Freud’s “Psycho-Analytical Notes on an Autobiographical Account of
a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides),”65 published in 1911. Freud’s work in turn is based on the
autobiography of Dr. Daniel Paul Schreber, Senatspräsident in the Oberlandesgericht in Dresden, who suffered
two separate periods of mental illness, the second of which lasted nearly 10 years. In both instances he was
treated by a Dr. Flechsig, who becomes a significant character in Schreber’s delusional system.
At nearly 400 pages long in the first English edition it is impossible to summarize adequately the
complexity of Schreber’s illness nor include as many details as one would like. Freud’s own presentation of the
case emphasizes specifically Schreber’s relationship with God and Schreber’s belief that the redemption of the
human race depends on himself, who must allow his body to be transformed into a woman’s. The following is
an account from Dr. Weber, director of the Sonnenstein Asylum where Schreber was cared for for the majority
of his illness:
it is not to be supposed that [Schreber] wishes to be transformed into a woman; it is rather a
question of a “must” based upon the Order of Things, which there is no possibility of his evading,
much as he would personally prefer to remain in his own honourable and masculine station in life.
But neither he nor the rest of mankind can regain the life beyond except by his being transformed
into a woman (a process which may occupy many years or even decades) by means of divine
miracles. He himself, of this he is convinced, is the only object upon which divine miracles are
worked, and he is thus the most remarkable human being who has ever lived upon the earth. Every
hour and every minute for years he has experienced these miracles in his body, and he has had
them confirmed by the voices that have conversed with him. During the first years of his illness
certain of his bodily organs suffered such destructive injuries as would inevitably have led to the
death of any other man: he lived for a long time without a stomach, without intestines, almost
without lungs, with a torn esophagus, without a bladder, and with shattered ribs, he used
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sometimes to swallow a part of his own larynx with his food, etc. But divine miracles (“rays”)
always restored what had been destroyed, and therefore, as long as he remains a man, he is
altogether immortal. These alarming phenomena have ceased long ago [Dr. Weber’s report is
dated 1899], and his “femaleness” has become prominent instead. This is a matter of a process of
development which will probably require decades, if not centuries, for its completion, and it is
unlikely that anyone now living will survive to see the end of it. He has a feeling that an enormous
number of “female nerves” have already passed over into his body, and out of them a new race of
men will proceed, through a process of direct impregnation by God. Not until then, it seems, will
he be able to die a natural death, and, along with the rest of mankind, will he regain a state of bliss.
In the meantime not only the sun, but trees and birds, which are in the nature of “bemiracled
residues of former human souls,” speak to him in human accents, and miraculous things happen
everywhere around him.66

Lacan takes up several of these details in the course of the seminar, but he emphasizes one aspect of
Schreber’s work specifically, which is that the rays speak, and do so in what Schreber describes as a fundamental
language. These rays are the only medium for Schreber’s communication with God who otherwise has no way
of communicating with living men (God speaks only to the dead).67

The whole thing creaks like a ship, stress at the boards so strong they
are warm.

Lacan makes it clear at the outset of the seminar that the only method for treating psychotics is via the
symbolic – that is, via a method that supposes in advance that the delusions experienced by the psychotic are
already captured within a complex network of significations that form a complete signifying network. The
delusional on the street might see this or that – say, a red car passing, one that is perceived to be not without
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“A fundamental misunderstanding obtained, however, which has since run like a red thread through my entire
life. It is based upon the fact that, within the Order of the World, God did not really understand the living human
being and had no need to understand him, because, according to the Order of the World, He dealt only with
corpses.” (Schreber. Memoirs, 75).
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meaning, but also not with a definite meaning. The analyst, in interpreting the experience of this delusional, can
situate him or herself in one of three positions, each yielding completely different conceptions of what delusion
is:
1) the real: “we can consider the thing from the angle of an aberration of perception. Don’t
think we are currently so far removed from this. Not so long ago this was the level at
which the question was raised concerning what a madman’s rudimentary experience
was. He might just be color blind and see red as green and vice versa.”
2) the imaginary: “again, we can consider the encounter with the red car along the lines
of what happens when the robin redbreast, encountering its mate, displays the breast
that gave it its name. It has been demonstrated that its dress corresponds to the guarding
of the limit of its territory and that the encounter alone occasions a certain form of
behavior towards its adversary. Here the red has an imaginary function which,
precisely in the order of relations of understanding, can be translated into the fact that
for the subject this red will have made him see red and seemed to him to bear within it
the expressive and immediate character of hostility or anger.”
3) the symbolic: “we can understand the red car within the symbolic order, namely the
way one understands the color red in a game of cards, that is, as opposed to black, as
being a part of an already organized language.”68
The different aspects of Schreber’s illness – his body, God, the rays, the miracles, the birds and trees, etc. – are
presented to him as already significant, already with meaning, a meaning that dawns on Schreber slowly during
a period he calls “the twilight of the world,” where one (true) world is replaced by another (delusional) world, a
world that, for all its hallucinatory phenomena intruding at the margins, nevertheless bears the mark of a unifying
consistency, radiating from a single master signifier. This confusion at the level of the symbolic produces
psychosis, and in the third seminar one of Lacan’s initial tasks is to provide an illustration of the structure of
psychosis, which he does so using the L-Schema.
Did you leave us a message, a hidden letter? I thought as I saw your eyes
struggle to place yourself in that hospital – the grand rooms of the ICU
– that you were pointing at the secret with your stare, fleeting. As I stood
there, cooling your cheeks, wetting your lips, regarding you, where were
you? Your life with us a dream and me within it, feeling myself a ghost
as you look at me with horror, a shard of your passing life I was, I felt,
and we died in opposite directions.
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In Seminar II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Analysis, Lacan writes,
you only know what can happen to a reality once you have definitively reduced it to being
inscribed in a language. We only became absolutely certain that the planets do not speak once
they’d been shut up, that is to say once Newtonian theory had produced the theory of the unified
field […] which is summed up in the law of gravitation, which consists essentially in the fact that
there’s a formula which holds all this together, in an ultra-simple language consisting of three
letters. At the time, thinkers came up with all kinds of objections – this gravitation is unthinkable,
we’ve never seen the like of this action at a distance, across a void […]. Newtonian motion makes
use of time, but no one worries about the time of physics, because it doesn’t in the slightest touch
on realities – it’s a question of proper language, and the unified field cannot be considered as
anything more than a well-made language, than a syntax.
There’s no cause to worry from that quarter – everything which enters into the unified field
will never speak again, because these are realities which have been totally reduced to language.
Here I think you can clearly see the opposition between speech and language.69

This quotation is how Lacan introduces the L-Schema for the first time
in his work, and it reappears in the early stages of Seminar III as a way
of providing a structural definition of psychosis. I have already
explained the terms in the imaginary relation, so I will begin here with
S, which is the subject, but “not the subject in its totality.”70 Nor is the
subject to be confused with the ego. Elsewhere, Lacan will call S the site of the subject’s “ineffable and stupid
existence,”71 and in Seminar III he identifies the S with that about which the ego speaks, where the S equivocates
with the homonymous German Es, Freud’s term for the id. The subject is not to be thought of as the locus of
agency or will (these are trappings of the ego), nor simply as a concretion of animal instincts. Lacan’s S/Es is
not possible to conceive of outside of the context of the symbolic since it is tied to the existence of the
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unconscious, itself conditioned by the symbolic.72 The subject is always the subject of the unconscious, which
is why the vector is directed from A to S. The imaginary relation, as I have already discussed, represents “the
plane of the mirror, the symmetrical world of the egos and of the homogeneous others,”73 but there is another
point to consider in the diagram, which is at the intersection S < A and a < a’, which Lacan calls the wall of
language, beyond which is A, the true Others. Lacan writes,

when the subject talks to his fellow beings, he uses ordinary language, which holds the imaginary
egos to be things which are not simply ex-sisting, but real. Not knowing what there is in the domain
in which the concrete dialogue is held, he is dealing with a certain number of characters a’, a’’,
etc. In so far as the subject brings them into relation with his own image, those with whom he
speaks are also those with whom he identifies.
That said, we, the analysts, must not overlook our basic assumption – we think there are
subjects other than us, [we think] that authentically intersubjective relations exist. We would have
no reason to think that if we didn’t have the testimony of the characterizing feature of
intersubjectivity, that is, that the subject can lie to us. That is the decisive proof. I am not saying
that that is the sole foundation of the reality of the other subject, it is its proof. In other words, we
in fact address A1, A2, those we do not know, true Others, true subjects.74

This wall is not opaque, however, but more like burnished brass – it offers a reflection, but one seen as if through
a glass darkly. “True speech” is so called because it aims at A, but the wall of language blocks, refracts, diffuses
this speech and instead of A there is a. “I always aim at true subjects,” Lacan says, “and I have to be content
with shadows. The subject (S) is separated from the Others, the true ones, by the wall of language.”75 Speech is
never without this ambiguity between A and a: insofar as speech exists at all it is directed at the Other, A, and
yet we are always confronted with a, the objectified other, the other as image, as fragmented or scattered, the
other in whom one recognizes oneself and one’s messages which cannot be reconstituted. In a relation of ego-
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to-ego, then, there is only ordinary language shuttling about along the plane of the imaginary relation, which is
why in Seminar III Lacan claims that “the subject speaks to himself with his ego,”76 thus indicating both the
difference between a and a’ as well as their identity in the imaginary relation: je est un autre, as Rimbaud wrote.
True speech, the ideal of analysis, is possible only if the analyst is trained to be a subject in whom the ego is
virtually absent. Lacan writes,
the analysis must aim at the passage of true speech, joining the subject to an other subject, on the
other side of the wall of language. That is the final relation of the subject to a genuine Other, to
the Other who gives the answer one doesn’t expect, which defines the terminal point of analysis
[…]. The analysis consists in getting him to become conscious of his relations, not with the ego
of the analyst, but with all these Others who are his true interlocutors, whom he hasn’t recognized.
It is a matter of the subject progressively discovering which Other he is truly addressing, without
knowing it, and of him progressively assuming the relations of transference at the place where he
is, and where at first he didn’t know he was. 77

The best example of this from Lacan’s work is his reading of Plato’s Symposium, in which Socrates
interprets Alcibiades’ encomium to Socrates as nothing but a ruse or charade to express the true subject of
Alcibiades’ words: Agathon.78
One might transpose this dynamic into the literature classroom if one admits that at least some part of a
literary education can or ought to facilitate precisely this kind of communication with the true Others in the
student. Picking up the stories of Edgar Allan Poe we find the famous “The Fall of the House of Usher,” wherein
our rational narrator is called upon to aid the delirious Usher, whose languishing sister succumbs to a mysterious
disease during his visit to their weird estate. All around Usher, before and after his sister’s death, he finds his
sense of reality shifting beneath him, and the puzzled narrator can do no more than worry about his friend’s
sanity. The narrator accompanies Usher in the burial of his sister, whose delayed entombment is a result of
Usher’s fear/hope that she may still recover from the baffling illness. In addition to serving as the guarantor of
the real, the narrator frequently joins Usher in reading scores of fantastic books, and is therefore situated in a
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similar position as the professor of literature, whose sanity/knowledge in the matter of reality goes unquestioned
(especially in relation to the more wild or unstable experience of Usher, the student), and whose chief role is
that of reader/interlocutor. Understandably, the death of Usher’s sister does nothing to alleviate his pain and
confusion, which erupts one dark and stormy night when Usher’s raving produces hallucinations so vivid that
the narrator is compelled to sedate Usher by – what else? – reading to him.
The antique volume which I had taken up was the “Mad Trist” of Sir Launcelot Canning; but I had called
it a favorite of Usher’s more in sad jest than in earnest; for, in truth, there is little in its uncouth and
unimaginative prolixity which could have had interest for the lofty and spiritual ideality of my friend. It
was, however, the only book immediately at hand; and I indulged a vague hope that the excitement which
now agitated the hypochondriac, might find relief (for the history of mental disorder is full of similar
anomalies) even in the extremeness of the folly which I should read. Could I have judged, indeed, by the
wild overstrained air of vivacity with which he hearkened, or apparently hearkened, to the words of the
tale, I might well have congratulated myself upon the success of my design. 79

The reading of the romance, whose literary “quality” is rather low, succeeds in entrancing Usher while
simultaneously unlocking the darkest secret of the house. What I am suggesting here is that the narrator, by
taking up the voice of the romance, gradually recedes from the scene with Usher; the words of the story act as a
screen or disfiguring haze that ultimately produces a space wherein Usher’s hidden truths can surface. The
narrator reads:
“and Ethelred, who was by nature of a doughty heart, and who was now mighty withal, on account of the
powerfulness of the wine which he had drunken, waited no longer to hold parley with the hermit, who, in
sooth, was of an obstinate an maliceful turn, but, feeling the rain upon his shoulders, and fearing the rising
of the tempest, uplifted his mace outright, and, with blows, made quickly room in the plankings of the
door for his gauntleted hand; and now pulling therewith sturdily, he so cracked, and ripped, and tore all
asunder, that the noise of the dry hollow-sounding wood alarumed and reverberated throughout the
forest.”80
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And the reading of these words produces an actual echo in reality:
at the termination of this [last] sentence I started and, for a moment, paused; for it appeared to me
(although I at once concluded that my excited fancy had deceived me) – it appeared to me that, from some
very remote portion of the mansion, there came, indistinctly to my ears, what might have been, in its exact
similarity of character, the echo (but a stifled and dull one certainly) of the very cracking and ripping
sound which Sir Launcelot had so particularly described. 81

And within the hermitage, once Ethelred destroys the door, we do not find the maliceful hermit but
rather a dragon sitting upon a hoard of treasure and whose distinguishing features are his tongue and his breath,
whose voice is so horrid that Ethelred is forced to “close his ears with his hands against the dreadful noise of it,
the like whereof was never before heard.”82 And once more the story is mirrored in reality:

here again I paused abruptly, and now with a feeling of wild amazement – for there could be no doubt
whatever that, in this instance, I did actually hear (although from what direction it proceeded I found it
impossible to say) a low and apparently distant, but harsh, protracted, and most unusual screaming or
grating sound – the exact counterpart of what my fancy had already conjured up for the dragon’s unnatural
shriek as described by the romancer.83

And of course as Ethelred proceeds to mutilate and destroy the dragon the sounds in the mansion
continue to echo exactly the violent sounds of the romance until the climax of the story is likewise made manifest
within the mansion itself. Our narrator, observing Usher, writes,
his eyes were bent fixedly before him, and throughout his whole countenance there reigned a stony
rigidity. But, as I placed my hand upon his shoulder, there came a strong shudder over his whole person;

81

Ibid.

82

Ibid.

83

Ibid. 244.

45

a sickly smile quivered about his lips; and I saw that he spoke in a low, hurried, and gibbering murmur,
as if unconscious of my presence.84

Precisely as in the analytic scene, Usher has become totally unaware of the presence of his friend in this
scene, apparently in complete communion with the events astir within the mansion. Finally, Usher speaks,
“Not hear it? – yes, I hear it, and have heard it. Long – long – long – many minutes, many hours, many
days, have I heard it – yet dared not – oh, pity me, miserable wretch that I am! – I dared not – I dared not
speak! We have put her living in the tomb!”85

And finally speaking these words to his friend pushes the moment to its crisis in a fatal confrontation
with a hideous truth,
as if in the superhuman energy of his utterance there had been found the potency of a spell, the huge
antique panels to which the speaker pointed threw slowly back, upon the instant, their ponderous and
ebony jaws. It was the work of the rushing gust – but then without those doors there did stand the lofty
and enshrouded figure of the lady Madeline of Usher. 86

The romance is a means by which the narrator, wittingly or otherwise, manages, as Lacan says of the
analyst, to make himself “dead” enough for Usher’s truth to emerge, embodied in the form of his revenant sister.
If we imagine the narrator – the rational, “normal” actor in the story, the one who throughout the tale keeps the
fantasies and romances at the level of objects of critical/aesthetic investigation (whereas as Usher takes them to
be portals to arcane corners of a sur-reality) – as the teacher, and Usher as the student, we can see that the literary
object can mortify the teacher while allowing the students’ truths to stir, provided that the literature at hand has
some sort of associative resonance for the students. I am not saying that the literature in any given course ought
to have this effect on the students, but I am saying that Poe’s story provides an example of how the pedagogic
and analytic scene can be structurally identical, and that no one can be certain in advance that a given piece of
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literature will not awaken unconscious elements in the students and the teacher. Often literature does prompt
this awakening, which I believe is one of its most important functions, and the purpose of my analysis here is to
give some indication of how psychoanalysis enables teachers to acknowledge these perturbations, but also to
indicate how literature already functions as a catalyst of free association, thereby already placing the teacher and
students on the stage of the unconscious.
Are there ghosts, though? Does a baleful secret emerge from some ancient corner of the students’ pasts
and erupt with the force of genuine trauma? Obviously it is possible. Lacan comments often on those somewhat
paradoxical occasions when an analysis actually precipitates psychosis, and it is a common enough occurrence
for teachers to witness a student’s emotional or psychic turmoil when confronted for the first time with some
emblem of knowledge that for whatever reason threatens to overwhelm the balance in the student’s world. A
character in a novel, for example, can provide a potent object for imaginary identification, which in turn can
completely reconfigure one’s desires and one’s relationship to the world, sometimes with terrible
consequences.87 The capacity for literature to destroy one’s sense of reality is in some ways at the very
foundation of the novel as we know it, given that this capacity forms the subject of Don Quixote, the first modern
novel. The L-schema and its implications help us distinguish, at the structural level, the difference between the
psychotic and the “normal” subject, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, for example. Lacan writes:
in the normal subject, speaking to oneself with one’s ego can never be made fully explicit. One’s
relationship to the ego is fundamentally ambiguous, one’s assumption of the ego always revocable.
In the psychotic subject on the other hand, certain elementary phenomena, and in particular
hallucinations, which are their most characteristic form, show us the subject completely identified
either with his ego, with which he speaks, or with the ego assumed entirely along instrumental
lines. It’s he who speaks of him, the subject, the S, in the two equivocal senses of the term, the
initial S and the German Es. The moment the hallucination appears in the real, that is, accompanied
by the sense of reality, which is the elementary phenomenon’s basic feature, the subject literally
speaks with his ego, and it’s as if a third party, his lining, were speaking and commentating on his
activity.88
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That is, the paranoia characteristic of psychotics stems from the sense of reality accompanying the voice of the
ego as if there were another party there, speaking, accusing, criticizing, threatening, commanding, etc. In the
case of Schreber it is the persecutory birds and rays that oppress him, and in the case of the man of La Mancha
is the Code of the knight errant or the omnipresent voice of the beautiful Dulcinea directing the knight to perform
this or that deed. Of course, as Lacan emphasizes throughout the seminar, hearing voices in one’s head is
something more or less universal in human beings, but it is the accompanying sense of reality that polarizes the
experience of the psychotic.

Why speech?
I can’t go much further in this direction without stopping to discuss in some detail the importance of
speech as Lacan sees it in his work up to Seminar III. In “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in
Psychoanalysis,” a paper delivered two years prior to Seminar III, Lacan writes:
whether it wishes to be an agent of healing, training, or sounding the depths, psychoanalysis has
but one medium: the patient’s speech. The obviousness of this fact is no excuse for ignoring it.
Now all speech calls for a response.
I will show that there is no speech without a response, even if speech meets only with
silence, provided it has an auditor, and this is the heart of its function in psychoanalysis.
But if the psychoanalyst is not aware that this is how speech functions, he will experience
its call all the more strongly; and if emptiness is the first thing to make itself heard in analysis, he
will feel it in himself and he will seek a reality beyond speech to fill the emptiness.
This leads the analyst to analyze the subject’s behavior in order to find in it what the
subject is not saying. Yet for him to get the subject to admit to the latter, he obviously has to talk
about it. He thus speaks now, but his speech has become suspicious because it is merely a response
to the failure of his silence, when faced with the perceived echo of his own nothingness. 89
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The emptiness Lacan describes here is an emptiness characteristic of the speech shuttling from ego to ego in the
imaginary relation. Empty speech is a mode of defense for the analysand, avowed or not, regarding whatever
thoughts or experiences have landed the analysand in analysis in the first place. At this point the analyst can seek
in the subject’s story to fill in this or that detail about his or her past, her thoughts about her job or relationship,
et cetera. That is, the analyst might choose to prioritize an unspoken reality – a choreography of events in the
real that are the foundation of the analysand’s neurosis. The analyst, that is, may assume that the speech of the
analysand is simply a medium of communication about a scene beyond it, waiting to be discovered by the
analyst’s perspicacity. Or, confronted with empty speech, the analyst may choose to disregard it entirely and
instead point out to the analysand her fidgeting, her way of distractedly touching objects in the room, how she
arrived, her posture or composure, details of her comportment – all ways of asking the analysand: “what are you
really trying to say?” As Lacan points out, this strategy obviously elicits a response in the analysand, but it
simultaneously spoils her speech, which gropes just as blindly as before but now self-consciously, suspiciously.
This sudden awareness of the inadequacy of her speech imputed to her by the analyst’s apparent
dismissal of it gives rise to a certain frustration in the analysand, which of course can cause an analysis to stall
out. But this frustration is only an amplified version of a deeper frustration that is embedded in the analysand’s
speech; a frustration anchored in the emptiness there, “a frustration that is inherent in the subject’s very
discourse.”90 As the analysand speaks and speaks about herself, perhaps seeking some unifying thread or
revelatory secret, what becomes apparent instead is the fragmentary, dissociated, and contradictory character of
her egoic trappings. Lacan writes,
doesn’t the subject become involved here in an ever greater dispossession of himself as a being,
concerning which – by dint of sincere portraits which leave the idea of his being no less incoherent,
of rectifications that do not succeed in isolating its essence, of stays and defenses that do not prevent
his statue from tottering, of narcissistic embraces that become like a puff of air animating it – he
ends up recognizing that this being has never been anything more than his own construction in the
imaginary and that this construction undercuts all certainty for him? 91

In an effort to circumscribe and isolate some essence of her being through her speech, the analysand instead
encounters the emptiness separating her from her objects, in which she has never had any other choice than to
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find herself reflected. This, again, is illustrated in the a < a’ vector in the L-Schema, where the certainty of the
self that assumes the imago is permanently incomplete. The analysand becomes frustrated precisely because the
attempts at unifying the sense of being cannot succeed, “for in the work he does to reconstruct [his being] for
another [i.e. the analyst], [the analysand] encounters anew the fundamental alienation that made him construct
it like another, and that has always destined it to be taken away from him by another.”92 This last component of
the crisis – having one’s being taken by another – reminds us that even at the most perfect extremes of imaginary
identification, one will only have one’s being recognized as that of the other. The ego, as a mosaic of imaginary
identifications, “is frustration in its very essence”93 because it orients being in a direction that can only ever
achieve recognition of the jouissance of the other, those objects upon which one’s ego identifications take shape.
Thus an analysis based on an improvement of the ego, using the analyst’s ego as a model, can never be successful
since it is only another imaginary identification to add to the lineage of the analysand. There is no adequate
response to the speech of the analysand at the level of the ego, since it will only ally the analyst with the battery
of imaginary identifications that have already proved insufficient for the analysand: “the subject regards as
contemptuous any speech that buys into his mistake.”94 Above all, the analyst must resist renewing the
analysand’s sense of alienation by offering up a trove of identifications, which is precisely why an analysand
will never succeed in getting her analyst to declare, yes or no, that she should get married, take a new job,
incorporate a new routine, or whatever else in the real the subject hopes harbors the secret to relieving her distress
or anxiety. “The analyst’s art must, on the contrary, involve suspending the subject’s certainties until their final
mirages have been consumed. And it is in the subject’s discourse that their dissolution must be punctuated.”95
That is, neither in the imaginary nor the real, but in the symbolic.
Even when the speech is empty, as it often is, it is nevertheless the only means by which the subject can
succeed in having its meaning crystallize, if the analyst knows how to punctuate it. The truth for the analysand
is nowhere than in her speech, and it is the analyst who must occupy the place of A in order for the subject to
receive the message from the unconscious.

I don’t know how
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There is no shortage of tips available to teachers who are struggling to communicate this or that about
literature to students, and likewise there is no shortage of resources available to students whose purpose is to
masticate their literature for them. The abundance of these tips and resources are a symptom, I say, of a fear of
literature – a fear of what it might make us feel or say, a fear of how it might intimidate or overwhelm us, or a
fear of how it might evade the copious synopses that are expected of the professor. That is, there is something
about the place literature occupies that threatens to evade us – student or teacher – and leave us confronting a
certain emptiness, a hollow whose threshold our personae and our imaginary identifications cannot cross.
Literature, for all its élan and provocation and vivacity, simultaneously maintains its morbid aspect, its
unresponsive or frustrating aspect, all the elements that, for example, Socrates inveighs against to the young
Phaedrus.96
As I write this some impulse drives me from the desk and I return with a copy of Anne Carson’s
translations of Sappho’s fragments and turning to a page at random I read:
But to go there
]much
talks[

Not easy for us
to equal goddesses in lovely form
]

]
]desire

96

Writing, which I am here using synonymously with literature, is for Socrates petrified, always signifying the
same thing and dead to any form of interrogation (Phaedrus, 275c-e), not unlike the figure of the “dummy”
that the analyst mimes.
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and [

]Aphrodite

]nectar poured from
gold
]with hands of Persuasion

]
]
]

]into the Geraistion
]beloveds
]of none

]into desire I shall come.97

Imagine again the analytic scene as a model for teaching literature. This poem in many ways resembles
the dream – its omissions, its texture, its space. What voice or whose pen can fill the silences and what within
this empty poem is there to be expressed? Carson, as translator, fantasizes about the possibility of disappearing
entirely within the light of Sappho’s words, made luminous in a new language as if by their own force. The
analyst does the same with the words of the analysand, and why not the teacher with the text or the student? Is
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Sappho’s poem as it is preserved here so different from the speech of the psychotic? And for the student
encountering this text in the classroom, what it is but a sort of Rorschach test with words, designed to catalyze
the students’ associations and free them to speak? This particular text has become so mutilated – censored, in a
way – that it mimics the uncanny and fitful aspects of the dream, which itself defies the logics of time, grammar,
and syntax. We are left with the radiance of the signifiers themselves, isolated but grasping, scanning constantly
for other signifiers. Much of Lacan’s teaching stems from this relationship between signifiers and the dream
elements as articulated by Freud. Lacan writes,
“transposition” – which Freud shows to be the general precondition for the functioning of the
dream – is what I designated earlier, with Saussure, as the sliding of the signified under the signifier,
which is always happening (unconsciously, let us note) in discourse.
Verdichtung, “condensation,” is the superimposed structure of signifiers in which metaphor
finds its field; its name, condensing in itself the word Dichtung, [poetry] shows the mechanism’s
connaturality with poetry, to the extent that it envelops poetry’s own properly traditional function.
Verschiebung or “displacement” – this transfer of signification that metonymy displays is closer
to the German term; it is presented, right from its first appearance in Freud’s work, as the unconscious’
best means by which to foil censorship.98

Carson’s translation here gives us an exaggerated example of how the poem resembles the dream: gaps
in the text indicating ways in which the messages are censored, remaining fragments of signifiers generating as
if on their own trails of associations that thread themselves through fissures in the blocks, the entire translation
representing a secondary elaboration of Sappho’s original words, themselves nowhere to be found.

[I see you often in the faces of strangers, people passing by who cannot
know you are revived in them. I let them pass. Even when I have
nothing more to say I continue to write to you, hoping that something
is preserved, that in this universe of writing something emerges from
the shores and breathes. Sentences are like offerings, Whitney – the only
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things I have to give to you anymore. I drop them like seeds, but am I
walking through the wastes?]

But what more can we say about speech in relation to A? Returning to Seminar III, we encounter one of
Lacan’s famous aphorisms: “the subject receives his message from the other in an inverted form.” 99 There are
two modes in which the validity of this claim is made apparent: first, what Lacan calls fides, “speech that gives
itself, the You are my woman or the You are my master, which means – You are what is still within my speech,
and this I can only affirm by speaking in your place. This comes from you to find the certainty of what I pledge.
This speech commits you. The unity of speech insofar as it founds the position of the two subjects is made
apparent here.”100 That is, by declaring about the other that it is this or that, the subject receives another message
that arrives as if from that other, supplying the correlate. You are my master can be heard as I am your slave.
Subjective positions are therefore founded for both subjects via the speech of only one, the other standing in the
position, in this case, of object.
Second, this mode can itself be inverted: “the sign by which the subject-to-subject relation is recognized,
and which distinguishes it from the subject-to-object relationship, is the feint, the reverse of fides. You are in the
presence of a subject insofar as what he says and does – they’re the same thing – can be supposed to have been
said and done to deceive you.”101 The feint, or the element of deception, is always present in the symbolic; it is
the possibility of speaking or acting with intent to deceive that the signifier rises to its status beyond the sign.
The inverted message, in this second case, comes from the second subject, who sends it in its deceptive form.
In terms of the L-Schema, both forms of speech can be
understood to occur between a and a’, where the ego and the other
address one another with an eye toward sustaining this or that aspect
of their ego, and yet as with all speech there is always an excess that
cannot be accounted for in speech. The other is addressed as other, and
yet regardless of his or her response there is always a beyond in her
speech, a beyond that is made apparent precisely in the address that is supposed to capture it. A is the place of

99

Lacan, Sem. III, 36.

100

Ibid. 37.

101

Ibid.

54

this beyond in the L-Schema, the Other as absolute, “that is to say that he is recognized but that he isn’t
known.”102 Later in Seminar III Lacan describes this Other as “the one we address ourselves to beyond this
counterpart [i.e. a’], the one we are forced to admit beyond the relation of mirage, the one who accepts or is
refused opposite us, the one who will on occasion deceive us, the one of whom we will never know whether he
is deceiving us, the one to whom we always address ourselves.”103 The gap between A and a represents the
grounds upon which delusion is possible. Lacan writes:
this distinction between the Other with a big O, that is, the Other in so far as it’s not known, and
the other with a small o, that is, the other who is me, the source of all knowledge, is fundamental.
It’s in this gap, it’s in the angle opened up between these two relations, that the entire dialectic of
delusion has to be situated. The question is this – firstly, is the subject talking to you? – secondly,
what is he talking about?104

Lacan considers these questions using the following example – a case of a paranoid woman in whom
one can see the place of the A, the function of speech, and the notion of reality coalesce in a single phrase, one
that has become an emblem of Lacan’s thought: “I’ve just been to the butcher’s.” Before relating the story upon
which this phrase serves as a crown, Lacan describes how the patient had contrived to stall the analysis; first by
making it a point to be completely open on any topic while at the same time “not allowing the doctor any room
for the wrong interpretation, of which she was certain in advance.”105 Lacan goes on:
all the same she confided to me that one day, as she was leaving her home, she had a run-in in the
hallway with an ill-mannered sort of chap, which came as no surprise to her, since this shameful
married man was the steady lover of one of her neighbors, someone of loose morals.
On passing her – she could not hide this from me, it still weighed upon her chest – he had
said a dirty word to her, a dirty word that she was disinclined to repeat to me because, as she put
it, it devalued her. Nevertheless, a certain gentleness that I had put into approaching her meant
that after five minutes of chat we were on good terms with one another, and on that subject she
confessed to me with a conceding laugh that she was not completely innocent in this matter for

102

Ibid. 38.

103

Ibid. 252.

104

Ibid. 40.

105

Ibid. 48.

55

she herself had said something in passing. This something, which she confessed to me more easily
than what she had heard, was this – I’ve just been to the butcher’s.106

The details of this case add considerable complexity to the situation: the man is married to a former friend
of the woman’s. After the marriage the two women’s relationship disintegrated, not least because of the man’s
violent distaste for his wife’s friend, who intruded on the newly-wed couple regularly until the point when the
husband, perhaps with his wife’s blessing, threw her out of the apartment, making it known that she was not
welcome. This whole ordeal precipitates the woman’s paranoia, and ultimately she ends up in analysis with
Lacan. She tells him the story of I’ve just been to the butcher’s, and Lacan hazards a little guess about the hidden
word: it has some reference to pork.
But here he pauses. Here he emphasizes the importance of not understanding. That is, do not assume too
hastily that you understand the speech of the patient, even though something is clearly there to be understood.
The patient baits Lacan with a withheld word, an allusion to the pork butcher; the point, though, is not to discover
this word but to discover the reason for its allusive form. “If I understand,” claims Lacan, “I continue, I don’t
dwell on it, since I’ve already understood. This brings out what it is to enter into the patient’s game – it is to
collaborate in his resistance. The patient’s resistance is always your own.”107 So the question is: why did she say
I’ve just been to the butcher’s instead of calling the man a pig? And what was the degrading word that incited
her response? The word is sow. She claims the man called her that. “Sow, what is that?” Lacan asks. “It is
effectively her message, but is it not rather her message to herself?”108 Why can’t she grasp this message?
This is the problem of delusion and of hallucination: speech is heard in reality as if it were coming from
somewhere or someone other than the subject who hears it. From this elsewhere, the subject cannot understand
the message, and certainly cannot understand it as coming from herself. In her speech she is appealing for
recognition, for the recognition one obtains by means of the You are my master. This recognition depends on
the place of the Other, the place from which recognition may come. She appeals to the other, the gentleman in
the hallway, for recognition, but he is only a puppet for a voice that is beyond him, “she receives her own speech
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from him, but not inverted, her own speech is in the other who is herself, the little other, her reflection in the
mirror, her counterpart. Sow! gives tit for tat, and one no longer knows whether the tit or tat comes first.”109
In terms of the L-Schema, Lacan summarizes the scene as follows:
the small a is the gentleman she encounters in the corridor and there is no big A. It’s small a’
who says, I’ve just been to the butcher’s. And who is I’ve just been to the butcher’s said of?
Of S. Small a said Sow! to her. The person who is speaking to us, and who spoke qua
delusional, a’, undoubtedly receives somewhere her own message in an inverted form from
the small other, and what she says affects the beyond which she herself is as subject and which,
by definition, simply because she is a human subject, she can only speak of by allusion. 110

It is the absence, or the exclusion, of the A that characterizes the woman as paranoiac or even psychotic. The
allusion she is making is to herself, yet it is so perfectly allusive that she cannot recognize herself in the message,
she doesn’t know she is speaking to herself. Lacan untangles the allusion like this:
What does she say? She says – I’ve just been to the butcher’s. Now, who has just been to the
butcher’s? A quartered pig. She does not know that she is saying this, but she says it
nevertheless. That other to whom she is speaking, she says to him about herself – I, the sow,
have just been to the butcher’s, I am already disjointed, a fragmented body, membra disjecta,
delusional, and my world is fragmenting, like me. That’s what she’s saying.111

In her speech, always directed toward an other, or toward the Other, the subject is looking for herself as
subject. The difficulty for the analyst is in contriving a way for the subject to become aware of this search without
ever making it a matter of self-observation for the subject. Lacan summarizes the situation as follows:
it is not about him [i.e. the subject] that you must speak to him, for he can do this well enough
himself, and in doing so, it is not even to you that he speaks. While it is to him that you must
speak, it is literally about something else – that is, about some-thing other than what is at stake
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when he speaks of himself – which is the thing that speaks to you. Regardless of what he says,
this thing will remain forever inaccessible to him if, being speech addressed to you, it cannot
elicit its response in you, and if, having heard its message in this inverted form, you cannot, in
re-turning it to him, give him the twofold satisfaction of having recognized it and of making
him recognize his truth.112

That is, the only message that can reach the subject is his or her own, received from the analyst, who
must discover it beneath or within the stream of speech that constitutes an analysis.
And when the student speaks? Literature can give the student an opportunity to speak as a student, as
someone attempting to commune with knowledge as it circulates in the university – and it can also give the
student the opportunity to speak to the Other who is not embodied in the teacher’s expectations but rather which
serves, as the Other always does for Lacan, as the locus of truth. One can hardly be expected to speak in this
way in the classroom, where the overbearing social and academic conventions do everything to prevent this
manner of speech. Any enterprising teacher can imagine ways to circumvent these obstacles, but the primary
point is that the teacher must (should? Ought to?) know how to receive this speech. Or better, how to position
herself such that the students’ speech that is directed at their truth is possible at all.
I return briefly to Kafka’s comment: we need books that affect us like a disaster, like the death of
someone we loved more than ourselves – we need books that affect us like a suicide. Kafka is both averring that
books can grieve us this deeply, and that we need such books. The debate here is not one I want to address in
any detail but only mention: literature can sadden, it can provoke, it can seduce, it can set light to many things
that people and students already bring with them before reading and can result in panic, violence, injustice,
uncivility, or chaos. There are stakes involved when one chooses to teach this and not that, and there is a
difference between knowledge and truth. To the extent that university education is frequently the last period of
time in a person’s life when his or her thoughts and opinions will be deliberately challenged, developed, or
transformed, it performs an important social function that of course can have consequences at the individual and
political levels. The university discourse has become structurally identical to the master’s discourse, and the
function of the university has primarily – not entirely – become the production of workers whose destiny is to
produce for a master whose sole desire is the maintenance of the status quo. One is either content with this, or
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not. Not to be content with it means disrupting, reorienting, or in some other way baffling the university
discourse, and my effort here is simply to provide an example of this baffling.

[As all this fades, where does it go? Swirling in the ancient air to settle
silently in some corner of my life’s past – an old dream houses a
fragment of your voice, a summer afternoon from years gone by harbors
a shred of your laugh, your birthday passes again and again and each
year a gauzy page is laid over all my pictures of you. Obscuring.
Obscuring. Death surrounds me like a dark forest, leaves breathing
silently – I let it grow. Spread. That’s why it is here and why you are here
in my words.]

Returning to Schreber’s case, we can now see that the emphasis on speech helps clarify the structure of
Schreber’s delusions, which include several speaking entities (rays, trees, birds). There is the example of the
“miracled birds,” about which Freud writes,
it is [Schreber’s] belief that [the talking birds] are composed of former “fore-courts of Heaven”,
that is, of human souls which have entered into a state of bliss, and that they have been loaded
with ptomaine poison and set on to him. They have been brought to the condition of repeating
“meaningless phrases which they have learnt by heart” and which have been “dinned into them”.
Each time that they have discharged their load of ptomaine poison on to him – that is, each time
that they have “reeled off the phrases which have been dinned into them, as it were” – they become
to some extent absorbed into his soul, with the words “The deuce of a fellow!” or “Deuce take it!”
which are the only words they are still capable of using to express genuine feeling. They cannot
understand the meaning of the words they speak, but they are by nature susceptible to similarity
of sounds.113

Moreover, Schreber himself is compelled to proffer strange words or formulations (such as “nervecontact,” “fleeting-improvised-men,” “tying-to-heavenly-bodies,” “soul murder,” etc.) to describe what is
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happening to him or being told to him. Lacan writes, “when [Schreber] speaks to us for example of
Nervenanhang, nerve-contact, he makes it quite clear that this word was spoken to him by the tested souls of the
divine rays. These are key words, and he himself notes that he would never have found the formula for them.”114
In one sense, then, the delusion occurs materially at the level of the signifier, at the level of the peculiarity of the
words Schreber must use to describe his experience; i.e. his delusion appears as neologism. These terms of
course do not refer to any specific thing in the world, but rather to a meaning (as is the case in any language
system: meaning always refers to another meaning). And at the level of meaning, Schreber’s delusion is
characterized by the fact that “the meaning of his words can’t be exhausted by reference to another meaning
[…]. The meaning of these words that pull you up has the property of referring essentially to meaning as such.
It’s a meaning that essentially refers to nothing but itself, that remains irreducible.”115
This aspect of Schreber’s discourse – the reference to meaning as such – can be located at two poles,
points which Lacan calls the refrain and the solution. The former includes the phenomena of the birds, whose
repetitions accrue to the point of completely erasing any initial meaning. The latter includes the phenomena of
Schreber’s spontaneously completed sentences, whose force seems to come from without and present him with
some insight far in excess of the possible meaning of the phrases. But it also includes the phrases most directly
related to the development of Schreber’s psychosis, especially the decisive thought: “it really must be rather
pleasant to be a woman succumbing to intercourse,” about which Schreber writes, “I would have rejected [this
thought] with indignation if fully awake […] I cannot exclude the possibility that some external influences were
at work to implant this idea in me.”116 “These two forms [i.e. the solution and the refrain],” says Lacan, “the
fullest and the emptiest, bring meaning to a halt, it’s like lead in the net, in the network, of the subject’s
discourse.”117 The career of meaning stops, circles itself.
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Finally there are the interrupted sentences that visit Schreber, an effect of what he calls compulsive
thinking, though the sense is really compulsory thinking since the questions Schreber must answer are spoken
into his nerves such that they “cannot possibly escape the impulse to think.”118 In a footnote he writes,
the souls were in the habit – even before the conditions contrary to the Order of the World had
started – of giving their thoughts (when communicating with one another) grammatically
incomplete expression; that is to say they omitted certain words which were not essential for the
sense. In the course of time this habit degenerated into an abominable abuse of me, because a
human being’s nerves of mind (his “foundation” as the expression goes in the basic language)
were excited continuously by such interrupted phrases, because they automatically try to find the
word that is missing to make up the sense. For instance as one of innumerable examples, I have
for years heard hundreds and hundreds of times each day the question: “Why do you not say it?”,
the word “aloud” necessary to complete the sense being omitted, and the rays giving the answer
themselves as if it came from me: “Because I am stupid perhaps.” 119

Later, Schreber elaborates,
the system of not-finishing-a-sentence became more and more prevalent in the course of years,
the more the souls lacked own thoughts. In particular, for years single conjunctions or adverbs
have been spoken into my nerves thousands of times; these ought only to introduce clauses, but it
is left to my nerves to complete them in a manner satisfactory to a thinking mind […]; as for
instance
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

“Now I shall”,
“You were to”,
“I shall”,
“It will be”,
“This of course was”,
“Lacking now is”,
etc. In order to give the reader some idea of the original meaning of these incomplete phrases I
will add the way they used to be completed, but are now omitted and left to be completed by my
nerves. The phrases ought to have been:

1.
2.
3.

Now I shall resign myself to being stupid;
You were to be represented as denying God, as given to voluptuousness, etc.;
I shall have to think about that first;
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4.
5.
6.

It will be done now, the joint of pork;
This of course was too much from the soul’s point of view;
Lacking now is only the leading idea, that is – we, the rays, have no thoughts.120

The sentences as wholes indicate something of Schreber’s relation to the signifier, but Lacan is more interested
in where the sentences are broken off than what they signify in sum. “In an interrupted sentence,” says Lacan,
“meaning is present in two ways – as anticipated on the one hand, since it’s a question of its suspension, and as
repeated on the other, since [Schreber] invariably refers it to an impression of having already heard it.”121 The
voices bearing these sentences, which Schreber refers to as rays of God, also exhibit a kind of temporal
elongating, a delay in the relay of words as though the distance of transmission is increasing, which Schreber
interprets as the withdrawal of God.122 The sentences are almost invariably peculiar; Lacan isolates one in
particular: “All nonsense cancels itself out.”123
All nonsense cancels itself out as nonsense. By listening to Schreber’s language as it unfolds and develops
over time a history of his discourse materializes. Years pass and the sentences develop a signifying consistency,
ceasing to be nonsense. The same phenomenon is true in “ordinary” language, especially in the case of adages
or that variety of speech known precisely as a “saying.” In fact it is this signifying consistency – this accrual of
sympathetic utterances – that produces generic distinctions between varieties of discourse: academic, legal,
pedagogical, medical, etc.. So much so that inhabiting these different regions of discourse becomes almost solely
a question of locutionary style, so profoundly has the language of these discourses been reified and internalized.
Schreber’s speech, as nonsensical, is precious for exactly that reason, that it is a language whose underlying
unifying code is not the real. Lacan returns again and again to Schreber’s “nonsense” as a way not only of
legitimizing Schreber’s speech as significant but also criticizing the notion that common language is “modeled
on a simple and direct apprehension of the real.”124 Lacan insists
language operates within ambiguity, and most of the time you know absolutely nothing about what
you are saying. In your most ordinary conversations language has a purely fictional character, you
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give the other the feeling that you are always there, that is to say, that you are capable of producing
the correct response, which bears no relation to anything whatsoever that is susceptible of being
pursued any further. Nine-tenths of discourses that have effectively taken place are completely
fictional in this respect.125

Schreber’s delusion is his language, the force of it, the manner in which it presses upon him as though spoken
by another, though it is only a variety of the delusional aspect inherent in all language. The corporeality of
Schreber’s imagery in describing the congress with his interlocutor evinces their intimacy: God speaks with
Schreber through nerves and through rays that penetrate him entirely, an internal discourse that Schreber cannot
ignore, which, again, is what characterizes him as psychotic. After all, Lacan notes, the only difference between
the normal and psychotic subject is that
the normal subject is essentially someone who is placed in the position of not taking the greater
part of his internal discourse seriously. The principle difference between you and the insane is
perhaps nothing other than this. And this is why for many, even without their acknowledging it,
the insane embody what we would be led to if we began to take things seriously. 126

This returns us to the question of the ego, the myths surrounding its “healthy” and “unhealthy” aspects. Schreber,
whose description of his illness is so lucid, who so clearly recognizes what is happening to him as abnormal and
outrageous, has obviously kept the “healthy” portion of his ego intact but this provides him nothing in the way
of relief from his delusions. The psychiatric – not psychoanalytic – discourse seeks to leverage a healthy ego
against an ill one, whereas “psychoanalysis endorses the psychotic’s delusion because it legitimates it in the
same sphere as the one in which analytic experience normally operates and because it rediscovers in [the
psychotic’s] discourse what it usually discovers in the discourse of the unconscious […]. This discourse, which
has emerged in the ego, shows itself…to be irreducible, unmanageable, incurable.”127 Lacan calls the psychotic
a “martyr of the unconscious,” since his or her experience bears witness to the unconscious, gives an “open
testimony” of this experience. As martyr, the psychotic is in a sense emblematic of a universal discordance, or
even a battery of discordances, between what we might call interior delusions and external reality.
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I remember the night we sat by the windows with the rain falling and
read poems. Or was it by the trees in the churchyard? Dusk rising, cold
grass blackening, you read, or spoke aloud into the distant air, to the
silent sparrows tucked like clouds in the distant hedges, “At night, by
the fire,” you said. And within you what breathed itself to life, what
demon rattled within your ribs, conjuring, conjuring, “the colors of the
bushes and the fallen trees,” the smoldering sun swallowed beneath a
sky of blood-stained rags, “repeating themselves, turned in the room,”
and the wind rises as to the call of the dawning stars, “like the leaves
themselves, turning in the wind”? Within you, a chaos of life singing like
a storm, beneath your eyes and your voice, raging until the final inferno
purified you, ashen on the waves, on the breezes, on the eternal crust,
“Yes,” as the trees traced their dark calligraphy against the pinkblack
sky, laughter beyond the copses fading into the relentless silence of the
night in this place, “but the color of the heavy hemlocks came striding,”
where you and I met and parted, where nothing remains but a vault of
words sinking into the stones, warming them, perhaps, echoing across
the walls as if to stitch a web, some place I might catch you again, you
spirit, you dream at my throat, “and I remembered the cry of the
peacocks.”

The literary artist, in her own way, gives an open testimony to the workings of the unconscious insofar
as literature, like the unconscious, unfolds in a universe bounded by a language whose laws are fantastically
pliable. Teaching literature can of course operate at the level of discovering, untangling, and interpreting the
streams of discourse characterizing a given literary example. The teacher can have a cure for the text, in a manner
of speaking. Or one can allow the text to persist uncured, speaking its own language and giving witness to its
own universe.
Some poetic forms resemble Schreber’s delusional grammar, which at least suggests that Lacan’s work
on psychosis is relevant to reading and teaching poetry. I’m thinking of the sestina and particularly the villanelle,
both of which incorporate repeated words or lines at regular intervals which produce a sense of anticipation or
call-and-response in the poem, similar to Schreber’s interrupted/completed sentences.

64

I shut my eyes and all the world drops dead;
I lift my lids and all is born again.
(I think I made you up inside my head.)

The stars go waltzing out in blue and red,
And arbitrary blackness gallops in:
I shut my eyes and all the world drops dead.

I dreamed that you bewitched me into bed
And sung me moon-struck, kissed me quite insane.
(I think I made you up inside my head.)

God topples from the sky, hell's fires fade:
Exit seraphim and Satan's men:
I shut my eyes and all the world drops dead.

I fancied you'd return the way you said,
But I grow old and I forget your name.
(I think I made you up inside my head.)

I should have loved a thunderbird instead;
At least when spring comes they roar back again.
I shut my eyes and all the world drops dead.
(I think I made you up inside my head.)

128

This poem stutters forward, ultimately revealing that a love has been lost and will not be refound, but
the refrains emphasize the priority accorded to the inner-life of the poet (the eyes shut and all the world drops
dead), and the delusional core of her love/desire (“I think I made you up inside my head”). The poet depicts a
twilight of the world – the stars and heavens recede and all that remains is a conversation with the absent love
to whom the poem is addressed but who, like Schreber’s god, is beyond the reach of language. The poem is in
some ways an expression of psychosis – or at least of “madness” – but one could also consider it an attempt at
a cure for psychosis, for the psychic suffering of the author. Both the poet and Schreber attempt to domesticate
their illness by writing, by giving freedom to their language of suffering, but did either author ever find the
proper reader? And what, in the end, is on offer for the teacher in this poem? That is, what in this poem is
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teachable? Obviously the formal and technical aspects of the poem are easy targets for a day’s “lesson,” but
there is also an unconscious landscape to be glimpsed here, a language that is evading the forms of everyday
communication by substituting a psychotic or unconscious grammar.
Joyce is the apex. Nothing throws the pretensions of teaching literature into so profound doubt as
Finnegans Wake. What would it even mean to teach it (this novel that is so often avoided and yet almost tailormade for the university)? One scholar writes of Finnegans Wake that “the learning of [the language of Finnegans
Wake] demands a pedagogy that takes Joyce’s own antiauthoritarian approach to teaching to its furthest possible
expression. Wakese, with its refusal of standardization, cannot be taught in an authoritarian way because no one
can be an absolute expert on it, and the depictions of pedagogy within the Wake […] support an anarchic ideal
of education.”129 Almost at random I choose this excerpt: “we can sit us down on the heathery benn, me on you,
in quolm unconsciounce. To scand the arising. Out of Drumleek. It was there Evora told me I had best. If I ever.
When the moon of mourning is set and gone.”130 In an instance of literature as scintillating as this one has
recourse only to the internal coherence of the text, which materializes out of the web of associations that extend
from the typographic and phonemic to the mythico-allegorical. To the extent that this excerpt can be taken at its
surface-level meaning, it describes ALP’s nostalgic wish to take a walk with HCE along the coast as they once
used to before they grew old and weary, and before HCE was crippled with desire for his daughter. The entire
scene, however, can be transposed into HCE’s consciousness, even, and taken as not ALP’s waking dream but
Earwicker’s, or some strange echo of HCE’s desire sounding out in ALP’s dreams. As the waking HCE
fantasizes about his impossible desire for his daughter Issy, the residue of his dreaming relaxes his language of
its semantic and logical strictures, revealing an undercurrent of meaning streaming through the expanse of
language at its most primitive levels – at its most exuberant and wild levels. The phrase “me and you” slips into
“me on you” as HCE’s sexual longing emerges into consciousness via the assonance of “and” and “on.” “In
quolm unconsciounce” is overdetermined as well, the forbidden aspect of the incestuous relationship making an
appearance in the typographic similarity between “quolm” and “qualm,” while the fantasized serenity is
nevertheless preserved in the homophony of “quolm” and “calm.” “Unconsciounce” contains within it the words
“unconscious” and “(un)conscience,” indicating both the degree to which HCE recognizes his desire as
forbidden – repressed from consciousness only to take root in the unconscious – yet still present and able to be
expressed only in a climate free of prohibition and thus free of the restrictions of one’s conscience. “Ounce”
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suggests how much of this desire HCE can consciously stand. “To scand the arising. Out of Drumleek” contains
both the bucolic image of surveying the horizon together (arising and horizon are near homophones) as well as
the scand(alous) image of HCE’s tumescence in the presence of his daughter. In the fateful year of 1177 Sir
Armoricus Tristram fought and won a battle at Howth, near a bridge called Evora, during the English invasion
of Ireland. Regarding this scene Anthony Burgess writes,
Tristram of Lyonesse came to Ireland to convey Iseult, chosen bride, to his uncle, King Mark of Cornwall.
But Tristram and Iseult fell in love, and a train of subterfuge, guilt, and disloyalty was started. Both HCE's
preoccupations find potent expression here – aged Mark, too old for love, superseded by a younger man;
the agonising sweetness of a forbidden relationship. But we can go further. Sir Armory Tristram (Tristram
of Armorica, or Brittany) founded the St. Lawrence family of Howth in Dublin and built Howth Castle:
a dream-identification of the two Tristrams is inevitable. 131

And of course Joyce plays on the similarity between “Iseult” and “Issy” throughout Finnegans Wake, thus
finding legendary avatars for the prosaic HCE and his daughter. Imagining the sun rising takes HCE in his
dreaming to the reverse image – the setting of the moon of mourning, indicating in a semi-biblical tone132 that
his congress with Issy is possible only in some otherworldly afterlife, perhaps the one awaiting him after he
himself is dead and mourned. Desire circulates between these characters’ lives in a pattern of renewal and
repetition, as the letter cast out to sea returns to the delta from which the novel itself begins again.
Obviously one can untangle these overlaid words and meanings and trace the mythical and historical
allusions, but this would be in an effort to conjugate the unique literary discourse with a shared discourse of
“reality.” Performing this kind of untangling is, I would argue, how the bulk of literature teachers understand
their roles as teachers. The value or efficacy of this method is not something I wish to call into question, even if
at the extreme it can serve to reduce literature to a kind of game of symbol substitution or, at its worst, an
example of the exercise of power Barthes identifies in his Inaugural Lecture. As a supplement – or antidote – to
this kind of teaching one can utilize, in the teaching, the very mechanics found in the literary object. The excerpt
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above ceases to be, in this case, a token isolated for its value in demonstrating this or that, but rather becomes a
question precisely for me, the teacher. Why, that is, has this sentence emerged from the wilds as my animal?
Why this text? What is my place in the sea of language such that this or that has brushed against my skin from
the depths? And my account of this place is not offered to lay any part of the text to rest but to invigorate it –
my account of this place is to give others witness to the dimension of our being that is contained entirely within
language and animated by desire, such that the student, the amateur, the one seeking through the image of the
other the place of truth, may find his or her own place and sink, or breathe, or thrash. A familiarity with the
multitude of ways in which language speaks beyond itself is necessary for the teacher to remain sensitive not
only to the wild reach of literature but also to the wanderings of the students’ speech, and again it is the discourse
of the psychotic that provides the clearest example of how far language can take us in its own directions –
literature especially.
We hang on to language, our harpoon inextricable, and draw nearer and nearer the flesh. Lacan’s analysis
of the structure of Schreber’s discourse leads him to more and more elementary facets of language in general:
the presence of a listener, the sentence as unit, and the signifier. Lacan is particularly interested in the way in
which the meaning of a sentence depends on the presence of a listener, a listener who anticipates the meaning
of the sentence, closing it off as a unit of meaning. The language of the psychotic presents itself as so
impenetrable or nonsensical in part because of the degree to which the listener anticipates in a direction foreign
or orthogonal to the sway of the psychotic’s discursive landscape. If the one listening to the psychotic feels
closed out of that discourse, or if the psychotic’s discourse appears completely autistic, it is because the listener’s
anticipations fail, further isolating the psychotic and his or her experience of reality.
The language of the psychotic is not a cloak that covers the real, making it accessible to expression; it
is a landscape populated by beings – or, rather, signifiers that seem to have the consistency of beings. Lacan
attempts to characterize this being in “everyday” or “normal” terms with the following example:
think about this for a moment. You are at the close of a stormy and tiring day, you regard the
darkness that is beginning to fall upon your surroundings, and something comes to mind,
embodied in the expression, the peace of the evening.
What link is there between the expression the peace of the evening and what you
experience? It’s not absurd to ask oneself whether beings who didn’t give this peace of the evening
a distinct existence, who didn’t formulate it verbally, could distinguish it from any of the other
registers under which temporal reality may be apprehended.
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Whitney, whose breath I hear all around me.

We can now observe that something quite different happens according to whether we, who have
called up this peace of the evening ourselves, have formulated this expression before uttering it,
or whether it takes us by surprise or interrupts us, calming the movement of agitation that dwelled
within us. It’s precisely when we are not listening for it, when it’s outside our field and suddenly
hits us from behind, that it assumes its full value, surprised as we are by this more or less
endophasic, more or less inspired, expression that comes to us like a murmur from without, a
manifestation of discourse insofar as it barely belongs to us, which comes as an echo of what it is
that is all of a sudden significant for us in this presence, an utterance such that we don’t know
whether it comes from without or within – the peace of the evening. 133

Lacan characterizes a phrase like this as a being, as something that presents itself to us, as a signifier in the real,
in more or less the same sense as the way Schreber’s phrases present themselves to him. As he does throughout
Seminar III, Lacan extends Schreber’s experience to more general dimensions and claims that it is not only
Schreber’s reality that is being re-written by the symbolic, but that “reality [per se] is at the outset marked by
symbolic nihilation.”134 That is, all the markings of reality that we presume to be the brute objects of that reality,
are already marked by the symbolic in the form of being overwritten by it. An aspect of reality as apparent, for
example, as the existence of day, is present as such only in relation, and in distinction, to night, the mutually
constitutive relationship of these terms defines them, precisely, as symbolic.
How best to begin discussing the signifier, as such? Lacan gives the following example:
I’m at sea, the captain of a small ship. I see things moving about in the night, in a way that gives
me cause to think that there may be a sign there. How shall I react? If I’m not yet a human being,
I shall react with all sorts of displays, as they say – modeled, motor, and emotional. I satisfy the
descriptions of psychologists, I understand something, in fact I do everything I’m telling you that
you must know how not to do. If on the other hand I am a human being, I write in my log book –
At such and such a time, at such and such a degree of latitude and longitude, we noticed this and
that.
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This is what is fundamental. I shelter my responsibility. What distinguishes the signifier
is here. I make a note of the sign as such. It’s the acknowledgement of receipt that is essential to
communication insofar as it is not significant, but signifying. 135

There is an excess in the signifier that cannot be reduced to a simple response to stimulus, as in the manifold
forms of animal communication in mating, predation, mimicry, etc. What marks the signifier is not that one
responds to it, but that one marks its arrival. This is an early formulation by Lacan, which will later be
supplemented by the more widely disseminated view that the signifier is marked not only by one’s
acknowledging its reception, but by its capacity to deceive. It is not the fullness of the signifier that marks it as
such, not the force it has to conjure meaning from the world, but rather its simple, empty arrival that distinguishes
it, its capacity to signify this or that, which is to say to signify nothing. If for Freud human civilization is marked
precisely by fundamental sexual prohibitions, Lacan simply opens up this insight to illuminate the fact that this
prohibition structures human life entirely and is significant not because of the specific content of the prohibition
(which could be anything), but because of its structuring capacity. That is, the fundamental prohibition is itself
a signifier in Lacan’s sense, which is what prompts Lacan to note that “if the Oedipus complex isn’t the
introduction of the signifier then I ask to be shown any conception of it whatever. […] For us [analysts] the
superego raises the question of what is the order of entrance, of introduction, of present instance, of the signifier,
which is indispensable to the functioning of a human organism that has come to terms not only with a natural
environment but with a signifying universe.”136 At the center of sexuality, which is the center of the Law, there
must be the birth of the signifier and its entire ensuing network. This perspective is what allows Lacan to situate
neurotic symptoms, which can be acknowledged as such only in their deviance from an order that is structured
like a language, at the level of signifiers.

Some days I’ll stand alone in the house, waiting for you. I try to conjure
you from the woodsmoke, from the falling water, from the patterns in
the mortar, from the buds of the impatiens hanging aloft – touch-me-not,
they’re called. Will you console me, I wonder, as I follow you toward
death, eyes closed. It was to you first of all that I promised our mark in
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the endless pages could not be effaced or mutilated or forgotten, and
that was what I told you last before you were swept away from the world
while I dreamt of a great darkness. Was it a dream of you?
Whitney, I speak to you like my absent God, my demon. I write to you
to be surrounded by your silence, to feel the smallness of my secret
heart. I write to you to hear myself in the place where I am not. I write
to you hoping to reach the end of the wastes, the end beyond which
there is only what? I write to you as to an abyss of desire, an empty sea,
I write to you in hope of one thing. I write to you in hope of one thing.
Please say it.

Lacan gives a detailed example of a case demonstrating the function of the signifier in the onset of
neurotic symptoms and, ultimately, their role in the orienting of sexuality. The case is that of an hysteric. Lacan
writes,
[the case] concerns an observation we owe to Joseph Eisler, a psychologist of the Budapest School,
made at the end of the First World War, which recounts the story of a chap who was a tram conductor
during the Hungarian Revolution.
He is thirty-three years of age, a Hungarian protestant – austerity, stability, peasant
tradition. He left his family to move to the city at the end of his adolescence. His working life was
marked by changes that were not without meaning – he started out as a baker, then he worked in a
chemical laboratory, and finally he became a tram conductor. He used to ring the bell and punch the
tickets, but he had also been a driver.
One day, alighting from his tram, he stumbled, fell, and was dragged a short distance. He
had some swelling and his left side hurt. He was taken to hospital where they found that there was
nothing wrong with him. He was given a few stitches in the scalp to close the wound. Everything
was fine. He left after a thorough examination. They took a lot of x-rays, and they were quite certain
that there was nothing wrong with him. He had put up a bit of a show.
And then, gradually, he fell victim to crises characterized by an increase in pain in his lower
rib, a pain that spread out from this point and drove the subject into a state of increasing discomfort.
He would stretch out, lie down on his left side, use a pillow to block it. And things stayed that way,
getting worse as time went on. The crises would last several days, returning at regular intervals.
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They kept getting worse, reaching the point of actually causing the subject to lose consciousness.
Once again he was given a thorough examination. They found absolutely nothing. They suspected
traumatic hysteria and sent him to our author, who analyzes him. 137

Upon entering the analysis, the subject’s symptoms find more bewildered or curious expression, which
Eisler is at pains to interpret but ultimately settles on an approach that would emphasize the features of an anal
character, en route to offering the subject an interpretation regarding the subject’s homosexualizing tendencies.
The interpretation, however, has no effect on the subject’s symptoms or behavior. As the analysis progresses
Eisler searches for an earlier traumatic scene that the subject’s accident has enlivened. Lacan goes on:
in the subject’s childhood we find traumas by the bucketful. When he was very small, starting to
crawl about the place, his mother had stood on his thumb. Eisler doesn’t fail to point out that at this
moment something decisive must have occurred, since according to the family tradition he is
supposed to have started to suck his thumb after this incident. You see? – castration – regression.
One can find others. However, there is one small difficulty, which is that what was decisive in the
decompensation of the neurosis wasn’t the accident but the radiographic examinations.

The subject’s symptoms arise as a result of his encounter with the instruments required for the x-rays. What is
important about the subject’s encounter with the machine is not simply that it triggers his pain but that it compels
the subject to ask a certain question of himself, and it is this question that divides him from the realm of the
imaginary (where it is his relation to objects that provokes this or that behavior) to the symbolic: am I or am I
not someone capable of procreating? The examination penetrates his interior and from this the question, perhaps
seeking for a long time to find its voice, materializes. Lacan writes, “this question is obviously located at the
level of the Other, insofar as sexuality is tied to symbolic recognition.”138 The subject is looking for his place in
the symbolic – as either day or night, red or black, man or woman – and appealing to the Other for this. Lacan
will henceforth refer to the question “am I a man or a woman?” as the hysteric’s question because of its specific
relation to the Other. Later, in “On a Question Prior to Any possible Treatment of Psychosis,” Lacan adds that
A is “the locus from which the question of [the subject’s] existence may arise for him.”139

137

Ibid. 170.

138

Ibid.

139

Lacan, Écrits, 459.

72

As a sort of analog to the hysteric’s question is the question of the obsessive, who asks, “am I dead or
alive?” The subject’s individual existence cannot be explained to him or her via the resources of the symbolic
simply because death, like procreation, is “radically inassimilable to the signifier […]. Why is [the subject] here?
Where has he come from? What is he doing here? Why is he going to disappear? The signifier is incapable of
providing him with the answer, for the good reason that it places him beyond death. The signifier already
considers him dead, by nature it immortalizes him.”140
Procreation and death, then, are the two points around which these varieties of neurosis orbit, passing
outside the realm of the Symbolic in their course. Obviously these two themes have an elemental role in the
history of literature and art in general, but my interest is not in literary works that address the hysteric or
obsessive in the form of content. I am interested in literature’s capacity, as Kafka mentioned above, to affect us
as an actual death or, as is depicted in some of Heidegger’s works on poetry,141 as an actual coming to be, an
introduction of something new and complete into the world all at once. The question is what sort of relationship
the teacher has to these dimensions of literature and how, if at all, she can open a space for these effects to occur.
As I have already made clear, I believe the teacher’s function does involve providing a structure that
makes the fundamental symbolic insolubility of birth and death palpable to the student. To the extent that this
experience is unsymbolizable, it has a kind of family resemblance to trauma or anarchy, which is one of the
reasons Finnegans Wake is so polarizing a pedagogical object: it both courts and resists academic capture. If for
now we call Finnegans Wake, with its overwhelming bounty, an hysteric or procreative work, one might
compare it to the obsessive or morbid experience of reading Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
which so powerfully explores the essential dimensions of the symbolic that its final moments depict a kind of
almost suicidal apotheosis, like Oedipus vanishing into the sky.
Working backward through the language of neurotics leads us finally to a consideration of the signifier as
such, the element upon which any possible language is predicated, language here considered as “the most
fundamental of interhuman relations.”142 It is important to stress the precise way in which Lacan intends this
claim to be understood. Every qualification, opposition, nomination, etc. that comprises the fabric of human
existence is grounded not in the “natural world” but in the symbolic. Even the basic elements of nature – say,
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day and night, or man and woman – are themselves products of a signifying structure which provides the
coordinates for human reality, including sexuality. Since this is generally one of the most contested tenets of
Lacan’s thinking I will justify it at a basic level. In Lacan’s words:
the signifier man and the signifier woman are something other than a passive attitude and an
active attitude, an aggressive attitude and a yielding attitude, something other than forms of
behavior. There is undoubtedly a hidden signifier here which, of course, can nowhere be
incarnated absolutely, but which is nevertheless the closest thing to being incarnated in the
existence of the word man and the word woman.
If these registers of being are anywhere, in the final analysis it’s in words. It isn’t
obligatory that they be verbalized words. It may be a sign on the wall, it may be, for the socalled primitive, a painting or a stone, but it’s elsewhere than in types of conduct or patterns.
This is not new. When we say that the Oedipus complex is essential for the human
being to be able to accede to a humanized structure of the real, it can’t mean anything else. 143

Every neurosis is indicative of a disturbance at some level of the symbolic. I have already mentioned
the questions by which hysteric and obsessive neuroses take root in questions of procreation and death that are
in excess of the resources of the symbolic, and psychosis, for Lacan, “consists of a hole, a lack, at the center of
the signifier.”144 He goes on: “in psychosis it’s the signifier that is in question, and as the signifier is never
solitary, as it invariably forms something coherent – this is the very meaningfulness of the signifier – the lack of
one signifier necessarily brings the subject to the point of calling the set of signifiers into question.” 145 This
explains many of Schreber’s symptoms – his neologisms, his cross-dressing, his homosexuality, his aposiopesis,
and ultimately his conflicted relationship with God. The disturbances at the level of the signifier are for Schreber
what produce his psychotic reality, a reality whose substance is not determined along the axis of material – “the
reality of a wall we might bump into,” as Lacan puts it – but rather along the axis of meaning, making it a

Ibid. 198. Later in the seminar Lacan makes the point again in different terms: “if we [analysts] now admit
as a fact of common experience that not to have undergone the trial of Oedipus, not to have seen its conflicts
and its dead ends open before one, and not to have resolved it, leaves the subject with a certain defect, in a
certain state of inability to bring about the correct distance that is called human reality, this is because we hold
that reality implies the subject’s integration into a particular play of signifiers.” (Lacan, Sem. III, 249).
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question of “a meaningful reality, which doesn’t present us simply with footholds and obstacles, but a truth that
verifies itself and installs itself by itself as orienting this world and introducing beings, to call them by their
name, into it.”146 Since, as I have already mentioned, it is the Oedipus complex that structures the real, Lacan is
able to locate Schreber’s psychosis quite precisely: in the relation to the father. Lacan asks, “by what path does
the dimension of truth enter in a living way into life, into the economy of man?” And his answer is “that it’s
mediated by the ultimate meaning of the idea of the father.”147 Not one’s actual father, that is, but the symbol of
the father, what elsewhere Lacan calls the name-of-the-father. In Seminar III, Lacan’s primary efforts are to
clarify the function of the father as symbol, which takes him directly to a consideration of the signifier, embodied
in the questions, “what does the signifier essentially signify in its signifying role? What is the original and
initiatory function, in human life, of the existence of the symbol qua pure signifier?”148
Lacan cannot answer this question without a long excursion into some of the fundamental characteristics
of human language, beginning with an analysis of metaphor and metonymy. He is led to this excursion by
following the thread of Schreber’s interrupted sentences, which are clearly a symptom of his psychosis. Schreber,
as his psychosis progresses, is flooded by the speech of the birds and the rays and yet their words are increasingly
meaningless, i.e. their speech is indicative of a swelling of the signifier and diminishing of the signified. This
prompts Lacan to notice that “even when [Schreber’s] sentences have a meaning, one never encounters anything
that resembles a metaphor. But what,” Lacan asks, “is a metaphor?”149
Metaphor can be understood as a mode of identification between words that completely disregards their
lexical equivalence. That is, metaphor identifies a subject with a predicate that is outside the scope of its
“accepted” meanings. The identification itself is maintained by the syntax of the sentence, without which the
sentence – regardless of the quality of its metaphor – would be meaningless. Lacan’s famous example is the
Victor Hugo line, “His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful.” The identification here is between Booz and the
sheaf, it being out of the question that a sheaf could be neither miserly nor spiteful. In structural terms one could
imagine metaphor as operating along a vertical axis, where any number of subjects could have the same
predicates. What is important about the structural perspective is that it prioritizes the signifier over the signified,
acknowledging that the meaning of a subject’s world is constantly mediated by the signifier, not comprised of
signifieds. Lacan describes the stakes as follows:
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in misrecognizing the primordial mediating role of the signifier, in misrecognizing that it’s the
signifier that in reality is the guiding thread, not only do we throw the original understanding of
neurotic phenomena, the interpretation of dreams itself, out of balance, but we make ourselves
absolutely incapable of understanding what is happening in the psychoses. 150

Metonymy is a kind of counterpoint to metaphor. If above I distinguished a vertical dimension to
metaphor, metonymy would be the horizontal dimension in which “one thing is named by another that is its
container, or its part, or that is connected to it.”151 I call this horizontal because in metonymy the substitution is
determined by features of the subject that are inherent to it – one’s list of attributes may stretch out indefinitely
without ever leaving the domain of the original subject. A typical example of metonymy is the phrase thirty sails
to describe thirty ships.

Your ashes.
You.
In the early summer mornings, honeybees at your blossoms, dusted in
pollen, solace from the growing heat for the brief moments wrapped in
your petals. You. Your ashes. Spread now so many years ago at this tree,
roots crooking their fingers in the chaos of soil, does your heart beat
here again? When the skies open and the rain flows through the veins
of the bankside, are you there again? When the cicadas perch aloft in
the hollows of your skin, their deaths rushing toward them, are you
renewed, your voice, your eyes? In the summer the monarchs grasp you,
newly emerged, the moisture dripping from their lashes, a silent
heartbeat in the afternoon stillness, they wait, then take their jagged
course through the air leaving one leaf quivering. You. And under your
crown, in the failing autumn sun, beneath your branches as though to
receive the laying on of hands I sit and wait for you to return to me.
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The red eyes of a black owl call forth the hunt.

Upon highlighting these two fundamental features of language Lacan returns to the neuroses:
the opposition between metaphor and metonymy is fundamental, since what Freud originally drew
attention to in the mechanisms of neurosis, as well as in the mechanisms of the marginal phenomena
of normal life or of dreams, is neither the metaphorical dimension nor identification. It’s the
contrary. In general what Freud calls condensation is what in rhetoric one calls metaphor, what he
calls displacement is metonymy. The structuration, the lexical existence of the entire signifying
apparatus, is determinant for the phenomena present in neurosis, since the signifier is the instrument
by which the missing signified expresses itself. It’s for this reason that in focusing attention back
onto the signifier we are doing nothing other than returning to the starting point of the Freudian
discovery.152

Lacan presents the Freudian discovery in terms of the signifier: the interpretation of dreams, the function
of memory, the significance of wit and jokes, the analytic technique, human sexuality, slips of the tongue and
the forgetting of names or misplacing of objects, all of these have the signifier as their starting point. In one of
Freud’s more famous biographical anecdotes he demonstrates the central role of the signifier in the seemingly
innocuous forgetting of the name “Signorelli.” In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life Freud describes the
situation like this:
in 1898 I vainly strove to recall the name of the master who made the imposing frescoes of the “Last
Judgment” in the dome of Orvieto. Instead of the lost name – Signorelli – two other names of artists
– Botticelli and Botraffio – obtruded themselves, names which my judgment immediately and
definitely rejected as being incorrect. When the correct name was imparted to me by an outsider I
recognized it at once without any hesitation. 153
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Freud’s analysis of the slip proceeds along a chain of associations represented by signifiers. Freud
discovers that he has forgotten the name while on a train to Herzegovina, and his forgetting of the name occurs
immediately after a conversation with a fellow traveler regarding the Turks living in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
whose confidence and deference to their doctors strikes Freud as noteworthy. Freud writes, “When one is
compelled to inform [the Turkish patients] that there is no help for the patient, they answer: ‘Sir (Herr [in
German]), what can I say? I know that if he could be saved you would save him.’ In these sentences alone we
can find the words and names Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Herr, which may be inserted in an association series
between Signorelli, Botticelli, and Boltraffio.”154 In connection with this particular memory of his Turkish
patients there is another memory from which Freud immediately withdraws his attention, and this withdrawal
proves to be the disturbance that resonates all the way to his forgetting of Signorelli. The memory is of his
Turkish patients’ valuing sexual pleasure above all else in life, such that sexual disturbances or incapacities
affect them more profoundly than even the news of terminal illnesses. This disturbing memory, centered on the
themes of death and sexuality, propels the chain of associations deeper still, to the recollection of a message
Freud had recently received of the suicide of one of his patients, who ended his life on account of an incurable
sexual disturbance. Freud received this news in the town of Trafoi. He writes, regarding this connection, “I know
positively that this sad event, and everything connected with it, did not come to my conscious recollection on
that trip in Herzegovina. However, the agreement between Trafoi and Boltraffio forces me to assume that this
reminiscence was at that time brought to activity despite all the intentional deviation of my attention.”
By analyzing the chain of associations – not simply their content but specifically their signifiers – Freud
is led to one of the more thoroughgoing conclusions of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life: the forgetting of
names (and also slips of the tongue, misplacing objects, bungling sentences) is not accidental but motivated by
unconscious repression and then carried out along an associative chain of signifiers. In Freud’s case, his desire
to forget the painful message received at Trafoi regarding the painful link between death and sexuality resulted
in his being unable to remember the name Signorelli; the very forgetting of which is in the end an emblem of
the original repressed content. Freud writes,
to be sure, I wished to forget something other than the name of the master of Orvieto; but this other
thought brought about an associative connection between itself and this name [Signorelli], so that
my act of volition missed the aim, and I forgot the one [the name Signorelli] against my will, while
I intentionally wished to forget the other [the news of the suicide]. The disinclination to recall
directed itself against the one content; the inability to remember appeared in another […]. The
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substitutive names no longer seem so thoroughly justified as they were before this explanation. They
remind me (after the form of a compromise) as much of what I wished to forget as of what I wished
to remember, and show me that my object to forget something was neither a perfect success nor a
failure.

Freud summarizes the linguistic ties in the following diagram:

Here we can see on the left the chain of associations that serve to cover over the painful thoughts regarding the
impenetrable human experiences of sexuality and death. On the right we can see the means by which these
repressed thoughts nevertheless find expression in the name Boltraffio, itself associated with the name of the
artist Boticelli, and both artists’ names appear in their phonemic connection to the name Bosnia, a name and
location strongly linked, of course, to Herzegovina. Analyzing this diagram in Seminar III, Lacan concludes,
“that’s the mechanism. Its schema, analogous to that of a symptom, suffices to demonstrate the essential
importance of the signifier. It’s insofar as Signorelli and the series of names are equivalent words, translations
of one another, metaphrases if you like, that the word is linked to repressed death, refused by Freud.” 155 Later
Lacan will call the link between these words metonymic, the link between the words being constituted in some
cases by proximity (Bosnia and Herzegovina), in others by phonemic equivalence (bo in Bosnia, Boltraffio, and
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Boticelli as well as the traf in Trafoi and Boltraffio), and yet again by translation (Signor and Herr being
translations of one another). It is important to stress the degree to which these associations manifest themselves
at the level of the signifier, not at the level of what they signify. The means by which the repressed thoughts
make their appearance follow the specific logic made possible by the fact that the signifier, in itself, signifies
nothing, but rather can yield meanings along several different axes at once.
The schema of the diagram, Lacan claims, is analogous to that of a symptom. The symptom is the
forgotten word, the inescapable phrase, or the refrain. Something in the body, or in the destructive or baffling
repetitions in a person’s life, is insisting on being heard but has no voice of its own. Psychoanalysis has since its
earliest stages of development been known as the talking cure, and this is because the patient burrows through
their symbolic landscape in order ultimately to hear a voice, to receive a message that all the while is struggling
to make itself heard in the form of the patient’s illness.

I dreamt of you again last night. I always give my dreams as I remember
them a coherence they don’t have – something so abhorrent or elusive
about their form. One wants simply to maintain order, perhaps. I
remember watching you dance, the truncated swaying of your shoulders,
your mincing steps, your fingers languid like moss in the stream, you
standing against the brick, you weeping, you dying. And what I dreamt
last night has today become a scattered mosaic of empty signs, of signs
in abeyance, to be neglected until when? I return to them now,
constellated as I imagine them to be across the floors where I once lay
listening to you brush your teeth, these shards everywhere unburnished
and silent beneath the dust. They rattle.

The blank, white page. My Bianca. Mother. A ringing silence.

Me.
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Or, moving in a different direction, meaning is distilled upwards through signifiers, the unconscious
heating the alembic. “If I told him would he like it,” asks Gertrude Stein, without asking. “Would he like it if I
told him. Would he like it would Napoleon would Napoleon would would he like it.” So much of Stein’s poetry
can be taken precisely as an exercise in mapping out the landscape of associations radiating from any given
phrase or signifier. Meaning in her poetry is only infrequently found at the level of what is signified by the words
she employs but rather in the radical deconstruction of grammar, syntax, and punctuation she practices while
modulating her signifiers at the phonetic or lexical level. Stanzas are unified not by any logical coherence but
instead by their forming a sort of system of mutually orbiting signifiers. Sentences, in her work, can often be
taken as signifying units in themselves, and punctuation is indicated less by traditional typographical markings
but rather by the space on the page or the introduction of a new system of signifiers. For example,
If Napoleon if I told him if I told him if Napoleon. Would he like it if I told him if I told him if
Napoleon. Would he like it if Napoleon if Napoleon if I told him. If I told him if Napoleon if Napoleon
if I told him. If I told him would he like it would he like it if I told him.

The stanza’s unifying consistency is provided more by the cadence and assonance of the signifiers than by their
lexical meanings. The actual historic figure of Napoleon seems so out of place in the poem that, as Freud does
in the story above, one is tempted to reject this signifier as “incorrect” as regards to what Stein is “really getting
at” in the poem. We take the signifier “Napoleon,” then, as a radically generalized metonymy for something like
avatar of history (as Hegel took him, as Tolstoy’s Prince Andrei took him), lion, conqueror – master. Yet even
this is perhaps too precise. The stanza does not receive a final punctuation until the next one begins, signaled by
a series of line breaks and a fresh set of signifiers:
Now.
Not now.
And now.
Now.
Exactly as as kings.
Feeling full for it.
Exactitude as kings.
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So to beseech you as full as for it.
Exactly or as kings.

The first four lines trace out almost perfectly the logic of the dream as Freud describes it in The Interpretation
of Dreams. Overdetermined elements of the dream are expressed in non-mutually-exclusive forms, or these
elements are expressed via their opposing signifier as the repressed element takes every opportunity to find
expression regardless of logic or consistency. The following line (“Exactly as as kings”) stitches this stanza to
the preceding one via the metonymy between Napoleon and king, while at the same time the signifier “kings” is
easily transformed into “askings,” which again refers to the preceding stanza – this time metaphorically – where
each sentence of the stanza is a question the poet seems to be asking herself. Each of the kings lines are united
by the inclusion of this play on words, while also sharing identical amphibrachic metre and, as in the preceding
stanza, cycling through different but similar constellations of signifiers. In the interest of space I will not analyze
the entire poem, which continues along the trajectory I have outlined here, slowly establishing a unique grammar
whose dominant rules are not syntactic or logical but metonymic, phonemic, metrical, and spatial. Instead I
address the obvious difference between Freud’s self-analysis regarding Signorelli and Stein’s (or so many other
poets’) work as I have described it here.
Repression distorts Freud’s memory, preventing him from remembering the name of the artist whose
place in Freud’s life is, in the end, not so grand except insofar as it, by chance, shares enough with the repressed
thoughts at the level of the signifier to produce the lapse in his memory. As he stitches together his associations,
depicted in the diagram above, he recovers the unpleasant thought and, in turn, reveals to himself the effect his
patient’s suicide has had on him and his efforts to evade the pain associated with it. And while Stein’s poem
shares much with Freud’s associations insofar as both are a crossing and re-crossing of signifiers, can Stein’s
work be said to be the product of repression the way Freud’s word-diagram is?
For more than a few reasons I will not speculate as to what caused Gertrude Stein to write “If I Told Him:
A Completed Portrait of Picasso.” What I will claim is that Stein’s insistence on evading the “thing” the poem
is “about” at least mirrors Freud’s forgetting. Not lamenting this “forgetting” but rather embracing and
celebrating it allows Stein to craft a work that is the product of language’s own feedback, whose rhythm and
assonance establishes nodes that function as syntactical markings, that demonstrate that language has a structure
independent of meaning, which is why it is almost nonsensical to ask what Stein’s poem “means.” Perhaps the
poem makes a promise to the reader, or seems to. Perhaps Stein wants “one to know that language runs off the
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rails concerning the magnitude of what she as a woman is capable of revealing concerning jouissance.”156 Does
the poem instigate? If the poem is a voiding out of meaning within a vault of language, then perhaps it can be
taken as a question for us regarding our desire – that is, will we cross the threshold, will we allow ourselves to
occupy the empty space with our own speech, our own associations, or our own memories? “Let me recite what
history teaches,” Stein concludes. “History teaches.” Our history, hidden somewhere behind the edifice of
language’s daily routines, stirring.

What would you tell me? Would you tell me someone is listening?

Lacan discovers in Freud’s forgetfulness a splitting that accords exactly with his L-schema. Freud forgets
Signorelli, but several other names speak in Signorelli’s place. Who speaks these names? Lacan answers,
the other does, he who both is Freud and isn’t Freud, the other who is on the same side as the memory
lapse, the other from whom Freud’s ego has withdrawn and who answers in its place. He [this other]
doesn’t give the reply, since he is forbidden to speak, but he gives the beginning of the telegram, he
answers, Trafoi and Boltraffio, which he makes the intermediary of the metonymy, the intermediary
of the slide between Herzegovina and Bosnia. 157

Lacan then asks, “who is this other who speaks in the subject,
of whom the subject is neither the master nor the counterpart,
who is the other who speaks in him?” It is the unconscious, but
it is crucial to note that the unconscious cannot be transformed
into an ego, and the function of the ego is not to provide a
unified or mythological knowledge of the true self. The ego
does in fact provide us with a notion of totality, but ultimately
the ego is only ever a product of a reflection or a mirage. Again, the ego – a in the diagram – constitutes itself
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through an unending series of identifications with the other (a’), which is precisely what constitutes the
imaginary relation.
Then there is, on the other hand, “the other who speaks from my place, apparently, this other who is
within me. This is an other of a totally different nature from the other, my counterpart.”158 This would be the
other whose place is made known by means of unconscious expression, which is a reminder that, “the
unconscious is essentially speech, speech of the other, and can only be recognized when the other sends it back
to you.”159 In terms of the L-Schema this statement means that not only is the Other recognized by means of this
unconscious speech, but perhaps more importantly the subject, S, who receives the message. The analyst’s ideal
position, as was already mentioned, is at A.
Freud’s anecdote of forgetting provides a model for a certain kind of reading, one that proceeds very
similarly to “normal” reading but with the added complication that Freud is attempting to read in himself
something that is both struggling to be make itself legible as well as dissembling itself regarding his own
repressed thoughts. In this instance Freud is his own text, whereas when one teaches Stein’s poetry there is no
Stein there to analyze: there are the teacher, the students, and the text. Freud’s associations take him nearer to a
truth in himself, whereas the prevailing notion of teaching literature would assume that the teaching is in service
of revealing a truth in the poem. Not as an alternative to this form of teaching but as a supplement, I imagine a
pedagogy that allows a space for both students and teachers to see in the literature at hand an invitation to explore
their associations, to accord these associations the same reverence often accorded to the words of the Poet or
Author, to allow the poem to send the message back.

Beauty, this violent thing, wrathful, charging earthward with hooked
prow, talons like shimmering spiders ready to clutch and claim and have
you ever felt the force of the hawk’s scaled feet gripping you like a
sprung trap? Have you? Or the stone unforgiving at your skull? The
voice from nowhere that annihilates you.
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For Lacan these insights eventually shed light on one of Freud’s last contributions to psychoanalytic
theory: the compulsion to repeat. It is Lacan’s insistence that Freud’s discoveries were ultimately grounded in a
theory of the signifier that explains the compulsion to repeat as not simply an affliction unique to neurotics but
an essential aspect of human existence. For example, in the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Freud
writes,
we have been struck by the fact that the forgotten and repressed experiences of childhood are
reproduced during the work of analysis in dreams and reactions, particularly in those occurring in
the transference, although their revival runs counter to the interest of the pleasure principle; and we
have explained this by supposing that in these cases a compulsion to repeat is overcoming even the
pleasure principle. Outside analysis, too, something similar can be observed. There are people in
whose lives the same reactions are perpetually being repeated uncorrected, to their own detriment,
or others who seem to be pursued by a relentless fate, though closer investigation teaches us that
they are unwittingly bringing this fate on themselves. In such cases we attribute a “daemonic”
character to the compulsion to repeat.

And, further, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud writes,
the impression given is of being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some "daemonic"
power; but psychoanalysis has always taken the view that their fate is for the most part arranged by
themselves and determined by early infantile influences. The compulsion which is here in evidence
differs in no way from the compulsion to repeat which we have found in neurotics, even though the
people we are now considering have never shown any signs of dealing with a neurotic conflict by
producing symptoms. Thus we have come across people all of whose human relationships have the
same outcome. […] If we take into account observations such as these, based upon behaviour in the
transference and upon the life-histories of men and women, we shall find courage to assume that
there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle. 160
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Lacan views these examples as evidence “of speech which returns in the subject until it has said its final word,
speech that must return, despite the resistance of the ego which is a defense.”161 I have already noted how Lacan
views the Oedipus complex from the perspective of symbolic structure; this structure persists until Freud’s final
thoughts in Moses and Monotheism regarding the murder of the father and the original prohibition, which Lacan
recasts in symbolic terms regarding the very notions of truth and justice. Lacan believes the essential Freudian
question ultimately relates exclusively to the signifier, and the compulsion to repeat is a function of a speech
that insists. Lacan writes, “Freud only ever asked himself one question – how can this system of signifiers
[embodied in the Oedipus complex and the murder of the father] without which no incarnation of either truth or
justice is possible, how can this literal logos take hold of an animal who doesn’t need it and doesn’t care about
it – since it doesn’t at all concern his needs?”162 Or, how is it possible that speech continues to insist even as this
insistence contributes directly to unpleasure? Why is that only in humans is there a beyond of the pleasure
principle? Freud’s answer stems from his belief in an actual primordial murder of the father, Moses, which in
turn instituted an original prohibition maintained throughout human history. In Lacan’s words, “man is in fact
possessed by a discourse of the law and he punishes himself with it in the name of this symbolic debt which in
his neurosis he keeps paying for more and more. […] From the Freudian point of view man is the subject captured
and tortured by language.”163 This captivation and torture is more pronounced in the neuroses, but we are all
subject to it.
Again, it is this general captivation by language that compels
Lacan to undertake such a detailed analysis of the elements of
language, ultimately tracing his way back to the signifier/signified
dichotomy made famous by Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure’s
analysis of the relationship between the signifier and the signified
begins with the following diagram. The upper amorphous stream (A)
is a representation of thought, so represented because “psychologically our thought – apart from its expression
in words – is only a shapeless and indistinct mass. […] Without the help of signs we would be unable to make a
clear-cut, consistent distinction between two ideas. Without language, thought is a vague, uncharted nebula.”164
The bottom stream (B), equally amorphous, is the body of sounds, of “phonic substance, [which is] neither more
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fixed nor more rigid than thought; it is not a mold into which thought must of necessity fit but a plastic substance
divided in turn into distinct parts to furnish the signifiers needed by thought.”165 Language, then, what Saussure
nominates as “the linguistic fact”, can be represented by the series of vertical dotted lines, “contiguous
subdivisions marked off on both the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas (A) and the equally vague plane of sounds
(B).”166 Lacan interprets Saussure’s diagram as follows: “[the upper level] we shall provisionally call the
sentimental mass of the current of discourse, a confused mass in which appear units, islands, an image, an object,
a feeling, a cry, an appeal. It’s a continuum, whereas underneath is the signifier as a pure chain of discourse, a
succession of words, in which nothing is isolable.”167 Lacan, however, is not satisfied with Saussure’s diagram:
“his solution is inconclusive, since it leaves the locution and the whole sentence problematic.”168
“No signifier is isolable,”169 claims Lacan. Signifiers reach; they scan. They associate. They crystalize
into a unit only at the completion of the sentence, a fact more apparent in Greek or Latin, for example, where
the syntax and arrangement of words is totally unrestricted. The unit, that is, is not signifying outside of a certain
binding of the signifier and signified, a binding achieved by what Lacan will call the point de capiton. To
demonstrate this, Lacan simply begins with a given unit, the word Yes. “Yes. And, since French, not English is
my language, what comes next is – Yes, I come into his temple to worship the Eternal Lord.”170 Obviously, the
word yes has a sense, but no matter how broad one takes this sense to be, it will not have the sense it does in
Lacan’s locution until the entire sentence is bound in place by the Eternal Lord. Lacan concludes, “we are, here,
in the order of signifiers, and I hope to have made you feel what the continuity of the signifier is. A signifying
unit presupposes the completion of a certain circle that situates its different elements.”171 And later, “whether it
be a sacred text, a novel, a play, a monologue, or any conversation whatsoever, allow me to represent the function
of the signifier by a spatializing device, which we have no reason to deprive ourselves of. This point around
which all concrete analysis of discourse must operate I shall call a quilting point [point de capiton].”172

165

Ibid.

166

Ibid.

167

Lacan, Sem. III, 261.

168

Ibid. 262.

169

Ibid.

170

Ibid.

171

Ibid. 263.

172

Ibid. 267.

87

The quilting point represents not only a bond between signifier and signified but, like the creases that
radiate out from the upholsterer’s knot, serves as the nexus about which countless other avenues of meaning take
form. Lacan describes the implications of the point de capiton as follows:
the schema of the quilting point is essential in human experience. Why does this minimal schema
of human experience which Freud gave us in the Oedipus complex retain its irreducible yet
enigmatic value for us? And why privilege the Oedipus complex? Why does Freud always want to
find it everywhere, with such insistence? Why do we have here a knot that seems so essential to him
that he is unable to abandon it in the slightest particular observation – unless it’s because the notion
of father, closely related to that of the fear of God, gives him the most palpable element in experience
of what I’ve called the quilting point between the signifier and signified? 173

This is why the Oedipus complex plays such a fundamental role in psychoanalysis: it is the first relation that
takes on a signifying structure. Schreber’s delusion is a result of the fact that “to all appearances [he] lacks this
fundamental signifier called being a father.”174 To compensate for this lack he imagines himself as the wife of
the ultimate father, God, and further imagines that he must be impregnated by this God in order for the function
of being a father to materialize.

A goblin comes to me and tells me I enjoy this. One tooth quivering in
her black gum as if stabbed there.

Is she right?
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The implications for Lacan’s return to Freud and his emphasis on the elementary function of the signifier
can be followed in several directions. I have at least offered some examples of how literature can be heard
differently if it is approached as the analyst approaches the psychotic. But there is very little in Lacan’s teachings
that can be directly applied to education, insofar as Lacan’s teachings are structured by a very specific battery
of experiences: that of the analyst and analysand interacting with one another in an analysis. Nearly all of what
psychoanalysis offers educators must be applied, as it were, atmospherically. The same is true for how one writes
about or criticizes Lacan from within the context of the university, for the university exists only because it is
structured by a certain relationship to knowledge, and its boundaries are continually reinforced by various rituals
and habits that range from the almost comic obeisance to these rituals all the way up to the syntax of one’s
speech. This is an organizing structure, and for every truth or fact it permits to be revealed there is another that
is, as if out of necessity, neglected, obscured, or dismissed. There is a voice that cannot be heard by the
university. Lacan says, “language is the condition of the unconscious,” and in doing so upsets the priority of
what seems so intuitive. Surely language is what Rousseau imagined it to be, some slowly evolved series of
increasingly more specific cries that were originally only the effusion of animal drives. This presumption gives
a compelling history to the origin of the human animal and permits one to believe that language is our organ to
use as we see fit and that the world of the symbolic and the world of the real are identical, overlaid one upon the
other. This presumption allows us to believe that it was the human animal who invented language, who has come
to master it and will by its means extend its mastery over all possible knowable things. Thus when the university
hears Lacan say, “language is the condition of the unconscious,” implying as this does that in fact it is language
that precedes anything that could be considered the monumental effusion of the instincts, that it is language that,
in an instant, produced a rift between the symbolic and real that can never be repaired, the university simply
translates it otherwise: the unconscious is the condition of language.175 The following and final chapter attempts
to find a place for the unconscious within the university.

Seminar XVII
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“What you say is always decentered in relation to sense, you shun sense”, claimed a member of Lacan’s
17th seminar audience. “This is perhaps why my discourse,” replies Lacan, “is an analytic discourse. It’s the
structure of analytic discourse to be like that.”176

One can only go so far along the path of summarizing this seminar in the context of the university;
something analogous to a translation must occur. Referring to Anika Lemaire’s university thesis, eventually
published as Jacques Lacan and representing perhaps the first “study” of Lacan’s work from within the
university, Lacan says,
this thesis […] retains its value [despite being written from within the academy], its value as an example
in itself, its value also as an example because of what it promotes to the level of distortion, in some way
an obligatory one, of a translation into the university discourse of something that has its own laws.
I have to unravel these laws. They are the ones that claim to give at least the conditions of a
properly psychoanalytic discourse. 177

Obviously this document that I am currently writing is not immune to Lacan’s insight here. My interest
in amalgamating Lacan’s work and something like a literary pedagogy has this moment of translation to
consider. The truths of psychoanalysis, which I claim are essential for renewing our (i.e. those of us in the
university) thinking about the possibilities of teaching literature, fly from the spotlight of university discourse,
whose own ethos is characterized by the assumption that the real is completely accessible to the symbolic. Here
Lacan demurs, saying that, “if there is one thing that our entire approach delimits, and that has surely been
renewed by analytic experience, it is that the only way in which to evoke the truth is by indicating that it is only
accessible through a half-saying, that it cannot be said completely, for the reason that beyond this half there is
nothing to say.”178 This is what justifies, in Lacan’s pedagogy, his efforts to leave in his work room to be
misunderstood, his elliptical or elusive style, and his habit of posing questions without ever completely
answering them or addressing them directly. It also explains his interest in enigmas, which leave some portion
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of the thing concealed and unsaid. An enigma is not simple a question, however, “the enigma is something that
presses us for a response in the name of a mortal danger.”179
So I will begin this final section with a bit of an enigma, a question Lacan asks at the end of the second
session of Seminar 17: “the analyst makes himself the cause of the analysand’s desire. What does this strange
notion mean?”180 And similarly, in the context of this project, does one dare ask whether the teacher makes
herself the cause of the students’ desire? What would this mean?
It is simplest to situate desire in the discourses by beginning
with the master’s discourse. In Lacan’s earliest depictions of this
discourse S1 has a rather precise meaning: it is an “intervening”
signifier, intervening in the mass of signifiers already forming a
network, which is represented by S2. Within this equation are a few other important terms – “knowledge” and
the “subject” [$] – about which Lacan says,
knowledge initially arises at the moment at which S1 comes to represent something, through its
intervention in the field defined […] as an already structured field of knowledge [i.e. S2]. And the subject
is its supposition, its hypokeimenon, insofar as the subject represents the specific trait of being
distinguished from the living individual. 181

That is, knowledge appears in the subject through the intervention of S1 within the network of S2. This
intervention “locates a moment,” akin to the moment of (mis)recognition during the mirror stage: this moment
“says that it is at the very instant at which S1 intervenes in the already constituted field of the other signifiers
[…] that, by intervening in another system, this $, which I have called the subject as divided, emerges.” 182 This
split, characterized by a gap, is represented as a loss, and this loss “is what the letter to be read as object a
designates.” Like the dialectic between the master and bondsman articulated by Hegel in the Phenomenology of
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Spirit, the master’s discourse is rooted in an historical moment (one that Marx later will articulate more precisely
in politico-economic terms). The master and the slave were two components of some of the earliest forms of
civilization (Lacan refers to ancient Greece): the master is the one with the power, the slave is the one with the
savoir-faire. Lacan describes the development of the master’s discourse as a kind of theft: the slave knows how
to do this or that, but it is the master who intervenes in the matter of articulating this knowledge – that is,
transmitting it – “which means [this knowledge] can be transmitted from the slave’s pocket to the master’s.”183
For Lacan, this operation signals the origin of philosophy: “philosophy in its historical function is this extraction,
I would almost say this betrayal, of the slave’s knowledge, in order to obtain its transmutation into the master’s
knowledge.”184 Not because the master has a desire to know, but because the master has a desire that things work
(for him) – that he be in a position to enjoy without knowing or working. Working for the master is what the
slave does, and just as Hegel noted that insofar as it is the slave, not the master, who first embarks on the path
to self-consciousness via the products he or she makes for the master, so here does Lacan note that the master’s
desire is in a sense managed by the slave, who anticipates that desire. What earlier was stolen at the level of
knowledge is in a way regained by the slave in terms of desire, insofar as the slave is able to anticipate the
master’s desire. But, because of this, the master’s desire cannot be said to be his own but rather is the Other’s,185
which is why Lacan claims that knowledge (in this case the slave’s knowledge) is the Other’s jouissance, insofar
as the master can only enjoy what the slave produces for the Other. This Other is neither the slave nor the master
but rather a field that emerges once S1 intervenes in S2, the Other that is the residue of the splitting Lacan already
isolated in the mirror stage and which also produces the gap, the loss, a, here felt by the slave as a loss of
jouissance that is accounted for elsewhere as a surplus: “under the Other it is the place where loss is produced,
the loss of jouissance from which we extract the function of surplus jouissance.”186
The position of each of the elements indicates its function within the discourse. Lacan gives different
names to these places throughout the seminar: three different schema in total:
1) master signifier
subject
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jouissance

“Already it is clear that the master’s desire is the Other’s desire, since it’s this desire that the slave
anticipates.” (Lacan, Seminar XVII, 38).
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2) desire

Other

truth

loss

3) agent
truth

work
production

The varied nomenclature allows the elements of the discourses to take on different inflections. At one
point in the seminar Lacan refers to the first position (the upper-left) as the “dominant” position – not in the
sense of dominance but rather in the sense the term has in music – and says “one can give different substances
to this dominant according to the discourse. Take the dominant in the master’s discourse, whose place is occupied
by S1. If we called it ‘the law’ we would not fail to open the door to a number of interesting observations.” And
later he adds, “at the level of the hysteric’s discourse it is clear that we see this dominant appear in the form of
a symptom. It is around the symptom that the hysteric’s discourse is situated and ordered.”187 Later still he says,
“the [upper-left position] will be said to function as the place of orders, of the command.” 188 In the context of
the university discourse this command will be heard as the command to know, to know more, to know
everything.189 And finally the dominant position, the place of the command, in the discourse of the analyst is
described as follows: “it is the object a, that is to say with what presents itself for the subject as the cause of
desire, that the psychoanalyst offers himself as the endpoint for this insane operation, a psychoanalysis, insofar
as it sets out on the trace left by the desire to know.”190
We move now to the university discourse, in order to note
immediately the affinity, or perhaps collusion is a better word,
between the master’s and university discourses. S2, knowledge at
large, in the university discourse occupies the place of the command,
and beneath it in the place of truth is S1, the master signifier. Lacan asks, “why does it come about that one finds
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nothing else at the level of [the university discourse’s] truth than the master signifier, insofar as it brings the
master’s order?”191 The collusion between these discourses becomes apparent when one realizes that it is a
continual seesawing between the master’s and university discourses that constitutes the progress of the sciences.
In the university discourse the command to know is made to a, which Lacan identifies as the student. The student
works, the product of her labour is, just as are the products produced by the slave, co-opted, acceding to the
position of knowledge only after being ratified by the master. Prior to this ratification Lacan calls this knowledge
“unnatural” and summarizes the progression as that which “brings an unnatural knowledge out of its primitive
localization at the level of the slave into the dominant place, by virtue of having become pure knowledge of the
master, ruled by his command.”192 In this way the university discourse, which in this particular moment of his
seminar Lacan equates with the discourse of science, is perpetually at the service of the master’s discourse,
which perhaps above all is a discourse devoted to maintaining dominance over the slave.
I ask: the teaching of literature transpires at the university, does this mean it is (necessarily?) structured
by the university discourse?

Erode.
Erode.
Erode.
Entropy.
All our lost things consigned to erratic orbits, revolutions too
vast and strained and mutable for us to map, the whole theatre spinning
itself slowly to silence, quiescence. You have not appeared in my sky for
months except as paraselenae, as your ghost and its shadow, as you and
your echo, as two silent and spectral creatures attending me, or hunting
me. What lament will transform me, my flashing antlers unfurling, that
you might devour me?

The short answer is: yes. The university itself in fact only exists as a consequence of a unique structure
of discourse. The essential distinction to note here is that between speech and discourse: the former indicates
that actual utterances exchanged by subjects in this or that setting, whereas the latter is a consequence of certain
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relations that materialize as a result of, or are emblematic of, a unique social structure. Discourse, for Lacan, is
always comprised of only four elements, and the style of discourse can be modulated according to how these
elements are situated with respect to one another. These elements are distilled from the most basic elements of
language; they do not reveal any answers as to the origin of language but are instead the components without
which no variety of discourse could really be imagined, and these components are the aforementioned S 1, S2,
$, and a. S2 represents the entire body of signifiers, one that is already from the outset considered to be complete.
S2 represents “a signifying battery that we have no right, ever, to take as dispersed, as not already forming a
network of what is called knowledge.”193 There is a kind of temporality or sequencing to the arrival of
knowledge on the stage, one that requires S1 and $. I have already commented on Lacan’s examples of day and
night, meant to illustrate how an entire signifying universe arrives all at once at the moment one signifying unit
is born. The word day takes on significance only by a dichotomistic relation with another signifier, which in turn
provides a blueprint for all possible signifying operations, and this is why Lacan insists that this field is already
a network. In his own words: “knowledge [i.e. S2] initially arises at the moment at which S1 comes to represent
something, through its intervention in the field defined, at the point we have come to, as an already structured
field of knowledge. And the subject [i.e. $] is its supposition, its hypokeimenon, insofar as the subject represent
the specific trait of being distinguished from the living individual.”194 This operation can be summed up by one
of Lacan’s more famous aphorisms that the signifier is that which represents a subject to another signifier;195 at
the moment the intervening signifier S1 appears, $ appears as well. And as I have already outlined at length, the
subject, as divided, is already marked by a loss, and this loss is represented in Lacan’s terms as a.
To repeat, for Lacan these elements can be situated in four cardinal ways, each orientation representing
a unique discourse, and each element taking on a slightly different connotation depending on the discourse it
structures. Being situated in the university, the possibilities of discourse are already qualified by the structure.
S2 occupying the dominant position in the university discourse indicates that what is essential about this
discourse, and the institution it makes possible, is knowledge, knowing everything, constructing the world in
terms of what is accessible to knowledge, acknowledging objects only because of their capacity to be known.
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Lacan recognizes in this particular discourse (and Žižek mentions this above) a mirroring of capitalist
exploitation that itself follows from the master’s discourse. The master/capitalist frustrates the slave (the worker,
the student, the proletariat) by rendering her knowledge useless, both insofar as she is unable to use it for herself
and also by overpowering it with hyper-productive technologized forms of that knowledge that increase the
master’s surplus at accelerating rates. The university compensates the slave (the worker, the student, the
proletariat) to some degree by offering no end to knowledge, but this knowledge is knowledge that has already
been calibrated according not exactly to the master’s interests but more to the master’s understanding of how
the world functions. Like the slave in Plato’s Meno, the grandness of the value of what is given to the boy is not
questioned (though knowing the square on the diagonal is clearly useless to the slave), and it also does nothing
really to free or enlighten the boy who has only moved from a master to a master’s knowledge. This is why
Lacan claims that the all the slave has acquired in becoming a student is a new master.196
It is important to note at this point what role desire plays in the discourses of the master and university.
In neither of these instances can it really be said to play any active role at all: Lacan mentions several times that
in the case of the master desire is in a way irrelevant; the master does not desire what the slave produces as much
as require it in order to perpetuate a specific order. And in any case the slave knows the master’s desire far better
than the master himself since the slave’s products take shape only with respect to this abstract desire. In the case
of the university discourse, where knowledge (S2) plays the dominant role, desire can again be seen as playing
more of a structural than dynamic role: the imperative of the university to know, and continue to know, and to
know more and more, is a consequence of the fact that as knowledge is acquired it simultaneously expands its
domain, opening new regions that must be acquired or colonized. The university houses the fantasy that
everything can be known – the fantasy of a totality-knowledge, Lacan calls it.197 Psychoanalysis intervenes at
this point, since it was Freud’s discovery of the unconscious that introduced
a knowledge that, precisely, is not known. And Freud made this discovery
by listening to the discourse of the hysteric.
This discourse would exist whether Freud was there to hear it or not,
because it is founded not on any specific symptom or neurosis, but is founded in the sexual relation, reflected in
the hysteric’s question: “am I a man or a woman?” which at heart is a question rooted in the basic signifying
structure
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As mentioned above, this question is at its base a question of signifiers. What gives this discourse its substance,
though, is that the question is addressed to an other, to one supposed to know and to have an answer. More
importantly, as the hysteric asks this question she at the same time solicits the desire of the master, S1, posing
as a kind of sphinx – who of course is always armed with a riddle. While in this way she does manage to obtain
some kind of power or advantage over the master (by being the object/cause of his desire), she is also at least in
some way eager to be whatever it is he answers.
All speaking subjects are split, which is why some have taken the hysteric’s discourse as a model for all
discourse.198 Within this discourse, though, we can also interpret $ as the symptom, as that which speaks apart
from or in addition to the subject, who now is in a sense alien from herself due to her “symptomatic tearing
apart.”199 In an appeal for recognition or restoration, a question is addressed to the master (S 1, analyst, priest,
teacher, guru, etc.) who is called upon to respond to this demand, producing what has come to be a very long
history of diagnoses, accumulated as an enormous body of knowledge (S2). What the discourse reveals, however,
is that all answers to the hysteric’s question attempt to restore to her a wholeness that she cannot accept since
the truth revealed here is that there is always a loss, a gap, or an excess that can never be accounted for by
knowledge. This appropriation by S2 amputates the hysteric’s symptom, which nevertheless persists as a, the
plus-de-jouir which characterizes her as hysteric in the first place and is an emblem of her somewhat truculent
relationship with language. To repeat a quotation from above, “what hysterics ultimately want one to know is
that language goes off the rails concerning the magnitude of what she as a woman is capable of revealing
concerning jouissance.”200 And in the clinical setting it is this very going-off-the-rails that establishes the
analytic scene in the form of free association and provides the pathways of the treatment: “how could saying nomatter-what lead anywhere, unless it was determined that there is nothing random in this production of signifiers
that, simply because it involves signifiers, does not bear upon this knowledge that is not known, and which is
really doing the work?”201 Ultimately, then, it is the business of the analyst to somehow procure and prolong
this production of signifiers until, ideally, the hysteric comes to see herself as answer to her own question.
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Prolonging this speech, however, is always challenged by the hysteric who is making her appeal to one
that is positioned as the master, as the one either in possession of the knowledge required to resolve the riddle,
or one who, when asked, will not be able to resist trying his hand at it. The hysteric appeals specifically to the
master in order to maintain what in her is hysterical.202 “The hysteric wants a master. She wants the other to be
a master, and to know lots of things, but at the same time she doesn’t want him to know so much that he does
not believe she is the supreme price of all his knowledge.”203 Without her, there is no desire to know on the part
of the S1 – she solicits this desire in an effort to obtain some token of knowledge regarding her illness, only to
dismiss it or demonstrate its ineffectiveness.
This brings us finally to the analyst’s discourse, which
demonstrates how the analytic scene functions. Here the analyst is
represented by a, which itself represents what has been lost as a result
the discourse of the analysand. The analytic position only exists insofar
as one believes this loss to be reparable in some way, and the analyst can remedy it: in Lacan’s words, “an
analysis is what one expects from an analyst,”204but what one expects from an analyst – and this is why S2 is
positioned in the place of truth – is that his knowledge will function in terms of truth. As the discourse illustrates,
the analyst addresses himself to the split subject, but does so silently and with an aim to get the subject to produce
what, for her, functions as the master signifier S1, the unary trait, the signifier around which the rest of the
subject’s symbolic universe takes form, and this universe is represented as S2. Knowledge functioning in the
place of truth is what characterizes the speech of the analyst, which takes the form of an interpretation. Yes, the
analyst eventually offers an interpretation, but it is rooted in the speech of the analysand and as such is really
only a half-saying, a veiled speech, an enigma, a kind of citation. In Lacan’s words:
interpretation – those who make use of it are aware of this – is often established through an enigma. It is
an enigma that is gathered as far as possible from the threads of the psychoanalysand’s discourse, which
you, the interpreter, can in no way complete on your own, and cannot consider to be an avowal without
lying. It is a citation that is sometimes taken from the very same text, on the other hand, from a given
statement – such as the one that can pass for an avowal, provided only that you connect it to the whole
context. But you are thereby appealing to whoever is its author.
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The analyst has only the speech of the analysand at his disposal when it comes to offering the
interpretation – it is not the analyst who is supposed to know, but the rather the analysand, within whom the
knowledge as truth resides. “This knowledge of which he who is prepared, in advance, to be the product of the
psychoanalysand’s cogitation, that is, the psychoanalyst, makes himself the underwriter, the hostage – insofar
as, as this product, he is in the end destined to become a loss, to be eliminated from the process.”206 And this is
why the analyst is represented by a, the lost object and also the cause of desire.
I asked above whether the teacher can be the cause of the students’ desire. Are we in a position yet to
answer this question? One might envision a relationship similar to that between Socrates and Alcibiades:
Socrates seeming to house some grand secret of knowledge or pleasure (the agalma) that allures Alcibiades
almost to the point of madness, but which ultimately is supposed to be edifying even as it is intensely frustrating.
Or we can imagine a teaching that imitates Cixous’s description of writing, an endless not-arriving, an interaction
with texts that does not circumscribe , delimit, corner, or domesticate them in any way but rather pursues them
like a nomad through the deserts or the Pequod through the seas, hounding some silent object, an object in which
one sees some dimension of oneself, as Ahab’s leg is literally a part of the white whale, but the identification is
tenuous, phantasmal, monstrous, unspeakable. One imagines a book that affects one like a suicide, and what is
Ahab’s monomaniacal lust for revenge but a form of suicide? We know Ishmael is the literal teacher, and but
for him there would be no tale at all, yet it was his own growing distaste of his role as schoolmaster that drove
him to decide between suicide and sailorhood, to replace his Cicero for Ahab, his world of knowledge for the
white whale. Yes, and my own pursuit of death here, chasing a ghost for years and where does she take me? Into
what realm of truth? Where have I not-arrived?
Freud included psychoanalysis in the list of impossible professions, a list that included healing, politics,
and education, all of which are so characterized because they cannot fail to produce results adequate to the less
wild trades. Allowing myself a bit of room to speculate here, I would say that education is becoming more
possible, in the sense that it is recalibrating its understanding of itself and its objectives in order to produce more
clearly delimited results. Perhaps this is its own form of the death drive, the drive for the stillness and peace the
results from the idea that the bureaucratic structure has successfully covered the field of education with its own
symbolic force – that all educational procedures and problems and methods can be understood in terms organized
by the bureaucratizing master’s discourse, and that all phenomena that threaten this order are either exiled or
colonized.
Let the ghosts in. Follow them. They are wondrous strange. There are more things in heaven and earth,
Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
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I hasten behind you, Whitney. But how you flee. You, star. You,
bird. What creature was I, that evening I first stepped into your home,
you in one of your dresses smiling, rushing, tending to a pot of yams or
kale? You were once alive. You were once alive. And now so many of
us bear the scars of your death upon our hearts as sharks do upon their
unearthly hides, swimming alone into their distant corners of the black
sea, seeking, seeking, seeking.

100

Part II: Paracite
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Why have I done this? Forced these pieces together in this way? I ask in anticipation of
questions that may arise in the mind of a reader, though I don’t necessarily expect them to.
This preface, unlike others, cannot summarize or distil any of what follows. What follows, by
the way, is a sort of concatenation, a collage, an assault of writing – not all of it mine – assembled in
what can be characterized neither as a deliberate order nor a haphazard pastiche. I assembled it all
under the hypothesis that whatever found its way in would engender – in me, in whomever –
associations, associations that will not be foreclosed or buried by the action of any overly apparent or
muscular thesis. The thesis is this hypothesis.
The existence of this writing, the materialization of my sustained efforts, implies my regard
for these associations, my valuing them. One could deduce, from the fact of this regard, certain literary,
philosophical, or ethical stances tied to certain schools or theorists. While there may be a range of
possible affinities, for me personally I consider them to be more or less exclusively Freudian and
Lacanian, these being the only theorists I consider myself to be acceptably familiar with when it comes
to the matter of declaring allegiances.
(At the sub-thematic level I profess a concern for education, specifically the teaching of
literature at the university level, though my expertise here is confined to my having been a student of
literature in several years of university education and my having taught a few courses. Since education
is so complicated and specialized as to constitute its own Faculty on most university campuses, it
therefore also has a ritualized and credentialized aspect, which is not completely insignificant since this
aspect is a major player in the constitution of knowledge within the discipline as well as a means by
which the borders of the discipline are determined and the criteria of its knowledge are established.
This is all obvious, and I mention it only to emphasize that my thinking regarding education comes
from a perspective that is almost entirely outside of these borders. This admission – I am thinking
again of possible readers – will make much of what follows literally useless and senseless if considered
from the disciplinary perspective. From the issues that I have in my limited contact with the discipline
understood to be significant for it, there is almost nothing in what follows of value, nothing of import.
This remoteness erases all the details comprising education’s academic constitution, and from
this distance education’s disciplinary boundaries disappear into the horizon. From where this work is
situated, education is not an academic discipline but rather, as they say, part of the human condition.)
But though this preface will not summarize, it will give me an opportunity to discuss at least
one feature of the method, which elsewhere in my writing I have called “paracitation”. At that time I
wrote:
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What would it mean to teach Kafka? Do some works resist teaching more than others,
or even resist it absolutely? Some works thrive endlessly, terribly, like Poe’s M.
Valdamar, in the state between sleep and death but putresce instantly at the command
to wake, the command to join us here. And if, for love of the object, one resolves to
teach otherwise, what can this otherwise be?
The play of language brings us the pair cite and parasite. One famous species
of the latter is the cymothoa exigua, a marine parasite that enters the host fish through
the gills, mates, and afterward the female enters the mouth of the fish, puncturing the
host’s tongue with a pair of foreclaws and extracting all the blood from the organ
until it atrophies and falls off. The isopod then attaches itself to the host where the
tongue once was, remaining there as a prosthetic for the rest of the host’s life.
If citation puts the tongue of the other in one’s mouth, then paracitation is
to become the tongue of the other. Surrounded by the body of Kafka, the brain and
eyes, the anguish and symptoms and habits and dreams, the style, the fabric of one’s
discourse is warped by this inhuman and unholy congress. Imagine teaching from this
vantage, from a place where one has become lost in the figure of another only to find
one’s essential vitality therein. Imagine that there is no lesson appended to a text but
rather a monstrous identification, the bliss of Aristophanes’ unhewn couple who are
languid with joy, Kafka’s text and words blinking to life again in the dew but laced
with hidden roots, mine, sinking. Paraciting, speaking like the demon within, what
does it mean for desire? What might I find myself able to say or teach from within
the other’s mouth? Are you other at all anymore, you, Kafka, what message is this?
Who speaks?

Those are my questions. One can follow a psychoanalytic line here – through the desire of the
Other, through identification – but how sympathetic are these situations, my relation to the text from
the perspective of teaching on one hand, and my relation to the Other from the perspective of an
analysis on the other? In the Lacanian quadripartite structure of Subject, other, other’, and Other,
where is the teacher and where the text? The student? How can desire be made to announce itself, and
whose desire?
What follows is an essay, absent all the stylistic trappings that have accrued onto that term
over the years and years. It is a sort of offering, perhaps no better than the infantile scybalum, an
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acknowledgement that you want something, but who knows what it is. It is an essay; it is not a response,
but desires one.
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‘…no longer to desire the work but to desire one’s own
language.’
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September
June 9, 2016
Like anyone else, the ecosystem of my
metaphorical production is unique –
the seams of fertility run this way or
that; the night sky is obstructed by
black trees, or not; seasons are short
or long; there are inaccessible places
that engender my myths or my
dreams; there is a breathtaking
coherence, hidden or fractured by, by
what?

There are symptoms in my writing
that are not stylistic.

On the right is a short story by
Donald Barthelme called “Me and
Miss Mandible,” published in 1964.
Throughout, I have added several
journal entries to the original story and
elaborated on some of them. Nothing
from the original is excised.

They are symptoms, qualifying as such
in a clinical sense: as evidence of the,
my, unconscious sending a message
(to the Other, from the Other?). The
coherence of my discourse, of
anyone’s discourse, crystallizes around
this Other. Symptoms, they’re
everywhere in my discourse, in what
I’m calling my ecosystem. Like wasps
fecundating in the boughs of the
groves, like the pearls of grubs
populating the undersoil, chewing the
roots of a now-dying seedling,
symptoms are invisible until you are
called upon to look and to feed
yourself by your own labor. And then
they are everywhere – the whole
system seething.

If Barthelme’s story serves as a
satisfactory object for scholarly
scrutiny, what is it now that I have
intervened in it, and how can we
characterize my intervention?

13
Miss Mandible wants to make love to me but she hesitates
because I am officially a child; I am, according to the
records, according to the gradebook on her desk, according
to the card index in the principal's office, eleven years old.
There is a misconception here, one that I haven't quite
managed to get cleared up yet. I am in fact thirty-five, I've
been in the Army, I am six feet one, I have hair in the
appropriate places, my voice is a baritone, I know very well
what to do with Miss Mandible if she ever makes up her
mind.
In the meantime we are studying common fractions.
The word ‘mandible’ is from Greek and refers to chewing.
Masticate. None of my peers could possibly know this, but I
do as a result of my fascination with Miss Mandible.
Etymology is a science of intimacy.
I am anticipating, in our study of common fractions, a time
in the future when we will be made to engage uncommon
fractions. The square on the diagonal. Irrational numbers. I
recall being young, hearing the myths of the algebra teachers
– numbers without end, imaginary numbers, √-1, matrices,
empty sets, paradoxes – and for now it really is nice to have
common fractions. In the future I know I won’t have it so
easy. I know this because I have already been 16 once, and I
will be 16 again in five short years. Apparently.
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I could, of course, answer all the questions, or at least most
I write “we,” but that’s just another trick
– there is no we – one that Plato noticed
thousands of years ago.
Really the question is: what shall I, in
your endless silence, impute to you, all
the way down to your very heart, your
ignorance, your desire? My address to
you, all my points and questions, place
you somewhere, whether you are there or
not.
And I am refusing to be somewhere, too.
“Ideally,” I told him once, “it would be
impossible to read.” Or so difficult, so
little thread stitching the thing together,
that the faintest association, the flash of a
strand of spider’s silk, would be precious.
Ideally, it would be the ruins of what was
never whole. My symptom, are you
there? The afflatus of ruin.
Value. This word is ringing everywhere in
my head – what value does it have, your
writing?
The strikethrough is only a means of
indicating the perseverance of a forsaken
step. Something one chooses to hide, and
in concealing revealing. I know we can
fill our time with empty speech – and
how often is teaching caught in its trap?
– but is there empty writing? Full
writing?
Some tropes must be exorcised. For
months I couldn’t stop thinking, “my
mother is a fish.” And then it was the
phrase, “the very blood of my syntax.”
Now it is Whitney, whose breath I hear
all around me. At this moment, surfacing
from the ruins, a relic:
What are the dead? An effect of
grammar, of an arrangement of
words, the breathlessness I feel
when I say, ‘Whitney is dead’. They
are there when words arrange
themselves in impossible or
unforgivable ways. That is when
they arrive, how they persist. The
routine of language, the coins we
pass without end tallying a
meaningless balance, crumbles like
bone when you are standing there
next to her as she gasps and chokes
and yet already new platitudes take
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of them (there are things I don't remember). But I prefer to
sit in this too-small seat with the desktop cramping my
thighs, bolts dully pressing into my legs all day long, and
examine the life around me. There are thirty-two in the class,
which is launched every morning with the pledge of
allegiance to the flag, which curiously we did not do when I
was in the actual Army. My own allegiance, at the moment,
is divided between Miss Mandible and Sue Ann Brownly,
who sits across the aisle from me all day long and is, like
Miss Mandible, a fool for love. Of the two I prefer, today,
Sue Ann; although between eleven and eleven and a half (she
refuses to reveal her exact age) she is clearly a woman, with
a woman's disguised aggression and a woman's peculiar
contradictions. Strangely neither she nor any of the other
children seem to see any incongruity in my presence here.
Incongruity. Incommensurability?
Oh, another pie here; this one missing three of eight slices.
The children here are blithely sketching oblong circles,
enjoying their proximity to these painless and undemanding
proofs. Even the worst diagrams in the room boast the sheen
of truth. Whatever the tragedies that surely await me and my
love for Mandible/Brownly, I am happy here in fifth grade.
15
Happily our geography text, which contains maps of all the
principal land-masses of the world, is large enough to
conceal my clandestine journal-keeping, accomplished in an
ordinary black composition notebook. Every day I must wait
until Geography to put down such thoughts as I may have
had during the morning about my situation and my fellows.
I have tried writing at other times and it does not work.
I am noticing today a certain commitment Miss Mandible
has to the phrase ‘principle land-mass.’ The precise meaning
and function of this phrase is eluding me, and our textbook
is cautious to avoid too many details in its explanations,
which anyway come off more as assertions. It is
unanimously agreed that there are seven of these masses,
distinguished in our various maps by different colors. The
reasons Europe is separated from Asia are suppressed. India
is granted a special ‘sub-continental’ status in this ruse, the
conversations or arguments leading to this title entirely
absent. My recent re-arrival in the fifth grade, however, has
relaxed my expectations regarding the coherence of the
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world and my existence. For now I am simply trying my best
to fit in.
I am lucky for Geography, anyway, because I am afforded
the opportunity to write in my journal. At any other time of
the day either the teacher is walking up and down the aisles
(during this period, luckily, she sticks close to the map rack
in the front of the room) or Bobby Vanderbilt, who sits
behind me, is punching me in the kidneys and wanting to
know what I am doing. Vanderbilt, I have found out from
certain desultory conversations on the playground, is hung
up on sports cars, a veteran consumer of Road & Track. This
explains the continual roaring sounds which seem to
emanate from his desk; he is reproducing a record album
called Sounds of Sebring. As in, he makes the sounds with
his own mouth. And I admit he has a talent for it.
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19
of language, the coins we pass
without
end
tallying
a
meaningless balance, crumbles
like bone when you are standing
there next to her as she gasps
and chokes and yet already new
platitudes take root like spores
and you begin to wonder if you
will ever have peace with the
dead without the fingers of
language ensnaring you in
bonds
that
leave
you
permanently out of reach of the
dead you have loved, of the
dead you have yet to endure, of
your death. When the dead
arrive at the faults of language,
they are asking you something.
They are like a dream.

Why Barthelme? Why this story? The
choice, I thought, was essentially
arbitrary, but I have since learned that
some styles are more resistant than
others, at least to my abilities. [Added
June 16, 2016: This story – this style –
does not resist. Or is it me who stops
resisting?]
June 10, 2016
There are expository interventions –
didactic interventions. Scholars, for
example, have written about this story:
“sexual contact, like every other form
of human contact, is denied and
perverted by a society which both
titillates its members and then
establishes all sorts of restrictive
norms for them”; “the point here
seems to be that all narratives are
interpretations in this sense, are
necessarily out of context. To tell a
story is therefore to submit oneself to
‘(Who decides?),’ the centerless
center”; “only the narrator realizes
that the children, as many older
members of their society, are
mistaking the sign for the thing itself,
but ‘that signs are signs, and that some
of them are lies’”; “this question,
asked of Barthelme’s fiction, needs
rephrasing: we must ask ‘how,’ not
‘who.’ In Barthelme’s fictions the
‘answer’ lies in the playful disruption
of our accepted forms of discourse
and understanding, in the play of irony
as structure ‘disturbs’ its contents,
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reprimanding sense once more
back into the ‘syntax’ which
produces it”; “this precocious
approach to sex leads to the
adoption of these prefabricated
patterns of standard behavior”;
“in other words, language turns
relative. Unfixed, it drifts among a
multiplicity of ‘meanings.’ Any
attempt at a stable linguistic
‘significance’ decomposes into an
infinite freeplay that refuses
truth”; “’Me and Miss Mandible’
takes on education and the
reliability of signs” (if it wasn’t
already apparent, most of the
scholarship is confined to the 70s
and 80s, representing the badly
eroded thought of a certain
philosopher from El Biar).

The citations above are from the
following sources, in order:

Larry McCaffery, “Donald Barthelme
and the Metafictional Muse,”
SubStance, Vol. 9, No.2, Issue 27:
Current Trends in American Fiction
(1980), pp. 75-88.

R. E. Johnson, “Structuralism and the
Reading of Contemporary Fiction,”
Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal,
Vol. 58, No. 2, STRUCTURALISM:
An Interdisciplinary Study (Summer
1975), pp. 281-306.

Francis Gillen, “Donald Barthelme’s
City: A Guide,” Twentieth Century
Literature, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jan. 1972),
pp. 37-44.

John Leland, “Remarks Re-Marked:
Barthelme, What Curios of Signs!”
boundary 2, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring,
1977), pp. 795-812.

Only I, at times (only at times), understand that somehow a
mistake has been made, that I am in a place where I don't
belong. It may be that Miss Mandible also knows this, at
some level, but for reasons not fully understood by me she
is going along with the game. When I was first assigned to
this room I wanted to protest, the error seemed obvious, the
stupidest principal could have seen it; but I have come to
believe it was deliberate, that I have been betrayed again.
On occasion I have, understandably, horrific bouts of déjà
vu. It happens so often that I’ve been compelled to look into
the scientific literature on the subject, which is but meagerly
represented at our school library (which seems to specialize
in texts on equine anatomy, truncated biographies of
professional basketball players, and illustrated recreations of
great Moments in American history). I have, at least,
collected the following theories (in no particular order,
quoted verbatim):
1)
the experience of déjà vu is an extreme reaction of
the system that your memory uses to tell you that you are in
a familiar situation.
2)
déjà vu is when the brain receives a small sensory
input (a sight, a smell, a sound) that is strikingly similar to
such a detail experienced in the past, and the entire memory
image is brought forward. The brain has taken the past to be
the present by virtue of one tiny bit of sensory information.
3)
déjà vu is when sensory information is rerouted on
its way to memory storage and, so, is not immediately
perceived. This short delay causes the sensation of
experiencing and remembering something at the same time.
4)
according to speculative physicists, déjà vu may
relate to particles that can travel backwards in time
(tachyons), time loops and multiple universes. This theory
presumes that these may give cause for more non-traditional
ways of seeing causality and for the possibility of
neurological ‘time travel’.
5)
the realm of parapsychology proposes that déjà vu is
a chance for reincarnates to get a sneak peak into a past life.
6)
other explanations for déjà vu have been given by
psychoanalysts, such as the manifestation of wish
fulfillment. Here, déjà vu is the subconscious repetition of a
past experience, but with a more positive ending.
I am collecting more information on an ongoing basis,
though my research is complicated by my impulse to keep it
more or less hidden from Miss Mandible, and by the fact that
the class visits the library for only two hours every
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Wednesday afternoon. Taking my cue from Vanderbilt, I fit
in by looking at books filled with exploded views of car
engines. These are not without their unique fascination:
extraordinarily complicated universes of steel, heat,
combustion, work, decay, exhaust, noise, and above all
entropy are violently dismantled and frozen in a single frame
of isometric clarity. Diagrams so clear you can hear them
ringing, hear them sustaining their impossible quiescence,
ex- or implosion immanent, V-8s threatening either to
collapse into perfect unity or erupt at howling velocities,
everything having its place either in the machine or in the
abyss. Vanderbilt whirrs with his lips in the background
while I gaze.
This life-role is as interesting as my former life-role, which
was that of a claims adjuster for the Great Northern
Insurance Company, a position which compelled me to
spend my time amid the debris of our civilization: rumpled
fenders, roofless sheds, gutted warehouses, smashed arms
and legs. After ten years of this one has a tendency to see the
world as a vast junkyard, looking at a man and seeing only
his (potentially) mangled parts, entering a house only to trace
the path of the inevitable fire.
Hence the appeal of the exploded view, where there is at
least a sublime order to the array, a bit of relief from the
calculus of damage and responsibility. Ten years at GNIC
and I couldn’t even see the catastrophe anymore, just claims
waiting to materialize.
Therefore when I was installed here, although I knew an
error had been made, I countenanced it, I was shrewd; I was
aware that there might well be some kind of advantage to be
gained from what seemed a disaster. The role of The
Adjuster teaches one much.
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Something strangely erotic about
this gratuitous citation.
It is apparent by now that I am in
Joseph’s Thomas’s situation. Or
some variant of it. I can’t be
blamed for wanting the love of
my teachers or for coveting the
secrets they seemed to hide. But
as I arrive I find what? There is
nothing here.

December 13, 2015
I have made a silent compact with myself
not to change a line of what I write. I
am not interested in perfecting my
thoughts, nor my actions. There is only
one thing which interests me vitally now,
and that is the recording of all that
which is omitted in books. Nobody, so
far as I can see, is making use of those
elements in the air which give direction
and motivation to our lives. One talks
about philosophy. The future. Our solace
is in what? Transgression? Resistance? I
can remember a time when the joy of
writing was like that of seduction, but
how does one write when one is beyond
desiring the love of another?
Taste the soil sometime. In the spring.
One is welcome to pass coins from hand
to hand for a lifetime, but what of the
thorns and seeds?
Enough has been said of the
paradoxical time of the preface.
Improvisation is known also as
extemporization – leaving the notes
behind, the guides and crutches, standing
outside a certain time and pacing; a
diachronic sequence, the time of logic. I
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I am being solicited for the volleyball team. I decline,
refusing to take unfair profit from my height.
23
Dream from last night: I am driving a soapbox derby car at
frightening speeds through the French countryside. I am
wearing a dark leather cap with goggles snug and clear on
my face and wool scarf whipping in the wind. At every turn
I see Miss Mandible in the distance, steadily vanishing.
Every morning the roll is called: Bestvina, Bokenfohr,
Broan, Brownly, Cone, Coyle, Crecelius, Darin, Durbin,
Geiger, Guiswite, Heckler, Jacobs, Kleinschmidt, Lay,
Logan, Masei, Mitgang, Pfeilsticker. It is like the litany
chanted in the dim miserable dawns of Texas by the cadre
sergeant of our basic training company.
On those mornings in basic I don’t recall ever feeling like I
was back in grade school, though now that I am back in grade
school I do feel compelled to remember the Army. Perhaps
it is something about the feeling of being misplaced, or of
having tacitly and unwittingly consigned my life to an overly
vague endeavor comprised of activities with inscrutable
purposes: constructing dioramas of important Moments in
American history, writing out themes for diluted fables.
In the Army, too, I was ever so slightly awry. It took me a
fantastically long time to realize what the others grasped
almost at once: that much of what we were doing was
absolutely pointless, to no purpose. I kept wondering why.
Then something happened that proposed a new question.
One day we were commanded to whitewash, from the
ground to the topmost leaves, all of the trees in our training
area. The corporal who relayed the order was nervous and
apologetic. Later an off-duty captain sauntered by and
watched us, white splashed and totally weary, strung out
among the freakish shapes we had created. He walked away
swearing. I understood the principle (orders are orders), but
I wondered: Who decides?
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am trying to write otherwise, is all,
follow a path that leads out (ex +
ducere: educate) beyond (not higher,
not better, not purer) the University
(if it is there at all; that is, a
unified notion called ‘the
University’). This writing has no
worth or use that can be determined
in advance. No thesis, no known
place to lay the stress. The wreck of
a life.
This is an improvisation on who?
on a theme from what?
February 17, 2016
From a slightly different vantage,
fantasy is the subject’s response to
the enigmatic desire of the Other,
a way of answering the question
about what the Other wants from
me. I imagine that by vouchsafing
to you these fragments of speech
hanging like scales at my eyes you
might offer some remedy, some
insight. Any response at all. But is
this how things stand with the
Other right now? This Other that
we have come to know as what?
The Law, the Symbolic, the locus
of speech, the stranger on the
bridge whose name we know
perfectly well but would not for
all the treasure of the world
mention it, to cite Dostoevsky.
And we are the acolytes? Is it
hysterical of me to wonder who
this writing is for and what they
want? What does the hysteric do?
Lacan says of Dora, the matron
saint of hysteria, ‘there is one
thing she prefers to her own
desire – she prefers to let her own
desires go unsatisfied and have the
Other hold the key to her mystery’
(VIII, 245).

Oh there was something else in my dream that I am
remembering just now: Vanderbilt’s voice, shhhhhhhh-ing
in the background, modulating his tone as I took corners and
hills.
And the trees are filled with white wolves.
29
Sue Ann is a wonder. Yesterday she viciously kicked my
ankle for not paying attention when she was attempting to
pass me a note during History (a note not, alas, destined for
me but for Anna Coyle). It is swollen still. But Miss
Mandible was watching me, there was nothing I could do.
Oddly enough Sue Ann reminds me of the wife I had in my
former role, while Miss Mandible seems to be a child.
Something about the way she talks to us, always gentle but
not quite friendly. Sometimes she seems to act like someone
who is supposed to be a fifth grade teacher. She watches me
constantly, trying to keep sexual significance out of her look;
I am afraid the other children have noticed. I have already
heard, on that ghostly frequency that is the medium of
classroom communication, the words ‘Teacher's pet!’
When I was in fifth grade for the first time my teacher was
called Ms. Mitchnik, who did not seem to me like a child nor
was I in any danger of becoming her pet. She once chided
me for improperly blowing my nose.
With Mandible, however, there is real danger that she will
adopt me as hers. I am six feet one. I am thirty-five, and I am
sensitive to the nuances of human gesture. The way she takes
my quizzes from me is practically drenched in longing and
desire. The way she says my name every morning, slightly
different intonations each time, as if she is attempting to
caress me with her voice as my name leaves her lips. The
way she grants me permission to use the boys’ room. She
once commented provocatively on my penchant for coffee,
which I drink from a thermos every morning on a bench next
to the swings. She’s never met a fifth grader who liked
coffee, she said, practically weeping.
October
2

116

Is it because I presume you, you sitting
here for whatever reasons you have, have
this key that I write this, that I stand here
speaking as if what? As if you can bless my
discourse, naturalize it, diagnose and cure
it? Why not? I don’t know what you’re
capable of. But as a teacher, as the subject
I become simply be being situated in the
position of teacher, within an educational
institution, I see something else with a key,
a key that I know does not exist between
any of the pages of laws that I know
nobody has written, but still it is there, and
if it is true that I want to be unlocked it is
only so the quaking chamber of my heart
might erupt like a star and incinerate my
liberator, my captor. But, again, there is no
key, only silence poised beyond time and
the universe of discourse orbiting it,
constellating, decaying, the rage of a life
swallowed in the darkness, words sprent
like spume from a comet, an ancient Yes in
a cloud of apology.

March 8, 2011

Preface to Dru Farro’s one-act play,
‘Will You?’
And what philosophically speaking is cruelty?

Letter to J.P.
Paris, 1932

Dru Farro was born to working parents
who, when he was quite young, divorced.
His letters later in life indicate that he
never recovered from his father’s absence
in his youth, and many of his writings
betray his neurotic relationship with
authority, masculinity, and sexuality. He
openly detested his mother, and in his
youth many times ran away from home to
live with friends, when he was lucky, but
spending many nights sleeping in his truck.
In college he studied philosophy, which
greatly influenced his poetry, particularly
the later collections and the posthumously
published Graves. Even a cursory glance at
his poetry reveals an incessant

On occasion, in the afternoon, we will play a game called
‘Bus Stop’ in which two or three members from the class
will sit up at the front of the room and pretend to be at a bus
stop together. I guess that’s the only rule of the game. Sue
Ann was up in front of the class yesterday – with Coyle and
Vanderbilt – pretending to be an old woman who had lost
her cane. Vanderbilt appeared to just be playing himself and
Coyle was pretending to be deaf. Sue Ann was howling for
Bobby to help her find it while the class giggled at his
feigned (?) ineptitude. Since you are destined not to find a
cane that doesn’t exist.
Sometimes I speculate on the exact nature of the conspiracy
which brought me here. At times I believe it was instigated
by my wife of former days, whose name was . . . I am only
pretending to forget. I know her name very well, as well as I
know the name of my former motor oil (Quaker State) or my
old Army serial number (US 54109268). Her name was
Brenda, and the conversation I recall best, the one which
makes me suspicious now, took place on the day we parted.
‘You have the soul of a whore,’ I said on that occasion,
stating nothing less than literal, unvarnished fact. ‘You,’ she
replied, ‘are a pimp, a poop, and a child. I am leaving you
forever and I trust that without me you will perish of your
own inadequacies. Which are considerable.’
She is not wrong about my inadequacies, at least that they
are considerable. Whether they are potentially fatal I think is
doubtful. It is a long shot that Brenda is behind this, but she
is harrowingly cunning. She could easily have been an
invincible corporate lawyer of international repute or a
severe and insatiable choreographer of Stravinsky. She had
a tendency to get deeply involved in things. As in, interested
in consuming their Life Force. She once told me that as a
child she wanted to be a teacher, which I have yet to be able
to fathom, since she so hated children and authority. Instead
she became a shrink, which I now believe was in an effort to
arm herself with terrible knowledge, intimate familiarity
with the blueprints of human pain, breathtaking agility in the
arena of affective warfare. She called me a pimp, a poop, and
a child, and something detonated in my chest. It was a total
surprise. It was as if for years she had been covertly stuffing
my heart with tinder that could catch only via the meter and
assonance of this unique phrase, a phrase silly in itself. A
poop, she called me. It all still haunts me and I know she
knows this.
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I squirm in my seat at the memory of this conversation, and
examination of language, love, and
death. He only rarely wrote
dramatic works, and ‘Will You?’ is
his most famous play.
June 10, 2016
The more the symptoms multiply,
the more the writing reveals a
(neurotic) structure. Effacing or
disguising the symptoms is a
symptom of writing, too. But if it
doesn’t cripple you it isn’t a
problem.
A reader could scan my writing
like a map; a topography
materializes, phrases repeat and
accrue into altitudes, or are
marooned. There is a climate, and
there are borders.
For example, what is this
obsession with fracturing
everything, dissociating
everything, scrambling it all,
ruining it? This phobia of
of
of
of
of
the thesis? This revulsion at the
thought of seducing you with
these little jewels, when I know I
don’t have them and want you not
to care for them.
Was there a break for me? A
twilight of my world as a teacher?
Or as a student? Adrift in this
wash of personae, of images, of
objects, by the simple force of my
will am I meant to raise some
monolith from the depths,
something that like a key causes
the disarray to crystallize into, into
what? The compass spins like a
horde of bats in the vault.

118

Sue Ann watches me with malign compassion. She has
noticed the discrepancy between the size of my desk and my
own size, but apparently sees it only as a token of my
glamour, my dark man-of-the-world-ness.
7
Once I tiptoed up to Miss Mandible's desk (when there was
no one else in the room) and examined its surface. Miss
Mandible is a clean-desk teacher, I discovered. There was
nothing except her gradebook (the one in which I exist as a
fifth grader) and a text, which was open at a page headed
Making the Processes Meaningful. I read: ‘Many pupils
enjoy working fractions when they understand what they are
doing. They have confidence in their ability to take the right
steps and to obtain correct answers. However, to give the
subject full social significance, it is necessary that many
realistic situations requiring the processes be found. Many
interesting and lifelike problems involving the use of
fractions should be solved . . .’
At basic they simply reminded us again and again that we
were learning to shoot guns in order to kill enemies.
8
I am not irritated by the feeling of having been through all
this before. Things are done differently now. The children,
moreover, are in some ways different from those who
accompanied me on my first voyage through the elementary
schools: ‘They have confidence in their ability to take the
right steps and to obtain correct answers.’ This is surely true.
When Bobby Vanderbilt, who sits behind me and has the
great tactical advantage of being able to maneuver in my
disproportionate shadow, wishes to bust a classmate in the
mouth he first asks Miss Mandible to lower the blind, saying
that the sun hurts his eyes. When she does so, bip! My
generation would never have been able to con authority so
easily. We would not even have bothered, because we
believed in them.
My déjà vu research is not progressing despite my persistent
inquiries. I am contemplating postponing it or simply
stopping. I am, understandably (due to the nature of my
subject), having a hard time telling when I’m learning
something new. It all feels new and yet ancient. What is there
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to learn about déjà vu when you are me, literally reliving the
fifth grade? I am déjà vu.
I have added an interesting etymology to my repertoire,
however: cryptomnesia: ‘hidden memory’. I encountered
this word in an old volume of psychological case studies
from the 60s featuring psychologists eerily photogenic –
very deliberate haircuts. Sometimes we forget thoughts that
we have had, and sometimes we forget that the thinker of a
thought was not ourselves. Both compel a man to believe
he’s brought a beautiful new thought into the world, yet with
something at the margins, darkly attendant. Uncanny.
Whose thoughts are we thinking?
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Another dream from last night: I don’t remember anything
April 5, 2016
What are the dead? The dead in
our lives that persist like what?
Like sparrows alighting and
vanishing with nothing but the
quaking of a voided branch in
their wake, or the blossoming of
an insatiable storm that secludes
you in a blackened room,
enshrouds you in a ringing silence.
The dead, if you have any, are in
the corner. They are right in front
of you. You can smell them and
hear them. They are perfect and
claw at you. When the dead arrive
they are smiling at the door but
also smiling in the sun and grass
but also laughing and like stars
when you fix them in your sight it
is as if they were never there
because they’re gone. The dead –
are there two or three or four? –
the dead are a bed of bright red
leaves and black leaves all the
same, iridescent with rainfall, rigid
with veins, decaying outside of
time. They are a like a dream.
December 16, 2015
The first book does not have to
be literally the first book a child
encountered, but it is the one that
the child has carried, knowing it
or not, preserving something too
precious to let vanish (in any case,
nothing vanishes), causing the
future to take shape around it. It
emphasizes the importance of the
question: what happens when we
read? What happens when, as
teachers, we invite others to
encounter something that might
return them to a past that has
transformed itself into their syntax
and habits and dreams? What
Freud uncovers with the Wolf is a
scene that, reaching out into the
future like a ragged claw, provides
the scaffolding for the Wolf’s
world, the watercourse for his
time. The primal scene, the heart
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except the feeling of dread. I was to be punished for having
stolen something. Was it a book?
13
It may be that on my first trip through the schools I was too
much under the impression that what the authorities (who
decides?) had ordained for me was right and proper, that I
confused authority with life itself. My path was not
particularly of my own choosing. My career stretched out in
front of me like a paper chase, and my role was to pick up
the clues. When I got out of school, the first time, I felt that
this estimate was substantially correct, and eagerly entered
the hunt. I found clues abundant: diplomas, membership
cards, campaign buttons, a marriage license, insurance
forms, discharge papers, tax returns, Certificates of Merit.
They seemed to prove, at the very least, that I was in the
running. But that was before my tragic mistake on the Mrs.
Anton Bichek claim.
Life itself. I’m starting to wonder about this one. As if, were
it possible to burrow one’s way resolutely enough through
the endless shale of documents representing your life’s
choices and sanctifying them as meaningful, there might be
some pure Itself at the bottom, holding it all together, where
a true thing might be said or done, something that cannot be
written on paper.
I sometimes try to imagine this place reflected in Miss
Mandible’s eyes. Teach me, I think. Teach me. Tell me why
I am here. And not just here in your class (which is
mystifying enough, though I am forming hypotheses), but
Here. Right fucking Here.
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of trauma. When we (I) teach
literature I want (whose desire is
this? The master’s? The
university’s? The analyst’s? The
hysteric’s?) that scene, whatever it
is, to quiver on the horizon, to
quicken to life. What is literature
without this distant murmur?
June 16, 2016
I have – surrounded as I am by
these fragments, by these shards
that have endured (why these and
no others? is my essential
question), these scenes that have
accompanied me in my
wandering, guiding it even,
consigned to desuetude until they
suddenly emerge all around me,
breathing, gazing, fading, passing
through like clouds above an
empty ocean – come to
understand how one could
wonder: Am I dead or alive?
Shot through by the symbolic, its
fingers reaching through the
notches in my spine, clutching at
the back of my throat, me, the
frightening excess of someone
else’s fantasies, withering in the
dust.

About the Bichek mistake, I misread a clue. Do not
misunderstand me: it was a tragedy only from the point of
view of the authorities (who were upset, of course, because
they were handed a bill). I conceived that it was my duty to
obtain satisfaction for the injured, for this elderly lady (not
even one of our policyholders, but a claimant against Big
Ben Transfer & Storage, Inc.) from the company. The
settlement was $165,000; the claim, I still believe, was just.
But without my encouragement Mrs. Bichek would never
have had the self-love to prize her injury so highly. The
company paid, but its faith in me, in my efficacy in the role,
was broken. Henry Goodykind, the district manager,
expressed this thought in a few not altogether unsympathetic
words, and told me at the same time that I was to have a new
role. The next thing I knew I was here, at Horace Greeley
Elementary, under the lubricious eye of Miss Mandible, who
has a new haircut.
17
Dream: I am in the basement of my childhood home, but I
am not a child. There is a substantial hole in the wooden
floors leading into darkness. This hole is perfectly round.
Out of it come silver ants the size of Jack Russells. I am
terrified, but nobody in the family seems to care. Suddenly it
is apparent that I am merely visiting the house as if on a
holiday. I just know the ants are protecting something.
Today we are to have a fire drill. I know this because I am a
Fire Marshal, not only for our room but for the entire right
wing of the second floor. This distinction, which was
awarded shortly after my arrival, is interpreted by some as
another mark of my somewhat dubious relations with our
teacher. My armband, which is red and decorated with white
felt letters reading FIRE, sits on the little shelf under my
desk, next to the brown paper bag containing the lunch I
carefully make for myself each morning. One of the
advantages of packing my own lunch (I have no one to pack
it for me) is that I am able to fill it with things I enjoy. The
peanut butter sandwiches that my mother made in my former
existence, many years ago, have been banished in favor of
ham and cheese. I have found that my diet has mysteriously
adjusted to my new situation (with the aforementioned
morning coffee habit excepted); I no longer drink, for
instance, and when I smoke, it is in the boys' john, like
everybody else. When school is out I hardly smoke at all. It
is only in the matter of sex that I feel my own true age; this
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May 8, 2015
“My mother is a fish.” Here is a
sentence I have loved, one that
stands like a ragged cairn at a joint
in my life’s passing, a beacon
visible not by the light it shines
but the shadow it casts, a chasm
creeping forward like a plant in
step with the blackening dusk.
This sentence says, when I read it
again or bring it to mind, that here
was a place of import, whether as
a site of loss, a mark of guidance,
a warning, or bare monument of
inscrutable human intention. It is
a tower among several dozen,
perhaps hundreds, that are sprent
like stars into restless
constellations awaiting their
mythologies and cartographies.
“My mother is a fish,” alluring and
enigmatic, is it hysterical? Does it
seem to say, “come and try to
know me, to divine my purpose,
the pathway I mark, my secret
meaning, the one stone among my
thousands that, when shifted,
when properly caressed,
transforms me entirely into an
abyss of unspeakable joy, a dark
ocean of knowledge, apocalypse
and apotheosis, a threshold so
profound its stillness sets the air
to ringing, a promise that will stop
your heart”? My mother is a fish.

is apparently something that, once learned, can never be
forgotten. I live in fear that Miss Mandible will one day keep
me after school, and when we are alone, create a
compromising situation. To avoid this I have become a
model pupil: another reason for the pronounced dislike I
have encountered in certain quarters. But I cannot deny that
I am singed by those long glances from the vicinity of the
chalkboard; Miss Mandible is in many ways, notably about
the bust, a very tasty piece.
With each clandestine erection I feel I am recovering
something from the past. I can’t seem to separate the warm
pressure in my Dockers from memories of sitting in a school
classroom. In those days of dread and intrigue, days of
heartbreaking sincerity, days of devotion to the unmitigated
purity of our leaders’ judgment, days of beautiful isolation
and confusion, days of longing and fear so intense you made
yourself literally sick with bewildering symptoms –
inflammation of the eye, tics in the face, stuttering,
incorrigible cowlicks, hideous acne – days where an erect
penis felt like the devil inside, all I had as remedy for the
pain of my loins and my ignorance was the dictionary.
Words would lead to other words: vagina: canal: sheath:
clitoris: bilateral symmetry: mammary: intercourse: coitus:
copulate: discharge: orgasm: labia: opening – all equally
unsatisfying, sterile, yet impossibly provocative. Diagrams
without skin or hair or faces, blanks awaiting imaginary
sketching. I used to follow reckless trajectories of forbidden
words, developing an admirable quickness and dexterity
manipulating the little alphabetical tabs, GHI, RST, DEF.
Scanning up and down pages, flopping thick reams from left
to right, crackling the bible paper, even licking my fingers as
I had seen adults do. Anything to look like I was simply an
enthusiastic young boy developing his vocabulary. But I was
on a hunt. Between the spacey-looking ‘fucoid’ and the
geological ‘fuchsite’ there it was: ‘fuck’. Slang: have sexual
intercourse with. Somehow the contours of the letters of this
word were themselves erotic. I spent many minutes simply
looking at it, feeling myself getting carried along by it,
imaging that its letters were a thin bed awaiting myself and
some ghostly other, some immaterial aura emanating from
the pulsing hum of my libido, some creature beyond
representation making its way to the bed, promising
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unimaginable pleasure and, more than that, release, some
March 5, 2013
We have in Marcel, and at times in
Swann, a kind of simultaneous
and contradictory dynamic of
desire (which is always, for
Marcel, it seems, bound up with
hope and love): he strives for a
perfect self-effacement so that he
might somehow receive more of
his beloved than can be contained in
his beloved (“more absolutely
Berma than herself”). The degree
to which he successfully erases
himself is the precise degree to
which he makes himself available
to the impressions offered by
Beauty. He longs to lose himself
that he might gain more than he
can imagine. There’s a kind of
suicide of longing here, in Marcel,
a sacrifice to which one happily
acquiesces so that unknown – and
unknowable – pleasures might
arise. And why not? We’ve all
choked on unapproachable
pleasures before; we’ve all wished
our lover would simply inhabit us,
that we might be food for our
lover; we’ve all stood transfixed
before a storm, an abyss, the salt
of the endless ocean, the
indifferent sun drying our blood,
dying birds, hordes of swifts, the
transmissions of Jupiter, colliding
galaxies, the violence of bells, the
feeling of contentment that comes
only in the wake of an
irrepressible conviction that you
were nothing, that love is not that
which saves you and then prepares
you for death. No, love is that
which takes everything from you
that you have ever hoped from it
by giving you precisely what it has to
offer, which is only what could
never have been anticipated. Love
is that which takes everything
from you so that you might have
anything at all. As Céline writes,
“that is perhaps what we seek
throughout life, that and nothing
more, the greatest possible sorrow
so as to become fully ourselves
before dying.”

125

dark monster of knowledge, all of this I remember feeling
while tracing lovely arabesques through the pages of this
huge book containing every possible word, all possible
knowledge. Fuck. Look at the etymology:
probably cognate with Dutch fokken to mock (15th cent.),
to strike (1591), to fool, gull (1623), to beget children
(1637), to have sexual intercourse with (1657), to grow,
cultivate (1772), Norwegian regional fukka to copulate,
Swedish regional fokka to copulate (compare Swedish
regional fock penis), further etymology uncertain: perhaps
< an Indo-European root meaning ‘to strike’ also shown
by classical Latin pugnus fist (see pugnacious adj.). Perhaps
compare Old Icelandic fjúka to be driven on, tossed by the
wind, feykja to blow, drive away, Middle High German
fochen to hiss, to blow. Perhaps compare also Middle High
German ficken to rub, early modern German ficken to rub,
itch, scratch, German ficken to have sexual intercourse
with (1558), German regional ficken to rub, to make short
fast movements, to hit with rods, although the exact
nature of any relationship is unclear.

To mock, to strike, to rub, to blow, to cultivate, to fool. Yes,
these meanings have all become only clearer to me, which is
why I fear and desire Mandible. Etymology is a science of
intimacy, and I am everyday progressing on the path to the
truth of my place here: it runs through her.
24
There are isolated challenges to my largeness, to my dimly
realized position in the class as Gulliver. Most of my
classmates are polite about this matter, as they would be if I
had only one eye, or wasted, metal-wrapped legs. I am
viewed as a mutation of some sort but essentially a peer.
However Harry Broan, whose father has made himself rich
manufacturing the Broan Bathroom Vent (with which Harry
is frequently reproached; he is always being asked how
things are in Ventsville), today inquired if I wanted to fight.
An interested group of his followers had gathered to observe
this suicidal undertaking. I replied that I didn't feel quite up
to it, for which he was obviously grateful. We are now
friends forever. He has given me to understand privately that
he can get me all the bathroom vents I will ever need, at a
ridiculously modest figure.
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Love is not the antidote to
sorrow; love is sorrow’s symptom
and presage and it brings us to
ourselves only because it ruins us.
June 16, 2016
There is a thread. But who threads
it?
After the first few masks fell –
student, teacher, scholar – you
grew more diffuse. They really are
masks; they are parts. Imagine the
fear of not having one, or of
trying to fashion one. They
coordinate discourse, calm
anxiety, and structure desire. Is
there nothing beneath them?
[Added August 3, 2016: (Of whom
is the portrait of the artist before
she is an artist?)]

I have fired automatic and semi-automatic rifles hundreds
and hundreds of times, but never thrown a punch at a man or
boy.
25
Sue Ann and Miss Mandible are wearing the exact same
shoes today. I am positive about this. Red flats with a semiglossy luster, cut just deeply enough to reveal the cleavages
between the toes.
In addition to déjà vu there are the related mnesic
phenomena of presque vu and jamais vu. Presque vu: the
feeling that something is imminent, that the word you’re
waiting for, the one you want, is about to arrive. Jamais vu
is far more perilous for me, personally, in its implications:
the feeling that our familiars are imposters. When you say or
write a word so frequently it loses its substance, its reality.
When your world is populated with doubles and fakes. I am
proceeding slowly and carefully in these new areas,
especially since I know from experience that most
psychological science is quackery.

All of this is a begging you to
speak, but what do I want to hear?
Am I enticing or destroying you?
Will one touch of approval
dissolve the entire edifice? Is it
masochistic, the way I beg you to
intervene, pronounce the Law?
Are these hysterics a way of
attuning us both to that desire
beyond the walls? It’s a parade of
working-through, this is.

‘Many interesting and lifelike problems involving the use of
fractions should be solved . . .’ The theorists fail to realize
that everything that is either interesting or lifelike in the class
room proceeds from what they would probably call
interpersonal relations: Sue Ann Brownly kicking me in the
ankle. How lifelike, how womanlike, is her tender solicitude
after the deed! Her pride in my newly acquired limp is
transparent; everyone knows that she has set her mark upon
me, that it is a victory in her unequal struggle with Miss
Mandible for my great, overgrown heart. Even Miss
Mandible knows, and counters in perhaps the only way she
can, with sarcasm. ‘Are you wounded, Thomas?’

My silent partner, absent as usual.

Conflagrations smolder behind her eyelids, yearning for the
Fire Marshal clouds her eyes. I mumble that I have bumped
my leg.

These letters, they drift toward
you, but you’re so far away and
already dead.

Fuck. Fuck. Fuck. Fuck. Fuck. Fuck. Fuck. Fuck. Fuck.
Fuck. Fuck. Fuck. Fuck. Fuck.
30
I return again and again to the problem of my future.
31
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April 9, 2016
What are the dead? I ask here
because they are never far enough
away to ignore. What more
quickly than a thought of the dead
brings to light the heart of desire?
Death envaults the universe of
human possibility like the speed
of light, providing a horizon
beyond which there is no
possibility of representation. And
at the heart of this human
possibility there is desire. And
each of us is here in the university
because there is something we
want to know, something we seek
out by occupying a specific
position in relation to knowledge.
Do the dead object? Do we
imagine that their secrets will
fulfill or sustain us? Do the dead
materialize at the borderlands as
seducers or pedagogues? We I sift
through a forest of voices looking
for an answer whose question
escapes us me; voices and words
with a hold on truth. They are like
a dream.

Halloween. My peers are all in disguise. I myself am dressed
as an insurance claims adjuster, an idea that came to me from
I know not where: I shocked myself somewhat that I am
apparently sufficiently perverse actually to wear this
costume. Brownly is stunning, if a little predictable, in her
witch’s garb while Mandible plays it conservatively with a
cat’s-ears headband accompanying her usual attire.
Vanderbilt is Dale Earnhardt in tie-dyed coveralls, aviators,
and convincing moustache. We are told that the holiday is a
celebration of the dead. Or for the dead? Mandible is unclear
on this point. The costumes and indulgences, I have gleaned,
are meant to arm revelers against the knowledge of death,
the abyss all around them.
I am fascinated by Mandible’s rhetorical tactics bearing on
the subject of death. She has managed to plan an afternoon
of Halloween-related lessons that refer either to innocuous
and ancient rituals of barbarians or platitudes involving
apple-bobbing. Not that I am enthusiastic about the subject
myself, but my recent experiences have me wondering about
how this will end. Or End. But of course this is a problem
we are left to deal with on our own time.
This afternoon we are scheduled to parade through the
school in our disguises, I guess to show them off. Sue Ann
will lead the way, surely, with Miss Mandible drawing up
the rear, and we are expected, as I understand it, to go into
all the classrooms and trek solemnly around the perimeter,
letting the second-graders or whoever get a nice long look
and then leave for the next room. We have already been
visited by the sixth grade, which featured no fewer than four
witches. There was also a boy dressed just like me who, he
exclaimed, was meant to be ‘a nerd’. We had the same
Dockers, same short-sleeve blue button-up shirt tucked in,
same spectacles. Imagine a classroom of 11 year-olds
dressed in disguise, seated obediently behind their desks,
gawking at a procession of cheeky 12 year-olds with their
ironic costumes and secret knowledge, reserves of maturity
unfathomable to us, invincibly indifferent to everything.
Costumes with real blood, probably.
I am not looking forward to my turn.
November
3
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A
August 14, 2010
When I was a boy I was captivated
by mirrors. I was abducted by them.
After reviewing a significant glance
(I pulled the same face every time
when I was young, the most
attractive one to me. I raised my
eyebrows as though listening to a
story that is difficult to tell,
understandingly, perceptively,
handsomely. I pulled my lips
together in tight lines and bowed
my head forward slightly so as to
look strongly out from beneath my
prominent brows. Sometimes I
would pretend the story ended with
an elated anecdote, a funny
conclusion at which point I would
drop my poised brows into a
relaxed, almond-eyed smile, a smile
I coveted as a dear gift, one which I
feared would fade should it see the
sunlight too often, one which I
smothered almost to death, but
which I thought would forever be
the antidote to my presumed
gloominess, a comet flashing amid
the fog) I sometimes looked again,
this time quite plainly, at my face.
My face. One thought echoed in my
mind until it lost its sense: ‘This
person is me. I will always be this
person.’ I stood still so as to review
this person, struggling to locate
myself within this sometime-alien
face. The strangeness of my features
would inevitably erupt,
unexpectedly, into a deep horror, a
wild thrashing to be relieved of my
body, rid of its heaviness, rid of its
uncanniness, a horror that seemed
physically to push me from the
mirror, taking up my habitual
faceless existence, my unround eyes,
my ghostflesh face, my body
animated not by bones and blood
but by my thoughts alone and my
body only as words, only as
gestures, only as the consequential
motions animated by the wake left
by my neverstill mind. In this period
of my life I thought not once about
death.

brief

investigation

concerning transgression

and

129

discipline:
Inside Horace Greeley Elementary many edifying activities
occur. Discipline is learned. And coloring is learned. Also,
an affinity for flags. Very little is tolerated within the walls
of Horace Greeley Elementary, but least of all a tendency
toward deviation. Should a child, for example, while
enjoying the liberties of recess, break some unwritten rule
presumed to belong under the category of ‘common
knowledge’ (since there are very few rules explicitly
announced in the classrooms on even a perfunctory basis)
such as:
1)
throwing a rock either directly at or implicitly at:
another child or employee of Horace Greeley Elementary, a
valuable structure (such as the school building or flag pole),
an animal (wild or domestic), a vehicle, the sky, a soccer –
or any other – ball that has become entangled in the branches
of a tree, the ground, water, other rocks, adults who are not
employed by Horace Greeley Elementary, or any clothing
not being worn by the owner at the present moment such as:
a coat hanging from a tree, a backpack hanging from a tree,
shoes hanging by their laces from a tree, et cetera,
2)
spitting (either in private or public),
3)
cursing (including the words ‘butthole’, ‘buttface’,
‘butthead’, ‘buttbrain’, ‘buttmouth’, ‘buttlover’, ‘buttbutter’,
or ‘buttcrackhead’ (among, of course, many other words
referring to the male or female genitalia or anal region as
well as words referring to unsavory bodily functions such as
flatulence or micturition, in addition to the traditional canon
of swear words: fuck, shit, ass, damn, bitch, bastard, hell,
and any phrase that speaks the name of any holy creature in
vain)). Moreover, words that imply curse words are also
forbidden such as: shiitakehead, shiatsuface, motherducker,
flipping, fudging, mother fudging, mother effing, arsehole,
basshole, Regina, and dastard, among many others. Finally,
saying regular words in a harsh and/or suggestive tone is
likewise not tolerated,
4)
performing overly gymnastic or athletic techniques
that require the jumping out of swings, jumping off of large
structures, climbing trees, climbing cars, climbing other
humans, climbing animals (wild or domestic), or running
very fast down hills,
5)
screaming,
6)
touching with too much force another human being
(child or adult), and
7)
selling goods to other children such as: sports cards
at prices other than those suggested in accredited sports
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beckets; various foodstuffs; pornographic magazines;
illegal, legal, or prescription drugs; or homework
assignments,
June 24, 2016
Time passes. It’s like I’m waiting
for something.
Kafka’s journals: “Wrote badly
today.”
I know you’re listening – reading.
But what are you looking for?
Anyway, I’ve given up on the
original ideas. I’ve developed an
allergy to the word “education”;
I’ve completely lost my handle on
it – turned back by the mountains
of paper on the subject. [Added the
next day: The mountains of
associations, the battery of images
in pursuit; so different from one
another, so profoundly different.
In any case, there is only one
question now, which is the
question of my desire, emptied
out by pretensions to altruism or
honorability: whose approbation
are you after, what image are you
struggling to embody? The secret
heart.]
Can’t help but feel a bit like
Hamlet.
But who to kill? [Added June 27,
2016: Which ghost to obey?]

then he or she will be subject to the following corrective
measures:
1)
standing at ‘a box’ for the duration of recess (for
minor infractions). ‘A box’ is a colored square located on the
easternmost promenade of Horace Greeley that features any
number 1 through 8 in whose confines the student stands and
must remain, facing the brick walls of the school, until the
recess bell rings.
2)
should all boxes be full (a not uncommon
occurrence), then minor offenses are punished by the
accused being forced to remain at the side of one of three
‘recess ladies’, all of whom are famous for their strict
dispositions and severe, jagged physiognomies. The accused
is not spoken to and must follow, at an uncomfortably close
distance, the strange ladies’ vigilant perambulations.
3)
being sent to the principal’s office (for either a single
major infraction or a history of minor infractions). This
requires interacting with the principal’s secretary, describing
in general terms the reasons for one’s appearance in the
office (though the details of the case will not be heard here),
and waiting until the principal is available. Once in the office
of the principle the accused must describe, again, his or her
offense (though again the details will not be considered) at
which point, absolutely frozen in fear, the principal delivers
an overgeneral moralistic homily based on one or a few of
the following themes: thou shalt not abuse property, thou
shalt not take one’s privileges for granted (the privilege, for
example, of attending school), thou shalt not listen to one’s
friends (also known as the rule of ‘monkey see, monkey do’,
where the student is, it goes without saying, the monkey),
thou shalt not swear, thou shalt not be exceptional (to any
and all rules), thou shalt not do anything but what the others
are doing, thou shalt not do anything at all.
4)
being suspended from school for 1-3 days (for major
infractions, such as spitting). The school suspension can take
the form either of an ‘in-school’ variety, in which the
accused does not attend his or her usual class but instead sits
in another, usually lower grade, class for the period of 1-3
days, or the ‘out-of-school’ variety, in which the student
simply remains at home for the duration of 1-3 days and
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February 7, 2012
We’re not here simply to
understand art, but we’re here to
understand more. Strangely,
though, it seems that, not unlike
certain physical experiments, by
participating too actively in the
scrutiny of reality – that is, by
inventing the jar – we do not
preserve the specimen for
scientific analysis (be it aesthetic,
ethical, or cognitive), instead we
cut ourselves off from it. The jar
not only does not give of bird or
bush, but it is also like nothing
else in Tennessee, and, how
absurd this is, why, in all of
Tennessee, do we insist on the jar?
June 25, 2011
I wreck the real thing.
July 21, 2010
And she,
I wonder,
has died before,
amid the things collected on the
floor –
some magazines, a can for trash,
the stash of wash,
the fan,
a few books.
Oh and a box of tissues –
just things that are never
forgotten.

must make up the missed work at a later date. During an inschool suspension the accused sits in a too-small desk (that
is, a desk cleared by the Board of Estimates to be sufficient
for the average second grade student) that faces a wall and
listens to lessons that he or she has already heard,
presumably feeling great shame for being a giant among
children and being subjected to the humiliating experience
of, temporarily at least, being forced to act like and think like
less developed human students. (N.B. despite the apparent
similarities, my current situation is nothing like an in-school
suspension, though ‘suspension’ is a rather provocative
word in this context). During an out-of-school suspension
much consternation is caused to the parent or parents who
must leave the child at home unattended. Much television is
watched by the suspended student.
5)
in the event that a student is accused of many major
infractions (such as spitting one day, then employing a neon
yellow plastic water pistol for the purpose of spraying
evaporative graffiti on the school’s majestic walls another
day), he or she may have all recess activity indefinitely
suspended. Instead, that is, of going outside with her or his
peers to expend energy she or he will sit in the school’s
empty gymnasium with a book. In this way many books can
be read by delinquent students.
delinquent: offender against the law. XVII (earlier
delynquant, Caxton, from F.). –L. delinquent-, ens, pp. of
delinquere be at fault, offend, f. de DE- 3 + linquere leave (cf.
LOAN); see –ENT. Also, de (‘completely’) + linquere, thus
‘exile’.

4
The underground circulating library has brought me a copy
of Movie-TV Secrets, the multicolor cover blazoned with the
headline ‘Debbie's Date Insults Liz!’ It is a gift from Frankie
Randolph, a rather plain girl who until today has had not one
word for me, passed on via Bobby Vanderbilt. I nod and
smile over my shoulder in acknowledgment; Frankie hides
her head under her desk. I have seen these magazines being
passed around among the girls (sometimes one of the boys
will condescend to inspect a particularly lurid cover). Miss
Mandible confiscates them whenever she finds one,
exercising her disciplinary tones. I leaf through Movie-TV
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June 27, 2016
Enduring image of the open ocean at
late twilight, placid, horrifying. In the
black sea below me the leviathan
drifts, silent among the constellations
of scintillating animals, following its
dark course to where? In the
midnight silence it vouchsafes
something to me, a fragment
surfacing like a corpse: a memory, a
relic, a trace.
There are readers I am trying to
destroy.
Why?
Is it revenge? Or am I provoking
them so they will destroy me? Am I
daring them to pronounce the Law?
You can’t.
1935
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Secrets and get an eyeful. ‘The exclusive picture on these
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pages isn't what it seems. We know how it looks and we
know what the gossipers will do. So in the interests of a nice
guy, we're publishing the facts first. Here's what really
happened!’ The picture shows a rising young movie idol in
bed, pajama-ed and bleary-eyed, while an equally blowzy
young woman looks startled beside him. I am happy to know
that the picture is not really what it seems; it seems to be
nothing less than divorce evidence.
What do these hipless eleven-year-olds think when they
come across, in the same magazine, the full-page ad for
Maurice de Paree, which features ‘Hip Helpers’ or what
appear to be padded rumps? (‘A real undercover agent that
adds appeal to those hips and derriere, both!’) If they cannot
decipher the language the illustrations leave nothing to the
imagination. ‘Drive him frantic . . .’ the copy continues.
Perhaps this explains Bobby Vanderbilt's preoccupation
with Lancias and Maseratis; it is a defense against being
driven frantic.
I cannot imagine what Frankie Randolph intends with all
this.
Sue Ann has observed Frankie Randolph's overture, and
catching my eye, she pulls from her satchel no less than
seventeen of these magazines, thrusting them at me as if to
prove that anything any of her rivals has to offer, she can top.
I shuffle through them quickly, noting the broad editorial
perspective:
‘Debbie's Kids Are Crying’
‘Eddie Asks Debbie: Will You . . . ?’
‘The Nightmares Liz Has About Eddie!’
‘The Things Debbie Can Tell About Eddie’
‘The Private Life of Eddie and Liz’
‘Debbie Gets Her Man Back?’
‘A New Life for Liz’
‘Love Is a Tricky Affair’
‘Eddie's Taylor-Made Love Nest’
‘How Liz Made a Man of Eddie’
‘Are They Planning to Live Together?’
‘Isn't It Time to Stop Kicking Debbie Around?’
‘Debbie's Dilemma’
‘Eddie Becomes a Father Again’
‘Is Debbie Planning to Re-wed?’
‘Can Liz Fulfill Herself?’
‘Why Debbie Is Sick of Hollywood’
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they get themselves in such a terrible predicament? Sue
Ann knows, I am sure; it is obvious that she has been
studying their history as a guide to what she may expect
when she is suddenly freed from this drab, flat classroom.
Again I am reminded of Brenda, so perspicacious with
regard to the secret histories of others. I wonder if Brenda,
as a young girl, coveted this contraband as passionately as
Sue Ann seems to. Of course, we’re all entitled to satisfy our
curiosity.
curiosity: late 14c., ‘careful attention to detail,’ also
‘desire to know or learn’ (originally usually in a bad
sense), from Old French curiosete ‘curiosity,
avidity, choosiness’ (Modern French curiosité),
from Latin curiositatem (nominative curiositas)
‘desire of knowledge, inquisitiveness,’ from
curiosus (see curious). Neutral or good sense is
from early 17c. Meaning ‘an object of interest’ is
from 1640s.
curious: mid-14c., ‘eager to know’ (often in a bad
sense), from Old French curios ‘solicitous, anxious,
inquisitive; odd, strange’ (Modern French curieux)
and directly from Latin curiosus ‘careful, diligent;
inquiring eagerly, meddlesome,’ akin to cura ‘care’
(see cure (n.)). The objective sense of ‘exciting
curiosity’ is 1715 in English. In booksellers'
catalogues, the word means ‘erotic, pornographic.’
Curiouser and curiouser is from ‘Alice in
Wonderland’ (1865).
cure: late 14c., from Old French curer, from Latin
curare ‘take care of’
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I know that Sue Ann will not stop until she learns whatever
Pulling this string of words out
and out from my chest and my
throat, where does it end?
February 8, 2016
“The very blood of my syntax” is
the phrase – a new one, finally –
bedded like a seed or a bat in the
eaves, breathing, glowing. It is
precious. It has risen like a spirit
from the ashen earth to arrest me,
to breathe its breath at my neck
warm and brief and be an echo
from a monstrous voice that is
like a splintered demon from an
ancient dream, yes, a dream
retreating like a hawk or leviathan
serene and indifferent and
familiar, a distant point of contact,
a dragging anchor and silt shroud
billowing, something saying ‘here’
where I am not, an accident of
worlds, a symptom.
June 27, 2016
Spirits, ashes, dreams, the
leviathan.
They recur.
July 4, 2016
No longer to desire the work but
to desire one’s own language.
And what, ever, was the work
except a pale double, a surrogate
of enjoyment, a seducer? Hidden
at the heart of it all was no secret
beyond me but rather the place of
my absence, the site inviting me to
arrive, always disappearing into
the distance.
What pact enjoins me to one
discourse among any?
Early this morning I woke from a
dream: I am standing behind the
red shed of my childhood home,
at the woodpile, searching for the
matches there.
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it is she wants to know, and these gossip magazines – with
their precisely calibrated intrigues, scrupulous balances
between seen and unseen, temporalities driven by an engine
of unending drama, teasing horrifically elevated to the status
of deliberate psychological derangement – are Step One.
I am angry and I shove the magazines back at her with not
even a whisper of thanks.
5
Dream: I am standing at the boys’ urinal trough in my old
elementary school. I am completely naked. I am alone, but I
know there are others watching, and I feel they are the girls
from my earliest fantasies. I have to pee real bad. When I do
there is a rush of guilty feelings, a vivid sense that I am doing
something forbidden, a terrifying joy.
I wake up soaked in piss, which has not happened to me since
I was nine.
The fifth grade at Horace Greeley Elementary is a furnace of
love, love, love. Today it is raining, but inside the air is
heavy and tense with passion. Sue Ann is absent; I suspect
that yesterday's exchange has driven her to her bed. Guilt
hangs about me. She is not responsible, I know, for what she
reads, for the models proposed to her by a venal publishing
industry; I should not have been so harsh. Perhaps it is only
the flu.
Nowhere have I encountered an atmosphere as charged with
aborted sexuality as this. Miss Mandible is helpless; nothing
goes right today. Amos Darin has been found drawing a dirty
picture in the cloakroom. Sad and inaccurate, it was offered
not as a sign of something else but as an act of love in itself.
It has excited even those who have not seen it, even those
who saw but understood only that it was dirty. The room
buzzes with imperfectly comprehended titillation. Amos
stands by the door, waiting to be taken to the principal's
office. He wavers between fear and enjoyment of his
temporary celebrity. From time to time Miss Mandible looks
at me reproachfully, as if blaming me for the uproar. But I
did not create this atmosphere, I am caught in it like all the
others.
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I am standing in the empty lot
behind the red shed in the
backyard. It’s winter, and wet
snow has collected on the wood
piled high against the shed.
There’s a large wooden box
overturned, and two saw horses
on top, homemade.
As if I were a crow I am seeing
myself from above, standing at the
empty lot behind the shed of my
childhood house. Snow covers the
woodpile – I am exactly in the
center of the empty lot, without a
coat, staring at the wood. At the
foot of the pile is a strip of canvas
with leather handles sewn at the
ends, for carrying wood. I see
myself from the narrow spruce to
the left, from the apex of the
shed, from the telephone wires
hanging high above, from
nowhere. The decaying cedar
fencing splinters behind me in the
cold, nails rusting. Wind blows
through my cotton shirt.
When you choose to burn it, pack
the dusty grass stalks drying in the
ash pail deep into the woodpile.
Rip the bark from the logs and
wrap it in dried brown grass and
newspaper. Fill every crack. The
silence of these empty houses
protects you. The grass splinters
into dust that now rises on the
wind around you like a shroud,
like a djinn. Though you are
weeping, there is no sound but the
cracking grass, the cracking paper.
A silent snow falls as you force
the grass wrist deep into the pile,
blood collecting scraps of bark on
your fingers and knuckles. Breath
rising like smoke, heaving like a
wide-eyed animal fleeing. And you
roar into the pile, hoping your
heart stops.
The crows are collected above
you; standing with your back
against the rotting cedar planks,

8

140

Everything is promised my classmates and I, most of all the
future. We accept the outrageous assurances without
blinking.
I myself get caught up in the rhetoric of it all. I feel the
strength of Mandible’s lesson plans – they are scientifically
calibrated to inject me with the precise minimal knowledge
of all possible careers and life plans. We learn of the beauty
of other lands, but nothing of immigration. We learn of the
heroics of politics, but nothing of hatred. We learn of the
accomplishments of science, but nothing of grant proposals
or the trials of organic chemistry. We learn of the dignity of
poetry, but nothing of anguish. Today we engaged a
taxonomy of dog breeds, which was cute and enlightening.
Strictly as a matter of preparing for all possible
contingencies and for the sake of fitting in, I am currently
considering a career as an ecologist or microbiologist, both
of which professions I have been warmly invited to pursue.
I am expected to give a report of the life and work of
ecologists as a large Research Project scheduled for March.
9
I have finally found the nerve to petition for a larger desk.
At recess I can hardly walk; my legs do not wish to uncoil
themselves, leading two obnoxious 6th graders I do not know
to call me ‘Frankenasshole’. Miss Mandible says she will
take it up with the custodian, and couldn’t contain a brief
guffaw when I told her about the offending term. Uncertain,
the meaning of this. Additionally, she seizes this opportunity
to tell me she is worried about the excellence of my themes.
Have I, she asks, been receiving help? For an instant I am on
the brink of telling her my story. Something, however, warns
me not to attempt it. Here I am safe, I have a place; I do not
wish to entrust myself once more to the whimsy of authority.
I resolve to make my themes less excellent in the future. If
my committed mediocrity is what it takes to keep me safe,
then I am committed.
11
A ruined marriage, a ruined adjusting career, a grim
interlude in the Army when I was almost not a person. This
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is the sum of my existence to date, a dismal total. Small
you listen for the sound of a glass
bell in the air, wretched and clear,
so quiet, from below the
overturned plywood box, where
the matches lie. Shoulders
steaming, cotton shirt sweatsoaked, hands shining with blood,
you regard the woodpile, your
mirror, your voice about to speak.
Will they light?
March 12, 2021
Why did you choose to vanish, all
these years, forsaking your home
and your family, the warm rush of
mountain wind through the
swaying pines, the waves of
plainsgrass swaying, the spring
hail, the cicadas singing, the silent
sun? Have you stolen off with
something, to pick it clean in a
secret corner of the world? These
years of wandering have brought
you closer to what? To the same
secret heart, hidden in the
shadows of the spruce boughs as
you lay in the warm grass, hidden
beneath the stairs, listening in on
your anguish and shame, hidden
in the shape of distant passers-by
as you paced out your midnight
walks, hidden behind the locked
doors, cowering at the shrieking
and gasping, witness of your
blackest hour, your wretched joy,
your boundless hate, the light you
carry through a night that never
ends except at the heart.
The days are getting long now.
One waits for nothing, anymore,
not even death.
This rotting earth, please take me.
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wonder that re-education seemed my only hope. It is clear
even to me that I need reworking in some fundamental way.
How efficient is the society that provides thus for the salvage
of its clinkers!
Plucked from my unexamined life among other pleasant,
desperate, money-making young Americans, thrown
backward in space and time, I am beginning to understand
how I went wrong, how we all go wrong. (Although this was
far from the intention of those who sent me here; they require
only that I get right.) There is something strangely satisfying
knowing that I am here because I was an insufficient human.
I am anxious to see how I shall be saved.
14
The distinction between children and adults, while probably
useful for some purposes, is at bottom a specious one, I feel.
There are only individual egos, crazy for love.
It is easy to see this when my efforts to ignore the advances
of Miss Mandible are too perfect. She is clearly hurt by my
indifference to her gifts of knowledge and care. She has a
fair share of groveling students, desperate to demonstrate
their obedience, their obsequy. These students literally bring
her apples on occasion. But I am waiting for an apple from
Mandible.
15
The custodian has informed Miss Mandible that our desks
are all the correct size for fifth-graders, as specified by the
Board of Estimates and furnished the schools by the Nu-Art
Educational Supply Corporation of Englewood, California.
He has pointed out that if the desk size is correct, then the
pupil size must be incorrect. Miss Mandible, who has
already arrived at this conclusion, refuses to press the matter
further. I think I know why. An appeal to the administration
might result in my removal from the class, in a transfer to
some sort of setup for ‘exceptional children’. This would be
a disaster of the first magnitude. To sit in a room with child
geniuses (or, more likely, children who are ‘retarded’) would
shrivel me in a week. Let my experience here be that of the
common run, I say; let me be, please God, typical. I hope I
forget my entire past so that I may more easily be an actual
fifth grader. I would consent to whatever is necessary, I feel.
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17
‘The predominant psychodynamic perspective is that déjà vu
reflects the mind’s effort to quickly block the emotional
distress aroused by the present experience by shifting into a
distorted state of consciousness and forcing an artificial
“familiar” interpretation of the present new experience.’
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September 8, 2034
Nightmare from last night, the sky
opening up into an archaic
darkness, streaked with purple and
red spreading like ink in water.
The same nightmare after all these
years, my constant dream.
We are standing in the yard, and
all the dogs are there with us and
alive again. The cedars are full of
cardinals and it is evening in late
summer. The wildflowers are
stringy and dropping wooly heads
of seeds and the bees are swirling
at the mouth of the hive and we
are gathered together to watch it
all.
You and me.
The moon is so close, dark sun
setting all awry, to the north,
shadows we’ve never seen before.
The limit of terror; we’re choking
on it, weeping. Of course the
whole thing is too beautiful to
endure, me standing there with
you and the dogs, animals all
around us.

‘…if the current experience is reminiscent of a previous
situation in which one acted immorally, the déjà vu reflects
the ego’s effort to divert the attention of the superego away
from this implication.’
‘Jackson suggests that we have two varieties of
consciousness: normal, that processes information from the
outside world, and parasitic, that monitors the thoughts and
reflections of the inner, mental world.’
‘On rare occasions, the parahippocampal system, operating
independently of the hippocampal/prefrontal system, will
mistakenly assess an unfamiliar experience as familiar.’
‘Personal descriptions of déjà vu often include a feeling of
being able to predict what will happen next.’
‘A second parapsychological interpretation is that an
individual is tapping into someone else’s experience of the
present situation in the past or future time, or even through
oneself from an out-of-body experience, with the “normal”
self receiving impressions from this disembodied state in
either the present moment or some other point in time.’
‘…the feeling of déjà vu corresponds to the memory of an
unconscious fantasy.’
Well.

The attendant dead, so near.

20

Clutching your hand, what do I
see breathing beyond the planets?

We read signs as promises. Miss Mandible understands by
my great height, by my resonant vowels, that I will one day
carry her off to bed. Sue Ann interprets these same signs to
mean that I am unique among her male acquaintances,
therefore most desirable, therefore her special property as is
every thing that is Most Desirable. If neither of these
propositions work out then life has broken faith with them.
I myself, in my former existence, read the company motto
(“Here to Help in Time of Need”) as a description of the duty
of the adjuster, drastically mislocating the company's
deepest concerns. I believed that because I had obtained a
wife who was made up of wife-signs (beauty, charm,
softness, perfume, cookery) I had found love. Brenda,
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July 6, 2016
Repeating.
These fragments I have shored
against my ruins, as they say.
“You have the same gait,” I’m
told. The picture is of some
ancestor, unknown to me,
stepping heavily through an
aberrant Tennessee snow, cedar
rail fences buried in drifts, making
his way along an empty path to
the church, solitary as a grave in
the wastes. Cursing to himself?
Squinting at the radiant abyss
around him? Can he see his own
dead antecedents peering through
the limbs of the pines? I am
swallowed by a future
unimaginable to them, he thinks,
approaching the churchyard. The
vagaries of lives pullulating across
these empty lands overwhelm the
mind. Where are you going, my
avatar? Do you know I am here,
in the distant wake of your
footsteps? Even as the melting
snows leave no trace I am
nevertheless locked here in
abeyance, quickened to life by a
battery of desires circling, circling,
leaving behind a legacy of decay
evanescing, until it is my turn.
Repeating.

reading the same signs that have now misled Miss Mandible
and Sue Ann Brownly, felt she had been promised that she
would never be bored again. All of us, Miss Mandible, Sue
Ann, myself, Brenda, Mr. Goodykind, still believe that the
American flag betokens a kind of general righteousness.
But I say, looking about me in this incubator of future
citizens, that signs are signs, and that some of them are lies.
This is the great discovery of my time here.
23
It may be that my experience as a child will save me after
all. If only I can remain quietly in this classroom, making my
notes while Napoleon plods through Russia in the droning
voice of Harry Broan, reading aloud from our History text.
All of the mysteries that perplexed me as an adult have their
origins here, and one by one I am numbering them, exposing
their roots. This is the essence of etymology. Miss Mandible
will refuse to permit me to remain ungrown. Her hands rest
on my shoulders too warmly, and for too long.
I am rushing toward something. I can feel it.
December
7
Many setbacks. I have avoided writing. I am not feeling well
here. Last week I saw Brownly passing Debbie-and-Eddies
to Vanderbilt. I was inordinately upset about this and nearly
called both of them several impermissible names. I
fantasized breathlessly about destroying Vanderbilt in a
demonstration of peerless vigor and masculinity before
denying Brownly’s inevitable wishes to side with me, after
all. The soul of a whore. The soul of a whore.
My consternation did not go undetected by Miss Mandible,
who quietly asked me during reading break if I needed to see
the nurse. I nearly wept, and I think she noticed this. But she
cannot possibly understand what is happening to me.
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August 4, 2015
My mother is a fish because they
are both dead. Vardaman and I
are walking together, surrounded
by ghosts, the summer sun
burning away the limpid sheen of
the scales and eyes, the noisome
disembowelment desiccating in
the weeds, silence for miles
accompanies the rhythm of our
footsteps through the crackling
stalks of scorched grass. The
drumming of a grasshopper’s
erratic flight, perhaps. “Do you
remember the time,” I ask him,
though he carries on as if I had
said nothing, as if I were another
among the spirits, “watching the
old man, railroad tie driven into
his belt, catch his fish and rip
from them his hook and grip
them about the fins, ribbons of
muscles tense along his forearms,
all to be destroyed by the single
obliterating stroke of the tie to the
skull and I, later, five- or six-years
old, no tie upon my person and
panicked, the fry seizing at my
feet on the rivershore, held aloft
the nearest stone like Abraham
with no blade and no angel to
deliver me from my charge, to
crush through skull and brain and
the site of all life and need in this
animal that made no cry and left
no monument behind but what?
Its eye.” And mine and me, seeing
myself in it.

It is the pledges that this place makes to me, pledges that
cannot be redeemed, that confuse me later and make me feel
I am not getting anywhere. Everything is presented as the
result of some knowable process; if I wish to arrive at four I
get there by way of two and two. If I wish to burn Moscow
the route I must travel has already been marked out by
another visitor. If, like Bobby Vanderbilt, I yearn for the
wheel of the Lancia 2.4-liter coupe, I have only to go through
the appropriate process, that is, get the money. And if it is
money itself that I desire, I have only to make it: keep my
nose clean, develop a general affability, have a decent handle
of numbers and grammar, get a job working for a company.
All of these goals are equally beautiful in the sight of the
Board of Estimates; the proof is all around us, in the nononsense ugliness of this steel and glass building, in the
straightline matter-of-factness with which Miss Mandible
handles some of our less reputable wars. Who points out that
arrangements sometimes slip, that errors are made, that signs
are misread? “They have confidence in their ability to take
the right steps and to obtain correct answers.” I take the right
steps, obtain correct answers, and my wife leaves me for
another man.

This scene is not the heart, it is
the lock. It is the gate beyond
which lies my silent double, you.

8

The first time through I really left with the impression that
the world was just full of nice people with jobs: a dentist, a
teacher, a secretary. The frequency with which mention is
made to these professions is astounding. It is heresy to say
to us 11 year-olds that we will probably be nothing but
gropers, though this is the truth. We will graduate to the sixth
grade with a party that will feature young girls in make-up
posing in photos taken by insufferable parents. I want them
to tell me that this is a ruse. I want them to take me to the
abyss. I am waiting for the truth to arrive to me again, from
somewhere else this time. I’m not leaving until I get it.

My enlightenment is proceeding wonderfully.
9
Disaster once again. Tomorrow I am to be sent to a doctor,
for observation. Sue Ann Brownly caught Miss Mandible
and me in the cloakroom, during recess, and immediately
threw a fit. For a moment I thought she was actually going
to choke. She ran out of the room weeping, straight for the
principal's office, certain now which of us was Debbie,
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which Eddie, which Liz. I am sorry to be the cause of her
disillusionment, but I know that she will recover. Miss
Mandible is ruined but fulfilled. Fulfilled because ruined?
Although she will be charged with contributing to the
corrupting of a youth, she seems at peace; her promise has
been kept. She knows now that everything she has been told
about life, about America, is true.
I have tried to convince the school authorities that I am a
minor only in a very special sense, that I am in fact mostly
to blame – but it does no good. They are as dense as ever.
My contemporaries are astounded that I present myself as
anything other than an innocent victim. Like the Old Guard
marching through the Russian drifts, the class marches to the
conclusion that truth is punishment.
Bobby Vanderbilt has given me his copy of Sounds of
Sebring, in farewell.

September 8, 2034
I see myself, silent, at last.
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“Dru Farro and paracitation: a critical analysis”
Anyone encountering Dru Farro’s essay “Me and Me and Miss Mandible” is likely to want an answer
key; a guide explaining the details of its structure, tracing down the sometimes oblique references, and noting
the various – often minute – oddities in the text. The essay’s two columns are, on the reader’s right, the
complete verbatim text of Donald Barthelme’s short story “Me and Miss Mandible,” though, as Farro points
out, Barthelme’s text is modified by Farro’s own additions, none of which are signaled in any way except,
perhaps, by stylistic nuances distinguishing Barthelme’s prose from Farro’s. On the reader’s left is another
series of journal entries that range from 1935 to September 8, 2034 (the month and day, one might point out,
of Farro’s mother’s birthday) and are not arranged chronologically. They are marked by a typographic
irregularity and feature several excerpts from Farro’s other work, mostly that between the years 2014 and
2016. Perhaps most noticeable is their apparent heterogeneity with anything related to Barthelme’s/Farro’s
text. Though some entries are commentary-like, these are confined to the early pages of the essay and then
completely disappear.
Luckily for the reader, Farro provides a preface to the essay that provides a preliminary orientation to
the piece. We begin with Farro’s epigraph, which is from Roland Barthes’ Criticism and Truth: “…no longer to
desire the work but to desire one’s own language.” The original quotation appears in the context of Barthes’
attempt to differentiate reading and criticism. Barthes writes,
[o]nly reading loves the work, entertains with it a relationship of desire. To read is to desire the work,
to want to be the work, to refuse to echo the work using any discourse other than that of the work
[…]. To go from reading to criticism is to change desires, it is no longer to desire the work but to
desire one’s own language. But by that very process it is to send the work back to the desire to write
from that which it arose. And so discourse circulates around the book: reading, writing: all literature
goes from one desire to another.

“Me and Me and Miss Mandible” seems to stand somewhere between reading and criticism as Barthes defines
it here. On one hand Farro clearly responds to the work in a discourse that exceeds that of Barthelme’s text,
but on the other hand never completely severs that relationship with the text; indeed the entire text is repeated.
What Farro’s text is ultimately an example of is the circulation of desire as Barthes describes it above. Desire,
as it is called forth by Barthelme’s text, appears in the form of Farro’s interjections, which then recede back
into the progression of the reading of the story. As Farro’s desire circulates, the story accrues more and more
of his language and this accrual, in the end, extends even beyond the Barthelme story to include the marginal
journal entries on the left which, in turn, one might imagine, could themselves collect or attract more and
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more of Farro’s (or anyone else’s) words. This model of reading/criticism as a potentially endless accumulation
stands as a contrast or balance to alternative models wherein criticism is seen as a means of distillation and
reading is seen as a sort of sensitivity to salient or relevant aspects of the whole. If, from a conventional
perspective, criticism is thought to be an operation of incision, Farro sees it as an occasion for elaboration or
expansion, which of course is what follows in the text of “Me and Me and Miss Mandible.”
The preface begins, as is typical, by indicating the purpose or hypothesis of the piece. Farro writes,
[t]his preface, unlike others, cannot summarize or distil any of what follows. What follows, by the
way, is a sort of concatenation, a collage, an assault of writing – not all of it mine – assembled in what
can be characterized neither as a deliberate order nor a haphazard pastiche. I assembled it all under
the hypothesis that whatever found its way in [to the work] would engender – in me, in whomever –
associations, associations that will not be foreclosed or buried by the action of any overly apparent or
muscular thesis. The thesis is this hypothesis.

The allusions, really, begin here. The thesis/hypothesis distinction cannot help but bring to mind the
emblematic Hegelian equation: thesis, antithesis, synthesis, which is meant to summarize the career of Spirit
in its monumental progression to self-realization as depicted in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The most famous
passage in Hegel’s work is no doubt the dialectic of the master and bondsman in which the two
consciousnesses stake their lives in what has been called the struggle for prestige, resulting in the subjugation
of the now-enslaved bondsman to the master. Paradoxically, however, it is the bondsman who is first capable
of recognizing himself in the work he produces for the master, positioning him to accede to a higher state of
consciousness than the master, who languishes in the endless consumption of the bondsman’s labour. The
bondsman’s experience, then, is not unlike the scenario described by Barthes above, at least insofar as the
bondsman’s desire materializes, as desire, by means of the works he fashions from the world around him.
Following the associations further, as Farro clearly intends us to do, the Hegelian theme recalls Jacques
Derrida’s Glas, which is the obvious stylistic ancestor to Farro’s work. Glas is comprised of two columns, one
of which is an interminable exposé on Hegel’s name, his corpus, and his legacy (the other column is on the work
of French writer Jean Genet). The ghost of Hegel extends farther even than this, as we also recall Farro’s oneact plays The This and The Thesis207, both of which depend on Hegel’s Phenomenology for their dramatic unfolding
and both of which bear the mark of Farro’s characteristic obsession with the notion of the thesis as well as
his penchant for making himself a character in his own work. In The This, for example, René Magritte and his

Both of which appear in the unpublished manuscripts of Farro’s thesis, which, prior to the final title of A Thousand
Unknown Things, was provisionally entitled New Possible Prefaces, indicative of Farro’s fixation on prefaces.
207
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kitchenware have a surreal conversation considering the relationship between the thesis and Hegelian sensecertainty in an effort to determine the point at which one can say that the thesis exists (the play facilely employs
Magritte’s infamous Ceci n’est pas une pipe as the fulcrum for this existential eristic). The Thesis, on the other
hand, is far more akin to “Me and Me and Miss Mandible” in its jaggedness, in the characters’ heterogeneity,
and in the intrusion of personal memory into the realm of philosophic reflection.208 Even the very phrase,
“this preface, unlike others, cannot summarize or distil any of what follows,” would be a welcome sentiment
in Hegel’s famous preface to the Phenomenology which, among other things, calls the summarizing aspect of the
preface into question.
If we can follow Hegel’s influence this far only in the opening paragraphs to Farro’s work, we can follow
Derrida’s at least as far. Not only is there the aforementioned stylistic influence of Glas, but also the
typographic and temporal disarray of Farro’s work clearly borrows from Derrida’s The Post Card, the first half
of which is the text of a series of dated post cards sent to an unidentified “you” and occasioned by a certain
picture, chanced upon by Derrida, of Socrates in the act of writing. As with Hegel, Derrida looms over Farro’s
dramatic works – along with the figure of Antonin Artaud – especially in the long introduction to Farro’s
one-act Will You which, moreover, is quoted in “Me and Me and Miss Mandible” (also, in “Me and Me and

208

An example excerpt:

DRU: I am always re-born out of my thousands and thousands and endless deaths.
THOMAS: This grave, however, stands for the Unhappy Consciousness as a monument of the vanished individuality
of the Unchangeable. The Unhappy Consciousness, in encountering this symbol of the vanished individuality of the
Unchangeable, comes to know that this individuality, because it has vanished, is not the true individuality.
DRU: And, though I want nothing more than for the wind to stop blowing through the pinetops and for the sound to
stop, it is no different than wishing, if I wanted this, for the wind to blow.
THOMAS: As a result, the Unhappy Consciousness lays aside its efforts to seek the Unchangeable as an actual existence.
“Only then,” Hegel says, “is [the Unhappy Consciousness] capable of finding individuality in its genuine or universal
form” (218).
DRU: Yes. The first memory is the memory that says, “There is nothing I can do in this place.” The first memory is the
memory that says, “I have just given up”. You will bear scores of marks in your palms forever. They are an inscription…
The remainder of the play continues this analysis of Hegel’s Unhappy Consciousness alongside the more and more
diffuse and suicidal yearnings of Dru.
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Miss Mandible” Farro evasively alludes to Derrida’s work, calling Derrida “a certain philosopher from ElBiar”). Of course, at the most general level, Farro’s almost neurotic relationship with the text – with the
typography of the text, the topology of its features (especially the site of the thesis, the end of the preface, the
beginning of the beginning, the end of the thesis, the terrain of its syntax, etc.) – betrays an indebtedness to
Derrida’s early works and his experimental works.
Perhaps surprisingly, though, Farro does not list Hegel or Derrida among his “allegiances,” but rather
Freud and Lacan. Farro writes, just after the paragraph I cited above,
[t]he existence of this writing, the materialization of my sustained efforts, implies my regard for these
associations, my valuing them. One could deduce, from the fact of this regard, certain literary,
philosophical, or ethical stances tied to certain schools or theorists. While there may be a range of
possible affinities, for me personally I consider them to be more or less exclusively Freudian and
Lacanian, these being the only theorists I consider myself to be acceptably familiar with when it comes
to the matter of declaring allegiances.

The paragraph is a perplexing one, not simply for the influences listed (though Farro’s emphasis on personal
memory and the idea of trauma invites psychoanalytic speculation). Farro assumes that the reader’s impulse,
when confronting an essay as unconventional and even mystifying as “Me and Me and Miss Mandible”, will
be to separate out thematic, literary, or philosophical motifs and extrapolate, from these fragments, underlying
theses that exist in the text whether Farro wants them to be there or not. But is this the reader’s impulse? We
have here an example of Farro’s tendency to assume the worst from his readers; that they will refuse to enjoy
his work but only seek to carve it up and ready it for sale, as it were. Ironically, Farro’s very efforts to avoid
being carved up in this way in fact compel his readers to do so since his work refuses to be digested as it is.
This is why other critics have referred to Farro’s work as “classically hysterical”209 since it longs for the reader
to have the key to his truth while interminably dangling the lock just out of reach.
In any case, either directly or indirectly the reader’s critical appraisal of the piece is directed, by Farro, to
psychoanalysis: specifically Freud and Lacan. This explains Farro’s “regard for [the reader’s] associations,” if
we take “associations” precisely in the analytic sense of “free association,” which Freud established as the
“fundamental technical rule of analysis”. In the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis he writes,
[w]e instruct the patient to put himself into a state of quiet, unreflecting self-observation, and to report
to us whatever internal perceptions he is able to make – feelings, thoughts, memories – in the order

See for example Regina Dowd-Specter’s “Dora Goes Again Unread: Contemporary Misunderstandings and
Repetitions” or Philippa Gregg’s “There is No Secret Heart: Fear of Women in the Work of Dru Farro.”
209
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in which they occur to him. At the same time we warn him expressly against giving way to any motive
which would lead him to make a selection among these associations or to exclude any of them,
whether on the ground that it is too disagreeable or too indiscreet to say, or that it is too unimportant or
irrelevant, or that it is nonsensical and need not be said. We urge him always to follow only the surface
of his consciousness and to leave aside any criticism of what he finds, whatever shape that criticism
may take; and we assure him that the success of the treatment, and above all its duration, depends on
the conscientiousness with which he obeys this fundamental technical rule of analysis. 210

It seems as though Farro is espousing the psychoanalytic practice of free association as a model for reading
“Me and Me and Miss Mandible,” and possibly as a model for reading in general. It was certainly the model
he adopted for writing it, as is clear from the sporadic arrangements of excerpts from the past, the often
unbelievably tenuous connections between the two columns, and the informal style of some of the entries.
Indeed, “Me and Me and Miss Mandible” reads almost like a transcript of psychosis, where the reader is
compelled to search everywhere for a unifying consistency to a language that appears completely dissociated
from the reality of the Barthelme story, or even from the reality of anything we would recognize as a
“document.” The very title “Me and Me and Miss Mandible” reminds one of the distinct personalities often
associated with psychosis, where different characters are nevertheless also contained within “me”. It is a
wonder that Farro recommends the model of free association for his readers, when in truth they ought to be
the analysts!
The preface continues here with a quite long parenthetical reference, in which Farro claims, “[a]t the
subthematic level I profess a concern for education, specifically the teaching of literature at the university.”
Farro acknowledges that his psychoanalytically informed method of writing/reading cannot very well be taken
as a simple pragmatic model of teaching in general, or teaching literature specifically. Though he emphasizes
his unfamiliarity with the academic discipline of education, he presumes, correctly, that “Me and Me and Miss
Mandible” will not be useful for students or researchers in education departments who are looking for critical
reflections on contemporary forms of pedagogical praxis. This further complicates the status of the document
– one can hardly consider it a contribution to scholarly literature on the topic of education; one can hardly
consider it scholarly at all. What is it then?
Before concluding his preface Farro introduces a neologism of his own invention: paracitation. The word
is a play on “parasite” and “citation” and is meant in some way to encapsulate what he is trying to do in “Me
and Me and Miss Mandible.” The term is originally from Farro’s essay “Paracitation,” delivered in Tokyo in

Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVI, trans. James Strachey
(London: Hogarth, 1963), 287.
210
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2015. This essay is likewise a piece on the teaching of literature, and it is likewise evasive and impractical.
Farro begins by describing – again, almost like a psychotic – a phrase that he cannot get out his mind: “the
very blood of my syntax.” He writes that this phrase is “bedded like a seed or bat in the eaves,” that is has
“risen like a spirit from the ashen earth to arrest” him and that it is “like a splintered demon from an ancient
dream […] a dream retreating like a hawk or leviathan.” Syntax, Farro claims, is a “structure of reality” and,
as such, it can shift the landscape of the real according to the use to which it is put. In the academy, he writes,
“it is put in the service of method, adopted as a dialect of profundity, [it is] a key rendering knowledge
transmissible […], [it is] a rhetoric of unobjectionable transparency.” Citing Roland Barthes, Farro argues that
the method to which the very syntax of the academy (if there is such a thing) is put is always goal-oriented
and straight-pathed. Barthes writes, “paradoxically, what the straight path actually marks out are the places
the subject doesn’t want to go: it fetishizes the goal as a place and, as a result […] it enters the service of a
generality, a ‘morality.’ The subject, for instance, renounces what he doesn't know of himself, his irreducibility,
his force (to say nothing of his unconscious).”211 The academic method, according to Barthes and Farro, does
not simply discourage exploration of the unconscious, it excludes it at the outset by means of the boundaries
established by its very methodological coherence. Indeed, this coherence extends all the way to syntax.
There are, of course, several problematic features of the above claims, the grossest of which is, ironically,
their generality – the very sin of which Barthes accuses the academy. The “straight path” is no doubt the ideal
of certain curricular structures, but this claim cannot really be verified without an extended analysis of actual
curricula employed in actual universities. No evidence, not even anecdotal, is offered by either Barthes or
Farro of the perfidious effect of this method, nor is there even any mention of whether the straight path
method is practiced equally from department to department (the assumption is that we are concerned
exclusively with Humanities departments).
Additionally, some readers might contend that the subject’s (read: student’s) “unconscious” ought not to
be a matter for university – or any other – education. These readers, who first of all might not even admit
that the unconscious exists, might point out that Farro is allowing the unconscious the status and influence
assigned to it by the likes of Freud and Lacan who, of course, developed their theories without the help of
contemporary sciences like neurobiology or neuropsychology. Moreover, they might argue, it can hardly be
denied that, in the last five years or so, university campuses across North America have become more
accommodating to students suffering from anxiety, depression, mild forms of autism, addiction,
anorexia/bulimia, bi-polar disorder, etc., all of which should be directed to the attention of the university

Roland Barthes, How to Live Together: Novelistic Simulations of some Everyday Spaces, trans. Kate Briggs (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2013), 3.
211
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mental health care offices, surely not the literature professor. It is one thing to discuss the act of reading from
a psychoanalytical perspective, but quite another to extend this perspective to the classroom itself.
Farro has responded to these claims elsewhere in his work, especially in his essay “Robber: Come,” which
is an exposé of the work of Deborah Britzman, delivered at Fudon University in 2013. His claim, following
Britzman, is that learning itself is an affective experience and, as such, all of the dynamics that are in play in
an analysis – love, hate, aggression, jealousy, paranoia, ambivalence, identification, etc. – are present in the
classroom, in the relationship between teacher, student, and knowledge. Farro writes,
it only takes a moment of reflection on our own childhood experiences of education to recall the
emotional element of learning. We desire our teachers’ love, our peers’ love, we are anxious in the
face of testing, we are feverishly ambitious […] we dream of being at school – the dream of being
naked in front of one’s classmates is one of the most famous – we learn to play at school, resolve
conflict at school, work together at school […]. Learning is at its best when it is done for its own sake
– for the sheer pleasure of it – and this is the most highly affected pedagogical experience we can have
of it. An erotics of learning.

There is little to object to in Farro’s description of typical schoolroom experiences; the resistance begins when
the looming and unpredictable element of education – the element that is always in excess of the material
being taught – is attributed to the unconscious. Denying the presence and function of the unconscious in the
development of humans and its persistence in every interhuman interaction – not least among them education
– is, however, to leave oneself recourse only to the theses of behavioral scientists, sociologists, education
administrators, etc. To the extent that these theses are structured by a specific scientific discourse they operate
under the presumption that the real corresponds precisely to the symbolic and that the unincorporated data
are simply acceptable deviations or anomalies that may be rejected in order to preserve the method that
produces the best results. Farro responds, on the contrary:
education proceeds along an axis that is not instrumental, progressive, or teleological. Education, like
psychoanalysis, is structured around a fundamental difference and absence that is grafted into its very
identity. Where psychoanalysis and education seem most often to diverge from one another, a
divergence I am warning against, is the last to final step – the penultimate step. Where education sees
the penultimate step as being that which stands at the precipice of a kind of Hegelian unity and
absolute – materialized in the form of, say, a standardized test or graduation exam – psychoanalysis
sees the penultimate step as one where the analysand is prepared to accept and navigate the difference
about which her identity is constituted. This is a radically uncertain scenario, and so long as education
persists in ignoring, or fearing, the radical uncertainty that it seeks perpetually to calm or control, then
it is failing students as humans even as it is succeeding in making them more productive, more tolerant,
or more efficient.
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The result of Farro’s commitment to this picture of education is a teaching that can only be characterized as
risky and speculative. Returning to “Paracitation,” Farro asks “[w]hat would it mean to teach Kafka? Do some
works resist teaching more than others, or even resist it absolutely? […] And if, for love of the [literary] object,
one resolves to teach otherwise, what can this otherwise be?” He then offers paracitation as an example of
teaching otherwise, a pedagogical strategy that, instead of centering on citation as the means of distilling a
piece of literature to digestible portions, focuses on speaking from within the object, as though the teacher
were lost within the body of the text, exactly as he does in “Me and Me and Miss Mandible.” From this
perspective, for example, “Kafka’s text and words [come] blinking to life again […] but laced with hidden
roots.” These “roots” are the lifeline of the teacher’s desire, coming alive from within the text, like a parasite.
He “cites,” Kafka’s short story “A Country Doctor” thus (Farro’s additions are unitalicized):
O be joyful, all you patients,
The doctor’s laid in bed beside you!
Never shall I reach home at this rate; trees pass like listless ruin to the ocean floor, I see the stars above
burn out one by one; my flourishing practice is done for and I have healed no one; my successor is robbing me;
in my house the groom is raging; Rose is his victim; he hunts her like a shark smiling; all about me a plague of
saprotrophic faces swirl like spores, eyeing me indolently, indifferently, saying nothing; the boy is
dead, my only chance gone; I do not want to think about it anymore. Naked, exposed to the frost of this most
unhappy of ages, with an earthly vehicle, unearthly horses, Gods in the canopy gauzy and still and incapable
even of disdain, I wander astray. My fur coat is hanging from the back of the gig, falling to pieces, but I cannot
reach it, and none of my limber pack of patients lifts a finger. How could I ever have loved you, you jackals,
you precious insects. Betrayed! Betrayed! I sought you with the blessing of all my people and you have
stolen away to the labyrinth while the birds swarm with songs of my death. Betrayed! A false alarm on
the night bell once answered – it cannot be made good, not ever.

The value of this excerpt as a pedagogical device is complicated by its value as an artistic object in its own
right, a sort of post-modern amalgam between Duchamp’s “L.H.O.O.Q.,” the Chapman Brothers’ “Insult to
Injury,” and Sherrie Levine’s “After Walker Evans” or Borges’ story “Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote”.
At the very least, Farro’s intervention here calls the status of “the text” into question; not the text in general,
however, but the text as already under the consideration of academic scrutiny; Farro’s question seems to be:
how is the text immediately transformed the moment it is taken as a literary object subjected to scholarly
analysis? Simply upon its arrival in the classroom the document is presumed to be susceptible to distillation
and fragmentation, a premium is put on symbolic interpretation, with an eye toward presenting the story in
the form of units of meaning available for exchange, which may then be employed as a guarantor of
knowledge acquisition. Here, and in “Me and Me and Miss Mandible,” this formula is inverted: the story is
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not summarized but, instead, it is protracted; symbols are multiplied by the analysis and the “meaning” of the
text materializes in the infinitely expansive network of symbols, metaphors, and especially associations, any
of which reconfigure the story while simultaneously extending its career along the tracks of interpretation.
The mode of intervention is anti-didactic insofar as Farro’s additions are not nearly as deliberate as they are
freely associative, revealing as much to him (him the reader more than him the teacher) about his unconscious
landscape as they do about the major themes or imagery of the story. As a model for reading, Farro’s work
reorients the value of the literary text insofar as it is no longer (only) an object available for intellectual
consumption and is instead an object making a demand of the reader, a demand literally to respond to the
text at the complicated intersection of the reader’s desire, her associations, and the general thematic coherence
of the story. One writes one’s desire into a text that, by the force of its internal coherence, reconfigures this
desire for the reader, not wholly unlike Lacan’s famous schema in which the reader/patient receives his or
her message from the text/Other in an inverted form. Here, however, the message is inverted not in its
meaning but in its intent: what was originally a demand for meaning made by the reader to the text becomes
a demand for meaning made by the text to the reader.
One ought to note that a pedagogy like this is possible, perhaps, only in the contemporary historical
moment, a moment when analysis in the form of information is more widely available than could ever have
been imagined 20 years ago. A student simply does not have to attend a class on Kafka in order to obtain
cogent and relatively detailed facts about him or his work and, therefore, insofar as the academy values this
form of fragmentized or distilled form of information it is participating in its own obsolescence. Today, one
can perform a simple internet search for analysis of “A Country Doctor” and obtain, in under a second,
dozens of analyses of the text ranging from peer-reviewed journal articles to blog posts to professors’ lecture
notes, most of which are sufficient enough in their thematic, stylistic, or symbolic reviews of the text to make
subsequent analyses in this mode more or less redundant. That is, the compiled scholarship is essentially
enough to consider the scholarly perspective complete, or at the very least more than sufficient to satisfy the
needs of the typical undergraduate student whose primary objective as a student is redeployment of
information. Farro’s work does not necessarily criticize or condemn this state of things as much as
acknowledge it and provide a novel means of engaging with texts that, even the more obscure among them,
are everyday accruing easily available scholarly analyses which in turn are challenging the university professor
to provide an education that is in excess of the facts already at the fingertips of any student. As Farro writes
in his essay “The Postmortem Condition,” an analysis of Lyotard’s seminal work,
[i]f knowledge comes to be equated with access to information, then educators will be less and less
crucial in the dissemination of knowledge and more useful as guides toward databases of information.
The material of learning, however, is theoretically already available in these computerized archives.
Curiosity is muted in favor of acquisition. Imagination is replaced by performance. Lyotard writes,
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“the transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to train an elite capable of guiding the nation
toward emancipation, but to supply the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles
at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions.” Should this be the case, and I think that it is, the
role of the professor or educator obviously gets thrown radically into question. If there is no longer a
pretense to transmitting knowledge that the student would otherwise have no access to, then the
question becomes: what kind of knowledge, if any, are we transmitting?

Farro’s answer seems to be: knowledge of one’s self, the self considered from the perspective of
psychoanalysis.
“Me and Me and Miss Mandible” is both the product of Farro’s wild self-analysis (an impossible endeavor)
and an object meant, as the preface indicates, to provoke, to foment, associations; associations whose
significance exceed the boundaries of information, even of knowledge, and aspire to the domain of truth –
the student’s truth.
The conclusion to Farro’s preface: “[w]hat follows is an essay, absent all the stylistic trappings that have
accrued onto that term over the years and years. It is a sort of offering, perhaps no better than the infantile
scybalum, an acknowledgement that you want something, but who knows what it is. It is an essay; it is not a
response, but desires one.” One such possible response is that of the present author: an answer key. Isn’t that
what you want?

*

*

*

One can hardly approach “Me and Me and Miss Mandible” without a copy of “Me and Miss Mandible”
at hand, in order to discover all the moments of Farro’s interventions. Farro expands Barthelme’s text by
almost double; some additions are only a few words, while others are several paragraphs. Especially notable
among the added passages are the themes of dreams, déjà vu, and etymology.
In the left-hand column emerge the more explicitly psychoanalytic themes, not only in the content of the
entries but in their form: the past is completely disjointed, ultimately giving way to a paranoid future; Farro’s
memories play the central role and the excerpted character of the entries reminds the reader of the fragmented
nature of memory; and the somewhat confessional tone of the entries suggests the tone of an analysand
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struggling between soliciting a response from the analyst and maintaining the freedom of her thoughts and
associations. Farro’s debt to Barthes is apparent here, especially in the latter’s work A Lover’s Discourse and
Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, both of which experiment with arbitrary arrangements of fragmented text.
This answer key will be structured similarly to “Me and Me and Miss Mandible,” in order to make things
as simple as possible for the reader. When the left column is under consideration the text will be aligned to
the left and a heading will be included indicating the date of the entry being analyzed, and similarly for the
right column. It is worth iterating that the intent of this key is to supply details regarding the structure of
Farro’s essay, notable biographical information, and elaboration of essential references and themes, which
alone can take the reader quite far afield from the apparent subject matter of the story. Borrowing an image
from the essay, this key might be considered to be an exploded view of “Me and Me and Miss Mandible,” its
individual components isolated as clearly as possible.

September 13

[Miss Mandible … makes up her mind.]

This scandalous first paragraph is Barthelme’s. The salient features are
the potential sexual relationship between teacher and young student (echoes
of the Oedipus complex are present here), and the disjunction of realities
bordering on the psychotic. Our narrator, who in the original is called Joseph
but which Farro changes to Thomas (his own alter-ego), is both thirty-five
and eleven years old, having reappeared in the fifth (originally sixth) grade
with the brutal immediacy of a psychotic break.
Farro has demonstrated his familiarity with the clinical and theoretical
aspects of psychosis in his piece, “Your Actual Ghost,” a summary of
Lacan’s early work up to his third seminar on psychosis, interlaced with
impressionistic observations related to the death of the dancer Whitney Mah
and a lengthy series of excerpts from various works of literature and
psychoanalysis. “Your Actual Ghost” begins with a long passage from David
Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress in which the novel’s protagonist and only
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character reflects on the peculiarity of certain logical conclusions (“Certain
matters would appear to get carried certain distances whether one wishes
them to or not, unfortunately”), as well as commenting on the fact that she
cannot get the word bricolage out of her head even though she does “not
speak one word of French.” These two themes – the internal motion of
discourse and bricolage – could easily be seen as hallmarks of Farro’s own
techniques, as well as showcase his reverence for the unexpected and
associative (Markson’s narrator writes: “[t]he world is everything that is the
case. I have no idea what I mean by that sentence I have just typed, by the
way.” This, of course, echoes Farro’s own “the very blood of my syntax,”
mentioned above). Like Thomas, Wittgenstein’s mistress lives in a second
world, the world that remains after some mysterious and cataclysmic trauma,
a world that is not completely unfamiliar, but also one that is relentlessly
alien. It is within the literary aura of alternate or bizarre worlds – worlds that
cohere almost exclusively thanks to their discourse – that Farro elects to
discuss Lacan’s work on psychosis. This positioning, clearly, reorients our
relationship as readers to Farro’s theoretical analysis, preventing us from
ever fully inhabiting the world of scholarship even while the material at hand
is deeply theoretical. Moreover, the intrusion of Farro’s reflections on the
aftermath of Mah’s death into the text on Lacan work as examples of the
sorts of hallucinations Lacan discusses at length in Seminar III, hallucinations
that help track the underlying trauma and which, as they appear in Farro’s
text, point to something to which he refers again and again in his texts: the
secret heart.
Lacan’s method for treating psychosis could be taken as a model for
reading Barthelme’s (and Farro’s) text. Farro writes,
[b]y listening to Schreber’s language as it unfolds and develops
over time a history of his discourse materializes. Years pass and the
sentences develop a signifying consistency, ceasing to be nonsense.
The same is true in ‘ordinary’ language […]. In fact it is this signifying
consistency – this accrual of sympathetic utterances – that produces
generic distinctions between varieties of discourse: academic, legal,
pedagogical, medical, etc. So much so that inhabiting these different
regions of discourse becomes almost solely a question of locutionary
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style, so profoundly has the language of these discourses been reified
and internalized. Schreber’s speech, as nonsensical, is precious for
exactly that reason, that it is a language whose underlying unifying
code is not the real. Lacan returns again and again to Schreber’s
‘nonsense’ as a way not only of legitimizing Schreber’s speech as
significant but also criticizing the notion that common language is
‘modeled on a simple and direct apprehension of the real.’

By valorizing Schreber’s discourse, and even imitating it to a certain
extent, Farro also repositions the role of the real in his own discourse,
undercutting declarations of truth and reality to such an extent that the
reader

is

compelled

to

discover

the

signifying

coherence

of

Farro’s/Barthelme’s text on its own terms, or supplement the discursive
framework with his or her own associative embellishments. In this scenario
the reader, reading Farro’s text, is simultaneously exhorted indirectly to write
his or her associations into the text, just as Farro writes his impressions of
mourning into his analysis of psychosis.

June 9, 2016

Since this entry speaks at one level removed from Farro/Barthelme’s
text, it is easy to assume that this voice is the “real” Farro, commenting on
the text the way this text is commenting on “Me and Me and Miss
Mandible.” The prevailing metaphor in this entry – indeed, it is a metaphor
of Farro’s capacity for metaphor – is that of the ecosystem, wherein an
astonishing array of flora and fauna can be said, despite their variance, to be
linked. Farro stresses the degree to which his metaphorical production is
unique to him, being, as it is, a product of his own career through the world
and the legacy left by what one might call the trauma of being – the battery
of experiences that resist everything but metaphorical signification. Despite
the multifarious instances of the metaphorical production of any one
individual, this plenitude can nevertheless be said to be organized by the
unconscious.
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For Farro, the unconscious is present already in his writing, manifest in
the form of symptoms that he writes “are not stylistic.” He goes on: “they
are symptoms, qualifying as such in a clinical sense: as evidence of the, my,
unconscious sending a message (to the Other, from the Other?).” Taken in
this sense, as a sort of subterranean or invisible message ciphered into the
material of the natural world, the symptoms of writing are akin to the
parasitic (“wasps fecundating in the boughs”) or buried (“grubs populating
the undersoil”) aspects of the ecosystem, present like a stain on the everyday
structures of nature – the common oak covered in the tumors of the gall
wasp, for example.
As already discussed above, in imitation of this parasitism Farro has
intervened in Barthelme’s work, leaving the mark of an entirely separate
discourse couched in the structural coherence of another discourse. In other
words, to the extent that Barthelme’s story can be considered to be an object
bounded by whatever more or less loosely determined set of literary
conventions, Farro’s staining of this object presents a kind of crisis of
boundaries. Where scholarly analysis purports to preserve the object in its
wholeness, Farro’s analysis perverts that object explicitly by marking it with
his desire.
Of course, every scholarly intervention is a product, in some respect, of
desire as well, and yet this desire is often disavowed or even repressed by a
discourse that aspires to objective generality. Farro explores this theme in
his paper “Clouds,” delivered in Saskatoon in 2013. The paper is occasioned
by an interview with Cecilia Giménez, the 84 year-old Spanish woman who,
in Farro’s words, was crucified for her attempt to restore a fresco of Jesus
at her local church in the town of Borja. For Farro, the gleeful scorn of the
critics and the carnival of stone-throwing that followed Giménez’s
intervention is indicative of a reverence for the true that disavows the
individual’s desire regarding the object. Taking shelter behind the aura of the
artistic relic, Giménez’s critics accused her of distorting the fresco beyond
repair, erasing an important artifact from the history of religious art.
Consulting Giménez herself, who was so pained by the fresco’s decay that
she took it upon herself – because nobody else was going to – to restore it,
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we learn that she volunteered at the church in her spare time, time that was
itself was sparse given that she is the caretaker of her 54-year-old son who
suffers from a degenerative disease (her other son died of the same disease
not long before the restoration). Describing Giménez’s situation, Farro
writes,

I don't know what it's like to have children, nor to have
a child die from a slow, constant, irrepressible
degeneration. We can imagine, though, probably, the
lengths we would go to save someone we love from
the onset and progression of a terminal disease. We
would pray for miracles, in whatever form our prayers
take, probably. We might even remember the stories
John tells of Jesus as he heals the sick, as he gives back
to us what we thought was forever lost. But you cannot
stop a degenerative disease from killing your sons. You
might even feel guilty about this. Certainly you will feel
powerless, and you will likely be in great need of
comforting and support. You may feel insufficient to
the task, and perhaps like you have failed your beloved.
But you go on loving, and trying, and caring. Lazarus,
resurrected or not, would still be beloved of Jesus, and
the quality of care is not measured by the degree to
which the sick are healed by it. Love is not vitiated by
the decay in whose midst it circulates. Bravely. Love
circulates bravely in the midst of decay, even though it
knows, Cecilia, that it cannot restore the sons that
engendered it.
But care and devotion and love might be able to restore
other beloved things.
Taking the restoration as a sublimation of her grief (Cecelia says, “all my life
I’ve painted as a way to relax, to help me forget my misfortune”), Farro sees
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the restoration not as a heinous ruining of the piece but, on the contrary, as
an example of art operating at its most profound levels, as bringing the
other’s desire to bear on itself. Farro sees Giménez’s example as one to be
followed by scholars who, instead of casting stones, might seek instead to
register their desire somewhere in their work, to avow it as desire.
Farro, however, also acknowledges the complexity of this registering
insofar as desire, as Lacan alleges, is the desire of the other. Transposed from
the psychoanalytic context, Farro considers this question from within the
relationship between the reader and writer. He writes, “[r]eally the question
is: what shall I, in your endless silence, impute to you, all the way down to
your very heart, your ignorance, your desire? My address to you, all my
points and questions, place you somewhere, whether you are there or not.”
Impossible as it is to know the desire of the reader – the expectations, the
demands, the interests – the writer is compelled to assume, or to place the
reader in a certain desiring position, which leads to the formal or generalized
language of, for example, scholarship. But does every cue taken by the writer
come from what is presumed about the reader? What if these presumptions
are completely suspended, or what if the writer writes as if his or her sole
reader were the writer him/herself? How near, returning to a psychoanalytic
context, would this form of writing come to the speech of the analysand,
who speaks without reservation to a presence who is only barely there,
listening with a third ear?
“And I am refusing to be somewhere, too,” Farro continues. This line,
in a psychoanalytic context, can be taken at least two ways. The first would
place Farro, the one acknowledging his refusal to be anywhere, in the
position described by Lacan as that of dummy, as the one who is “dead
enough not to be caught up in the imaginary relation,”212 ideally the place of
the analyst. With the emphasis on provoking and encouraging the free
associating of the reader, it is easy to imagine Farro as the figure providing
the context for the reader to encounter her associations but who is otherwise
absent from the text; absent insofar as he has organized the text in such as
a way as to refrain from saying anything overtly thetic or assertive about
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literature, psychoanalysis, etc. In this manner Farro would be imitating
Lacan’s own pedagogical techniques as he expresses again and again in the
seminars, summarized by his claim that all of his teaching aspires to be not
quite understood.213
Alternatively, as mentioned above, one can liken Farro’s refusal to be
somewhere to the hysteric’s analogous refusal, who occupies an enduringly
evasive position insofar as her desires are perpetually unsatisfied in order, as
Lacan says, “to have the Other hold the key to her mystery.”214 There is,
after all, something fundamentally hysterical about the position of the writer
since it is only at the indulgence and judgment of the reader that the writer
manages to exist at all. There is the example of David Markson’s novel
Vanishing Point, in which the narrator, known only as Author, expresses a
desire to remove himself entirely from the text he’s writing, which we are
told is itself only a randomly selected list of curiosities and facts from the
history of literature, art, and philosophy collected by Author on notecards
that have, over the years and years, come to fill two shoeboxes. Only the
tiniest threads of a “story” exist in Markson’s novel (akin to the precious
strands of spider’s silk Farro mentions), which amount to the reader coming
to understand that Author has grown old and tired and his death is quite
near.
Farro’s description of his hopes for his own work could double as a
description of Markson’s novels: “the ruins of what was never whole,”
wherein an author searches for himself in the form of his symptom,
embodied by all the memories and notes that he surrounds himself with –
these memories and notes and no others. Like Farro, Markson will often
remark on why a memory or anecdote persists when so much else is
forgotten. Vanishing Point is struck through with the inescapable (if
miniscule) traumatic memory of a figure washing her face in the basin of a

“I would say that it is with deliberate, if not entirely deliberated, intention that I pursue this discourse in such a way
as to offer you the opportunity to not quite understand. This margin enables you yourselves to say that you think you
follow me, that is, that you remain in a problematic position, which always leaves the door open to a progressive
rectification.” Lacan, Sem. III, 164.
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toilet. Several instances of these inescapable, inassimilable, unrepresentable
memories exist in Farro’s work – the mutilated fish, above all.
The fish, for Farro, is embodied in a phrase from William Faulkner’s As
I Lay Dying: “my mother is a fish,” Vardaman’s famous one-sentence
chapter. Farro goes on also to mention the phrase “the very blood of my
syntax,” to which I referred above, and the new phrase, “Whitney, whose
breath I hear all around me.” Like Markson, Farro assembles these
fragments in order to discover what they produce by the sheer power of
their being assembled (Markson’s methodological mantra in Vanishing Point
is: “nonlinear, discontinuous, collage-like, an assemblage”). Where
Markson’s fragments tend, throughout his novels, to be striking or peculiar
scenes from the history of art, Farro’s tend to be cast-off excerpts from
unfinished or unpublished works, which is indeed the case here for the
“relic” “surfacing from the ruins:”

[w]hat are the dead? An effect of grammar, of an
arrangement of words, the breathlessness I feel when
I say, ‘Whitney is dead.’ They are there when words
arrange themselves in impossible or unforgivable
ways. That is when they arrive, how they persist. The
routine of language, the coins we pass without end
tallying a meaningless balance, crumbles like bone
when you are standing there next to her as she gasps
and chokes and yet already new platitudes take root
like spores and you begin to wonder if you will ever
have peace with the dead without the fingers of
language ensnaring you in bonds that leave you
permanently out of reach of the dead you have loved,
of the dead you have yet to endure, of your death.
When the dead arrive at the faults of language, they
are asking you something. They are like a dream.
This excerpt is from an unfinished one-act tentatively entitled
“Anamorphosis,” in which three to five actors were to be speaking different
lines simultaneously except for spontaneous moments of unison – “like the

166

chords in a Debussy,” Farro wrote in his journal for the piece. The
fascination with unpredictable moments of crystallization persists here –
Farro, in the journal, writes: “out of a chaos of speech, actors varying their
volumes, moments of unison feel like lightning strikes, and these are the
traumas, whose clarity is so forceful, so entirely different from the stream of
speech that is everywhere in the theatre, that it is so disorienting and
terrible.”

September 13
[Etymology is a science of intimacy … I am happy here in fifth grade.]
The remainder of September 13 contains much original material of Farro’s,
specifically the apothegm on etymology (likely borrowed from Joyce’s
portmanteau “intimologies”215) and the ruminations about fractions, which
are given a distinctly Platonic and Badiouian slant (the emphasis on the
square on the diagonal recalls Plato’s Meno – perhaps the most crucial
philosophical text for educators – while the brief mention of matrices and
empty sets brings Plato’s disciple Alain Badiou to mind). In his essay, “A
Commentary on a Brief Interview of Roland Barthes in Which He Claims
That Literature is the Only Thing That Should Be Taught,” Farro offered a
Lacanian reading of the Meno in which, quoting Lacan, he writes, “Meno
isn’t the analysand, he’s the analyst – the bulk of analysts.”216 This barb
simply signifies Lacan’s distaste for any analyst who demands too
categorically for methodologies that could, for example, be summarized in a
kind of manual of psychoanalytic technique. Meno asks Socrates, with
somewhat intimidating persistence, a question while being completely
incapable of recognizing its underlying presumptions which, in the end,
make it impossible for Socrates to give a meaningful answer. Lacan

215

James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (New York: Viking Press, 1939), 101.

The quotation is from Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique
of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: Routledge, 1988), 14.
216

167

summarizes the issue as follows: “[t]he aim and paradox of the Meno is to
show us that the epistêmê, knowledge bounded by formal coherence, does not
cover the whole of the field of human experience.”217 The character of
Thomas is keenly aware of this given that a great deal of his reflections deal
precisely with the disjunction between the highly organized world of formal
education and the chaotic, irrational and unjust reality of human life. More
than these elements, though, there is the element of the unconscious, which
could be considered the antithesis of education par excellence given its
defiance of chronology, logical operations, etc. The unconscious, from a
certain perspective, exists in fact only as a consequence of education taken
in the most primitive sense: as the domestication or eradication of the uncivil
instincts. These instincts, however, cannot be completely eradicated, ending
up instead precisely in the locus of the unconscious.
September 15
The “principle land-mass” paragraph is Farro’s addition. Function uncertain.
June 10, 2016
At the end of June 9, 2016 Farro asks himself why he has chosen, from
any number of stories or artifacts, this particular story of Barthelme’s. He
notes that “some styles are more resistant than others, at least to my
abilities,” meaning, presumably, that Barthelme’s casual, humorous, and
surreal storytelling lends itself easily to Farro’s experimental impulses. Farro
does not specify what the texts are resistant to, but one might assume he
means resistant to paracitation. Barthelme’s story, with its episodic structure
and surreal setting, lends itself to distortion far more simply than, for
example, the tightly woven plot of a typical mystery novel or the inimitably
styled work of a Flaubert or a Twain. But Farro also wonders, in an addition
to this entry – made on June 16 – whether the resistance is not from the text
but from himself. This question (“is it me who stops resisting?”), invites us
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to consider the extent to which our interaction with a text is complicated by
our resistance to elements from the text, elements we might as readers have
no idea we are resisting or why. What this means in the context of education
or the academy is that reading practices are shaped by a current of desire
running beneath the pretensions to close reading or objectivity.
In June 10, 2016 we get a list of quotations from the scholarship on “Me
and Miss Mandible” which serves as a foil for Farro’s own work with the
story and as an example of the tropes of scholarship. While the individual
excerpts vary in their tone and content, they each exemplify the mode of
intervention Farro is committed to suspending. That is, each excerpt
reconfigures or distils the ambiguous or uncertain aspects of Barthelme’s
story into a thesis, a move that is especially gross in the examples explicitly
referring to the ambiguity or indeterminateness of literary narratives. Taken
together they represent an aspect of what might be called “literary
knowledge” and when taken individually they might be seen as, to steal of
favourite phrase of Farro’s, coins circulating in the economy of this
knowledge. To possess these coins is to possess a specific, supreme insight.
Together with the “strangely erotic” citation information (i.e. proof of
publication) these scholarly insights possess an unassailable validity within
the literary economy. The eroticism is perhaps a reference here to
Aristophanes’ famous speech in the Symposium in which love is described as
an intense longing for the two halves of a formerly whole being to be
reunited, reproducing their former symmetry and reciprocity. What is a
citation, after all, but a moment of contact between two pieces of writing?
The citation serves as an emblem of the bond that can never be too
complete. Or, differently, the citation can be a mark of dominance, a sign
that another text has been consumed and is now entirely represented by the
token that remains which itself serves to signify to others that some
confrontation has occurred and spoils rewarded. The citations, as they
proliferate, are like a harem of servants whose submission is guaranteed by
the license the writer may always take on the text she quotes.
“Me and Miss Mandible,” which is so strangely centered on the rules of
the game of education, becomes even more monstrous when education
attempts to reincorporate it within its own discourse. The scholarship that
rightly emphasizes the subversive dimension of Barthelme’s themes and
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techniques is itself an extension of the fantasies (and perversions) that are
so obvious to Thomas. That is, by commenting on the “play of irony” in
Barthelme’s text one does not so much unlock that playfulness as freeze it
in its place as an item in scholarly discourse. Or, instead of claiming to
discover an “infinite freeplay” of language, which as a statement in itself is
mostly didactic, one could produce an example of this freeplay, as Farro has
done.
“It is apparent by now that I am in Joseph’s Thomas’s situation. Or some
variant of it.” The aspect of Thomas’s experience Farro sympathizes with is
no doubt the feeling of confusion or emptiness at discovering that when one
finally accedes to the position of teacher, expecting the enjoy all the truth,
order, or knowledge one had long assumed teachers enjoy, there are only
more mystifying rules to play by that seem to have no author.
September 19
The entire section on déjà vu is Farro’s addition, and Barthelme never
mentions the phenomenon in the original. The listed theories are selected
from several different psychology texts published since 2000.
The diverse theories listed here indicate clearly how unresolved the
experience of déjà vu is for contemporary science. Farro utilizes the
uncertainty here to emphasize the mystery of memory and the surreal,
alienating aspects of one’s experience of reality (much like Thomas’s
recording of his dreams, discussed later on). They also convey a little about
the awkwardness with which scientific discourse and methodology deal with
phenomena that do not readily submit to their approach or orientation. The
first example hardly even qualifies as a description of déjà vu, given that it
implies that déjà vu is triggered by being in a familiar situation, when anyone
who has ever experienced déjà vu would claim that it is the feeling of having
done this exact thing already. Or again, the third example, intentionally or
not, demonstrates how deeply science can be influenced by metaphor given
the imagery here of roadways, storage houses, and itemized units of
sensation. The fourth example gives a possible explanation for Thomas
appearing to re-experience the fifth-grade: he is literally re-living it by having
returned his consciousness back through time to when he was eleven, letting
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it play out in a separate timeline, a separate universe. A citation for the
psychoanalytic explanation (example 6) is not given, but the source cannot
have been Freud or Lacan (or even one of their disciples); and while
psychoanalysis obviously places a great deal of stress on repetition of past
experiences, the phenomenon of déjà vu is rarely mentioned in connection
with trauma or wish-fulfillment, as is implied here.
By inserting the theme of déjà vu, Farro provides a response to the
question of what exactly is happening to Thomas while at the same time
complicating the picture further. We might take this technique as a
cornerstone of Farro’s literary critical or pedagogical methodology, where
every incisive gesture is accompanied by a forking of multiple pathways
whose directions are determined by one’s associative impulses.
Of course this methodology is itself challenged by the very next
paragraph in which Thomas expresses his sense of peace or relief when
regarding the exploded views or car engines. In this passage it is not the
chaotic multiplicity that is depicted but a supreme clarity, or rather a supreme
suspension. Farro’s extravagant prose in this paragraph is a clear deviation
from his miming of Barthelme’s writing, suggesting that this particular
description of the exploded view was precious for Farro. The exploded view
is neither a total mess nor a perfectly functioning machine but rather the
precise moment between the two; thus Farro’s conflicted language in the
passage, which modulates between stressing the violent as well as the
quiescent aspects of the view.
The exploded view is a theme sympathetic to Thomas’s reflection on
his former profession of claims adjuster for the Great Northern Insurance
Company. Barthelme’s original text continues here, extending the theme of
chaotic disarray. The reader might see an analogy between the function of
the claims adjuster – who distils a monetary value out of ruin or disarray –
and the literature teacher or scholar as Farro sometimes implies that person
to be, one who sifts out certain values from the text, refashioning them for
circulation in the economy of scholarship. “Ten years at GNIC and I
couldn’t even see the catastrophe anymore, just claims waiting to
materialize,” might be a fitting description of how the literature scholar’s
relationship to literature changes as she gets farther along in her academic
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career: everything one reads must be adjusted into a claim (synonym for
thesis).

December 13, 2015

This entry is the preface to Farro’s essay “Petals. Flowers.” the first
portion of which is a quotation from Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer:
I have made a silent compact with myself not to change a line of
what I write. I am not interested in perfecting my thoughts, nor
my actions. There is only thing which interests me vitally now,
and that is the recording of all that which is omitted in books.
Nobody, so far as I can see, is making use of those elements in
the air which give direction and motivation to our lives.218

All the themes of Farro’s writing return in this essay: the coins, the seeds,
the preface, the (lack of a) thesis, the desire of the other, education,
experimentation in writing, etc. The essay has a somewhat colorful
publication history, being at first rejected by the journal Chiasma: A Site for
Thought, which Farro co-founded. In his journals Farro describes the
rejection as “a sign that I need to leave.” The piece was later published in
the e-journal Critical Studies in Culture, Society, Texts, Media, Gender, and
Civilization.
Like nearly all the rest of his work, “Petals. Flowers.” cannot be easily
summarized, and ranges from biography, poetry, psychoanalysis, and
education with the typical structural experimentation in formatting and the
use of footnotes, as well as an early example of paracitation (this essay
precedes Farro’s coining the word). A part of what the essay examines is the
role of books and teachers in what one might call one’s psychic destiny.
Citing Freud’s brief essay, “Some Reflections on Schoolboy Psychology,”
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Farro depicts the influence of the teacher on the young student as
ambivalent and ambiguous; the teacher is both admired and reviled and
often taken as a substitute for a parent. Moreover, again citing Freud, the
teacher is frequently a significant figure in the onset of neurosis, as is clear
in the cases of the Wolf Man and Rat Man. The classroom is the site, for
many, of the domestication of the impulses and the experiences of
prohibition, punishment, and pleasure, all of which profoundly contribute
to the psychic development of the child, including the decision, later in life,
to become a teacher. If, as Lacan notes, to be an analyst one must perhaps
be at least a little neurotic,219 Farro asks in turn:
What must someone be to be a good teacher, a good researcher?
The world of education, insofar as it is a world of research,
learning, and acquisition of knowledge, is its own kind of culture
for breeding (and preserving) neuroses. Freud makes this clear in
the analysis of the Rat Man’s case:220

[For obsessives], thought processes themselves become sexualized as
sexual desire, which would normally refer to the content of the patient’s
thoughts, is applied to the act of thinking itself, and the satisfaction felt
in arriving at a certain intellectual outcome is experienced as sexual
satisfaction. This relationship between the drive to knowledge and the
intellectual process makes it particularly well suited, in various forms of
obsessive-compulsive neurosis where it has a part to play, to waylaying
the energy that struggles in vain to force its way through to action and
luring it in the direction of thought, which offers the possibility of a
different kind of pleasurable satisfaction.221
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Is this what our practice and thinking as researchers amounts to,
the thrill of a ciphered satisfaction? Yes? How would our
thinking on the matter of teaching change?

Farro does not directly answer these questions but, as is typical of his style,
leaves them for the reader to take in whatever direction she chooses.
Ultimately these questions aim at the bedrock of one’s identity as a teacher,
compelling the reader to consider the circumstances – psychic or practical –
that have led to her decision to become a teacher, to take up this unique
position with respect to knowledge and with respect to others. By unsettling
these issues Farro displaces the teaching position from a simple matter-offact perspective and exposes its faces that are otherwise hidden or too close
to see, thereby making the teaching position available to a novel critical
perspective. Citing Lacan, Farro takes a claim about the analyst and applies
it to the teacher: “[i]f you are not coming here to put into question
everything you do, I don’t see why you’re here. Why would those who do
not sense meaning of this task remain tied to us, rather than joining up with
some bureaucracy or other?”222 Farro continues this line of thought with
one of the more explicitly prescriptive passages in his work:
[i]t is no longer a question that the university is a bureaucracy.
The question has become whether it is possible to isolate and
maintain spaces where thought is unconditioned. This does not
exclusively mean the freedom to be critical, but additionally the
freedom to be creative and experimental. The value of the
experimental in this setting cannot be determined in advance, but
only in the effect it has on students, readers, and the
experimenters themselves. A space to feel the heart of their
desire.

And obviously Farro’s work is a testament to his commitment to insisting
on a creative and experimental space in the classroom and in the university.
In the final paragraphs of this entry Farro repeats the uncertain status of his
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experimentation, as far as something like projected outcomes go: “[t]his
writing has no worth or use that can be determined in advance. No thesis,
no known place to lay the stress. The wreck of a life.”
“The wreck of a life,” a rather unexpected fragment in this entry, seems
to refer to the disarray of experiences, memories, and desires that comprise
the substance of our lives and the font of our writing. While writing might
be thought to be precisely the ordering of these elements into something
powerful and coherent, Farro’s “writing otherwise” is more of a portrait of
the chaotic trajectories our associations take us on as we write, a portrait
whose educational worth is of the more abstract “know thyself” than of the
easily circulating “objective” or “impartial” writing typically employed in
scholarship. Indeed after reading enough of Farro’s work it is easy to deduce
that he would not believe in the possibility of a writing in which the writer
takes no or even little part.

September 23

The recorded dream is Farro’s addition to an entry that, in the original,
is just the roll call and the anecdote of the whitewashed trees. The dream is
rather elegantly woven into Barthelme’s text, and the entire entry is a near
perfect example of the pathways of associations as they move from a
mystifying dream to the recollection of a past trauma (the whitewashed trees
represent a crisis in authority for Thomas), to the incorporating of
Vanderbilt’s imitations (likely heard the day before), finally to the
whitewashed trees which help Thomas remember a forgotten aspect of his
dream: the trees full of white wolves.
Nobody unfamiliar with Freud’s work would see the white wolves as a
reference, while those with even only a small exposure to Freud’s work
would know of the dream of the wolves and its eponymous dreamer, the
Wolf Man. Farro uses the Wolf Man case study as an example of the
sometimes profound and traumatizing role books have in one’s psychic
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development, a role he exhorts educators to acknowledge. Indeed the Wolf
Man is so called because of a fear of wolves that originates with illustrations
in a book, and extends to a fear of a certain teacher whose name was Wolf;
this fear then extends to the Wolf Man’s relationship with other teachers.
Setting the scene in this way might help one to reflect on the rather
peculiar name of Barthelme’s teacher: Mandible. As Farro has already
pointed out, the name refers to chewing and this, combined with Thomas’s
sexual attraction to Mandible, cannot fail to connote for the reader the image
of the praying mantis, whose dangerous allure culminates in the most
famous of post-coital indulgences. The threat of being gobbled up is, of
course, likewise at the heart of the Wolf Man’s fear of his own teacher, Herr
Wolf.

February 17, 2016

Another excerpt here from “Paracitation,” where the affinities between
teaching and psychoanalysis are alluded to in what can only be described as
bombastic prose. Citing Lacan, Farro writes, “there is one thing [the
hysteric] prefers to her own desire – she prefers to let her own desires go
unsatisfied and have the Other hold the key to her mystery,” and the rest of
the excerpt circles around this metaphor of the key to the hysteric’s mystery
and the teacher’s position. The entry is an insistent inquiry into the state of
desire at two different moments in the academy: the first moment is as a
speaker at an academic conference, a position, after all, that scholars are
required to occupy at regular intervals. Directly addressing the audience,
Farro writes, “I imagine that by vouchsafing to you these fragments of
speech hanging like scales at my eyes you might offer some remedy, some
insight. Any response at all.” Of course the metaphor of the scales at the
eyes is meant to emphasize precisely their falling, which would characterize
Farro’s position as, say, the blind one looking to be healed, to be guided, to
be taken in by those for whom the world is clear and radiant. It is a position
not unlike the student seeking the master, or the neurotic seeking the analyst.
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In this moment Farro imagines, rightly or wrongly, that the conference is at
least potentially a place of diagnosis, or even of judgment, not simply an
arena for the circulating of research. Though he perhaps cannot be faulted
for at least presuming that there will be a response to his speech, and this
response would, again perhaps, be enough to mark the desire of the
respondent.
Farro is quick to acknowledge, however, that the conference, this staple
of academic life, is hardly the therapeutic or enlightening endeavor he
portrays it as. The fantasy he is desperately trying to locate, a là Barthes, is
certainly a response to the enigmatic desire of the Other, but the people
sitting in the audience are not this Other, which Farro instead identifies as,
“[t]he Law, the Symbolic, the locus of speech, the stranger on the bridge
whose name we know perfectly well but would not for all the treasure of the
world mention it.” What does this Other want, Farro asks. If one does not
write for a specific other – a letter or postcard, a direct address – then one
writes for the Audience, for the Reader. In short, for no one. It is due to his
sense of this emptiness that Farro characterizes his writing as hysterical, a
sort of rueful hysteria that pretends to harbor a secret in order to force the
other to solve it and in so doing appear. Only to be insufficient, of course,
allowing the hysteric to preserve the place of emptiness that sustains her
position.
The second academic position Farro considers in this passage is that of
the teacher, a slightly different position than that of scholar presenting to a
room of peers. A certain orientation with respect to knowledge, a certain
variety of discourse, a certain configuration of human bodies, a certain
institutional ethos are all elements that determine someone as a teacher, and
once one is so determined a vitality is engendered that carries discourse
along, guides the question of desire in certain ways. The force of these
determining aspects of teaching cannot easily be attenuated and have the
rigidity of structural laws: the teacher, the master, cannot abdicate the power
she has. Even an explicit claim to ignorance about a question cannot unseat
her in this role. These are laws that nobody has written, and the key that
Farro searches for is precisely that which is so obdurately sought by the
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hysteric: the key held by the one who knows. The one who really knows
what she wants, unlocking an incinerating bliss. This one, however, of
course, is not there and there is no key, “only silence poised beyond time
and the universe of discourse orbiting it,” a first word attended by an endless
reckoning, which is the destiny of language.
This entry, at least obliquely, does give some indication as to the
motivation behind a piece like “Me and Me and Miss Mandible,” which seeks
to avoid taking up any position that could be too quickly assimilated by a
given structure or discourse. The piece is neither academic nor strictly
artistic, neither Barthelme’s nor Farro’s, neither autobiographical nor
fictional, neither true nor false, neither serious nor a joke. Or, again, it is also
all of these things. This uncertainty disorients the reader entirely within her
usual framework of understanding or interpreting, and disorients Farro as
well, compelling both to do as Lacan exhorts analysts to do with the
psychotic: listen to the discourse in order to find the buttons that quilt it and
the subject’s discourse and reality together.

September 29

This entry is primarily Farro’s invention – only the first paragraph is
Barthelme’s and Farro inserts the insinuation that Miss Mandible, like
Thomas, is playing a part: “[s]ometimes she seems to act like someone who
is supposed to be a fifth grade teacher.” This small addition elevates the
surreality of the story as well as welcomes the speculation that role-playing
and life-repeating is not an experience confined to the unique case of
Thomas but others as well, perhaps everyone.
Little is added to the whole story by the remainder of the new material
in this entry, except that this section is particularly funny.

October 2
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Another entry that is primarily Farro’s. Like the previous entry, this one
raises the surreal element of the story to another power by depicting the
children playing a game that depends on their capacity to assume a life-role.
“Bus Stop” is apparently an actual game Farro played while he attended
public school. In the journals of his youth, which were kept as a requirement
for an English course, he writes, “I hate bus stop and I can’t believe everyone
thinks this game is so fun. If I ever have to go up [and participate] I’m not
playing along. Big football game today against McCormick…”.
The extended reflection on the character of Brenda is also Farro’s. In
Brenda we see another tacit comparison between psychoanalysis and
education insofar as she apparently aspired to be a teacher before becoming
a “shrink.”

March 8, 2011

Here we have another excerpt from the unpublished A Thousand
Unknown Things; the only instance we know of in which Farro writes of
himself in the third person (indeed, in the excerpt here he writes of himself
after his own death). The preface to “Will You?” contains only this small
amount of “autobiographical” information before moving on to a rather
extensive consideration of Antonin Artaud and Jacques Derrida, specifically
Derrida’s essay on Artaud that appears in Writing and Difference. Several
associations link up in this work: the fascination with masks and playing
roles, the element of psychosis or hallucination, the expulsion of the
author/god and denying the sanctity of the text are all aspects of Farro’s
writing that appear in this preface. Derrida’s reading of Artaud’s theatre of
cruelty might even be taken as a benchmark Farro has set for his own
writing. Farro writes, quoting Derrida,
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[t]he stage [of the theatre of cruelty] will not be representation “if
representation means the surface of a spectacle displayed for
spectators. It will not even offer the presentation of a present, if
present signifies that which is maintained in front of me. Cruel
representation must permeate me.” All the distance of the
hierarchy established by the authority of the text collapses here,
which produces a communication that is unmediated and
undistorted by this distance. We can see better now how the
theatre of cruelty is a theatre of affirmation, a mode though
which the primordial yes of existence is articulated immediately,
exhaustively, unmistakably. The unrepresentable source of life
upon which representation is predicated is here represented,
justifying Derrida’s claim that ‘non-representation is, thus,
original representation.’

Whereas Artaud’s techniques of representation were on the level of an
assault – lights, screams, grunts, percussion, bodily excretions, etc. – Farro’s
are more labyrinthine and evocative, designed to permeate the reader by
catalyzing their associations, igniting them like a spark in the tinder, to use
an image from “Me and Me and Miss Mandible.”

October 7

This entry is entirely Barthelme’s but for the last paragraph. In Farro’s youth
journals a brief mention of his knowledge of the military: “some guy called
yesterday asking if I’d like to join the Marines. Said no. Asked if he’s ever
seen Full Metal Jacket.”

June 10, 2016
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Generally, the June 2016 entries have a consistent thematic content,
given that the entire text of “Me and Me and Miss Mandible” seems to have
been composed in June-July of that year. The topographic or cartographic
vocabulary reappears here, as well as the speculative symptomology of
Farro’s writing. He writes, stuttering as if looking for the correct word, or
uncertain that the cause of his fear exists, “what is this obsession with
fracturing everything, dissociation everything, scrambling it all, ruining it?
This phobia of
of
of
of
of
the thesis?” In addition, then, to the hysteric and psychotic aspects of his
writing there are obsessive and even phobic aspects as well, related to the
notion of the thesis, which he describes as a “little jewel,” that he does not
have and does not want the reader to value, to seek out.
Just as the last June 10 entry, this one concludes with a reflection on the
teaching position. Using the language of psychosis (“break,” “twilight of the
world”) Farro wonders what precipitated the symptoms in his writing to
multiply, crippling him. Commenting on the ambiguity of the scholarly
identity (teacher, writer, reader, student, authority, parent-figure, analyst,
etc.) Farro writes, “[a]drift in this wash of personae, of images, of objects,
by the simple force of my will am I meant to raise some monolith from the
depths, something that like a key [the key image returns] causes the disarray
to crystallize into, into [more stuttering] what?” Farro leaves the question
unanswered, and the reader wonders what could fill the space here. Raising
the monolith from the depths connotes the analytic procedure of revisiting
the past in order to find the source of neuroses, clarifying the patient’s
experiences, revealing the otherwise inaccessible truth. Farro, however, is
not a patient in analysis but a writer in solitude, and instead of the clarity of
the exploded view there is the chaotic whirling of bats. There is essentially,
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one supposes, an identity crisis, a failure to identify with any given role or
figure which leads to an inability to orient himself in the symbolic flow
regulating civilized life. The key, in this instance, would be a palpable desire
that says, “I want to be x,” or “I want to be like x.” But, as already
mentioned, the hysterical desire forecloses this option, leaving Farro in
abeyance, waiting for a cue from the Other (a job title, an institution, an
interpellation). Like Thomas, who spent the first portion of his life following
a paper trail of “diplomas, membership cards, campaign buttons, a marriage
license, insurance forms, discharge papers, tax returns, Certificates of
Merit,” before being returned to the fifth grade, Farro can do no more than
wait to see where it all leads.

And is it leading somewhere.

October 8

Again, all of the material on déjà vu and the dream recordings are Farro’s.
This particular passage recalls Plato’s theory of recollection (“I am […]
having a hard telling when I’m learning something new. It all feels new and
yet ancient”) as performed in the Meno.
The inclusion of a notion such as cryptomnesia is another turn of the
screw regarding Thomas’s situation. While the force of the story does not at
all depend on Thomas’s predicament having a logical or psychological
explanation behind it, including a cryptomnesiac dimension at least provides
grounds for the speculation that Thomas’s re-experience of the fifth grade
is actually a memory of the fifth grade that was forgotten or repressed. Along
these lines the repressed aspect would be his sexual desire for Miss Mandible
and Sue Ann Brownly, which manifestly is now fully apparent.
The dream recorded in this entry is an almost clandestine allusion to a
small section in “A Commentary on a Brief Interview of Roland Barthes in
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Which He Claims That Literature is the Only Thing That Should Be Taught”
in which Farro analyzes the famous Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick essay, “A Poem
is Being Written.” This essay is in part Kosofsky Sedwick’s self-analysis
performed through am elaboration of her personal history of writing – of
poems specifically. She claims her poetic impulse originated when, as a
young girl, she received a flattering poem from her grandfather, who had
used a rhyming dictionary to write the piece. In an effort to reproduce the
feeling the poem inspired in her, she steals the dictionary and writes her first
lyric. While the reference to the book theft is brief, it grounds a more
sustained analysis of the poet’s relationship to her own writing, which of
course is a question dear to Farro’s heart. Kosofsky Sedgwick’s tack, as is
clear from the title of her piece, is to examine her poetry almost as a
symptom of her sexuality – the blunt and violent elements of her poetry
correspond to the masochistic fantasies explored by Freud in his paper, “A
Child is Being Beaten.”
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s paper provides Farro with the occasion to extend
his usual lucubration on writing. His analysis begins with the following
scenario:
imagine your writing is not you-become-other but rather a child
of yours, a “problem” for you, a living entity in need of care,
discipline, teaching. Imagine a poem that began like a dream you
cannot remember ever having, a poem that recurs for years,
spreading. One might spend nine years, as Kosofsky Sedwick
does, giving voice to a poem that is trying to give voice to this
dream, the dream of herself waiting to occur, the dream that
returns her to the scene of writing, a scene of a complex trauma:
the lyric poem, known to the child as such by its beat and
by a principle of severe economy […] – the lyric poem
was both the spanked body, my own body or another one
like it for me to watch or punish, and at the same time the
very spanking, the rhythmic hand whether hard or subtle
of authority itself (115).
What is meter but a heart pumping blood, the mindless, incessant
caresses, or the measured force of spanking? And, when one
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stands over one’s writing, hand risen, whose body lies prone
beneath?

Farro leaves the question, as usual, unanswered, but the reader is at least
guided toward acknowledging that writing, in Farro’s and Kosofsky
Sedgwick’s case at least, can be the body that accepts the violence, anger, or
hatred of the writer, directed at herself or others. It is this volatile aspect of
writing that Farro finds so intriguing when considered from the perspective
of education. After all, school is the primary site of writing for the bulk of a
person’s life, and, as Freud and Farro both note, the school and school
teacher often constitute the mise-en-scène of the beating fantasy (where the
teacher replaces the father and the beaten child and the onlookers are almost
invariably schoolmates).
Thomas’s situation can here be taken in a new light as well; not as a
forgotten or hidden memory but as a fantasy. Freud concludes in “A Child
is Being Beaten,” that this fantasy is ultimately a production of the
prohibition of the father as sexual object. The child is taught to renounce
her desire of the father which, if it persists, results in a guilt that is punished
in the form of the beating. In Thomas’s case the sexes of the players are
reversed, but the desire of the teacher/mother is obviously still intact, as are
the vague feelings of paranoia or impending doom that signal to Thomas
that he is meant to be punished for this desire.
The last relevant aspect of Farro’s analysis of Kosofsky Sedgwick’s work
is the function of pleasure in the fantasy of being beaten. Freud’s claim is
that the pleasure of the fantasy is a result of a regression of the libido from
the original object (the now-prohibited father) to a different object, whether
anal, oral, or genital. Freud observed from his patients that at the climax of
the beating fantasy “there is almost invariably masturbatory [i.e. genital]
satisfaction,” while a regression to an anal object would explain the
significance of spanking. The correlation Farro attempts, via Kosofsky
Sedgwick, to establish between writing and the fantasy of being beaten can
now be extended to include masturbatory pleasure. Quoting Derrida, Farro
entwines the act of writing with that of masturbation: “the supplement [of
“auto-affection in general”] has not only the power of procuring an absent
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presence [as does, e.g., writing] through its image; procuring it for us through
the proxy of the sign, it holds it at a distance and masters it [like a taming, a
beating].”223 Several critics have accused Farro of alienating his readers to
such an extent that his writing could only be described as masturbatory,
which it clearly is. Of course, as already noted, the mental activity of the
obsessive is also characterized by Freud as being more or less masturbatory,
and critics and scholars alike make their living by their mental activity.

April 5, 2016

Another excerpt from the aforementioned “Anamorphosis,” where it is
clear that the actors’ voices were meant to align on the question, “what are
the dead?” and again on the answer, “they are like a dream.” While the first
excerpt focused primarily on the linguistic or grammatical presence of the
dead (“[w]hat are the dead? An effect of grammar, of an arrangement of
words, the breathlessness I feel when I say, ‘Whitney is dead.’”), this second
excerpt, whose images connote scenes of isolation in the natural world,
scenes where one might most easily believe one has seen a ghost or spirit,
describes the way in which the dead intrude into our perception only to
vanish instantly (one cannot help but consider the similarities with
psychosis). Thus the dead make their presence felt both in the mourner’s
speech and in the mourner’s field of perception, scintillating in the margins.
The entry of April 9, 2016, which is discussed below, completes what is
apparently a kind of trilogy or cycle on the theme of the dead and the dream.

October 13
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Only the first and last paragraphs of this entry are Barthelme’s. It is a
crucial entry in the original story; appearing almost exactly halfway through
the story, it gives the reader some kind of indication as to why or how
Thomas/Joseph ended up in his predicament. The entry suggests that the
trauma of discovering his employer would prefer him to act more like a
heartless cog in a profit-generating machine than a sensitive or generous
human being precipitates a crisis in Thomas/Joseph that causes him literally
to regress to the formative parts of one’s life – parts when one’s unique value
and irreplaceable individual worth are constantly emphasized – in order to
have the vacuity and dishonesty of these claims demonstrated to his now
emotionally and mentally advanced self. Seen in this way the story then
becomes a sort of surreal or ridiculous depiction of the emasculating,
disillusioning, or heartbreaking onset of typical working-class male mid-life
malaise.
Farro complicates this picture somewhat by reflecting explicitly on the
meaning of the phrase “life itself,” having Thomas wonder if anything of a
life remains if one burrows to the bottom of the document or symbols that
taken together present the picture of oneself that circulates in the world and
in one’s personal life. Farro puts a decidedly Lacanian spin on these
reflections by having Thomas fantasize about this place of truth as being
reflected in the eyes of Miss Mandible, the one whose desire he covets and
the one for whom he wishes to be the object of desire (to repeat yet again a
hackneyed Lacanian maxim, “desire is the desire of the Other”). The fact,
however, that his desire for Miss Mandible is essentially an existential matter,
a question of his being “not just in [Mandible’s] class […] but Here. Right
fucking Here,” as Farro puts it, elevates Thomas’s relationship to Mandible
beyond one of sexual desire. Or, rather, sexual desire reveals its unique link
to Being, and this experience transpires in the classroom via the figures of
the teacher and student. This new configuration, though, is also nearly
identical to that of the analyst and analysand (Farro discusses the similarity
between these two positions at length in “Your Actual Ghost”).

Farro also adds the detail that Miss Mandible has a new haircut.
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December 16, 2015

Another passage from “Petals. Flowers,” this one more focused on the
role of the book than the role of the teacher in the psychic development of
the child (the passage also recalls Farro’s analysis of Kosofsky Sedgwick’s
theft of her grandfather’s dictionary). Perhaps the most pertinent element of
this passage is Farro’s blunt, even scandalous, claim that “[w]hen we (I) teach
literature I want […] that [primal] scene, whatever it is, to quiver on the
horizon, to quicken to life. What is literature without this distant murmur?”
And how, indeed, does the study of literature defend itself against charges
of its increasing irrelevance except by claiming that literature “humanizes”
students, provides knowledge of “the human condition”? While Farro might
agree with these claims, his work suggests more specifically that literature
provides knowledge not of the human condition but of your human
condition, of the coordinates of your, the student’s/reader’s, matrix of
desire, the relationships between love, hate, and ignorance that are pillars in
its structure, the function of language as it mediates your involvement or
disengagement with others, language understood as what David Foster
Wallace calls the “tiny keyhole”224 at the pole of the universe inside you, a
universe we typically know less about than we do about the actual literal
universe. This knowledge is hidden beyond what in the student/reader
escapes symbolization, and literature, taught in a way that frees the
associations of the reader/student, can bring this knowledge to light, briefly
but unmistakably. So Farro seems to believe, given the rather high place he
assigns to the experience of trauma or the primal scene in his notion of
teaching literature.
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October 17

The entry begins with a rather silly dream, the only meaningful element,
by my estimation, is that the giant ants recall those described by Herodotus
as dwelling in the Indian deserts and protecting large sums of gold that could
only be recovered by riding female camels whose desire to return to their
newborn young gave them sufficient speed to outrun the murderous ants
(who are smaller than dogs but larger than foxes).225 One might concede that
this has a vaguely psychoanalytic bent, given the important role of the
mother camel. This dream of course does not appear in the original text.
Only the second paragraph of this entry is Barthelme’s, and Farro takes
advantage of Thomas’s Mandible fantasy to add his own reflections on the
relationship between words and sexual pleasure (one cannot help but recall
Dora, who likewise, Freud alleges, derived her “guilty” knowledge of
sexuality from an encyclopedia).226 In Barthelme’s original paragraph,
however, there is the intriguing detail that Thomas/Joseph makes his own
lunches now, which invites all manner of speculation regarding his home life
(e.g. does he have a mortgage, phone bill, home insurance? Who pays for
these things, if not him? Who will attend the parent-teacher conferences
when the time comes? Does everyone in the world treat Thomas/Joseph
like an 11-year-old or just the people at Horace Greeley? Do grocery store
clerks raise an eyebrow when he comes through the checkout? Etc. The
complete irrelevance of these questions to the development of the story
makes Barthelme’s brief allusion all the more delightful).
This lengthy and impassioned entry signals the acceleration of the theme
of sexuality as it progresses, for lack of a better phrase, through the rising
action of the story up to its, ahem, climax. In Barthelme’s original text,
lacking the long parenthesis on authority and the digressions regarding déjà
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vu, this acceleration is even more marked. The relationship between school
and sexuality is made apparent enough in this digression, as well as the
importance of books in exploring these early phases of sexuality.
While a preoccupation with etymologies is a consistent habit of Farro’s
work, this excavation of the word “fuck” recalls in particular his essay,
“Clitophon,” on the Platonic dialogue of the same name. This essay, in
addition to the attention it gives to etymology and translation, is another
example of Farro’s oblique approach to discussing education. After
commenting at length on the highly contested legitimacy of the Clitophon as
Plato’s original work, Farro writes,
[t]hese preliminary orientations also reveal perspectives on
the relationship between truth and knowledge, and on
education. Presuming that the Clitophon is not a widely
taught text, even in Classics or Philosophy departments, we
might imagine this is due to the fact that many educators
believe that this “riddle” [of a text] cannot be taught – there
are simply too many problems, too many questions, too
little

about

it

that

can

be

said

“definitively,”

“authoritatively,” or “without doubt.” After all, an entire
archaeological history has to be proffered before one can
even properly call it (and not without contention) a
dialogue of Plato’s. Neglecting to allow a non-work such as
this, however, exposes beliefs or presumptions that are
otherwise difficult to see: a “proper” subject for education
is one that is already determined in its historical,
hermeneutic, or generic contours, an object that meets
certain

requirements

of

conceptual

integrity

or

transmissibility.
These “beliefs,” Farro goes on to show, do not appear exclusively in the
decision to teach this dialogue and not that one, for example, but in the very
strategy of reading adopted for handling or presenting a text. Farro writes,
“[t]he dialogue is so uncanny that the bulk of scholarship on it is concerned
almost exclusively with determining its validity as Plato’s actual work,” and
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that the majority of scholars make no effort to contend with the content of
the piece until the value of it is, in essence, legitimated by affixing Plato’s
name to it.
Finally, even the content suffers from a certain distortion, as all
translations do, in the form of the translators’ presumptions regarding what
a Platonic dialogue looks or ought to look like. It is here that Thomas’s
vocabularic reverie finds deeper expression in Farro’s other work. Accusing
translators of a sort of moral conservatism regarding subject matter “fit” for
philosophical analysis, Farro demonstrates that in at least four different
translations of the dialogue there is a willful resistance to acknowledge the
sexual connotations of Plato’s Greek, connotations that are of course
entirely legitimate to consider given the absolutely central role sexuality
played in ancient pedagogy as portrayed in the unquestionably Platonic
dialogues Phaedrus and Symposium. The full text of this demonstration is
included here as an endnote.227

June 16, 2016

For Lacan the question, “am I dead or alive,” is a question specific to the
obsessive, while the hysteric asks, on the other hand, “am I a man or a
woman?” Farro interprets the obsessive’s question essentially in terms of the
phrases and memories that seem to determine the course of his life far more
than they are the products of that life. When one’s life, desires, fantasies, et
cetera seems to be nothing more than the accumulation of stray words and
images that seem to come from without, that seem to persist beyond all
rational explanation, one gets the sense, as Farro puts it, that these words
are in fact the motivating force behind his life, fortifying and animating his
spine and throat, proximate and alien both. Is a life in fact merely the life of
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these fragments, orbiting and eclipsing one another in an economy
determined by laws strict enough for one to see one’s destiny stretching out
into the future, a zodiac of repetitions?

May 8, 2015

This entry is a quotation of the first paragraph of Farro’s essay,
“Desert/Destroy, Variation, Fourth Draft,” which borrows its title from
that of Whitney Mah’s last dance performance before her death. This is the
first appearance in Farro’s work of the mutilated fish, mentioned above as
an example of a “thorn” that both blocks writing and unleashes it. In this
instance Farro uses the image of a cairn to illustrate the standing the phrase
has in his memory and in the pathways of his associations. Like a cairn on
an obscure trail, the phrase represents a kind of landmark moment in Farro’s
personal history that persists, and in this essay he attempts to uncover what
the phenomenon of this persistence means for the study and teaching of
literature. “My mother is a fish” is the first of four cairns, the others being
“do I dare disturb the universe,” from “The Lovesong of J. Alfred
Prufrock”; “the desire to die is the desire to know; it is not the desire to
disappear, and it is not suicide; it is the desire to enjoy,” and “the only book
that is worth writing is the one we don’t have the courage or strength to
write,” both of which are from Hélène Cixous’s Three Steps on the Ladder of
Writing. The essay also features a long aside on Dostoevsky’s The Double and
a sort of literary re-telling of Freud’s famous case of the father who dreams
of his burning child.
This entry provides some depiction, whether it is a common one or not,
of the experience of the literature student whose reading can amount to the
accrual of these cairns, which appear and persist for reasons that, Farro
would claim, can only be ascertained from the perspective of psychoanalysis.
Asking if the phrase is hysterical in particular highlights the psychoanalytic
aspects of this entry, which also situates the text as the (hysterical) analysand
and the reader as the analyst. Of course, the analogy only goes so far as it is
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the analyst’s job precisely not to be caught up in the hysteric’s attempts to
have her secret desire discovered or satisfied by the knowledge she presumes
the analyst to have (and, of course, does not have). The structure, though, is
nevertheless an important way for the reader to glimpse some dimension of
her own desire, that dimension which causes this or that phrase to radiate
and take its place in the catalog of enduring images or phrases that have a
similar value to those that recur in the dreams of the reader.
As an example, while the phrase “my mother is a fish,” taken from
William Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying, obviously indicates the young
Vardaman’s attempt to comprehend the death of his mother by associating
her with the fish he has recently caught and killed, Farro instead pursues a
series of associations that provide an answer to why, of all the beautiful and
mysterious sentences in Faulkner’s novel, this one persists for him. This
leads to the memory of himself killing a fish with a stone such that its eye
became dislodged from its skull. One need not go far from this point to
locate an ancient hatred or aggression directed toward the mother, which is
a rather banal stopping point in the analytic dérive, but Farro pursues the
image further, reaching an insight that is far in excess of the dimensions of
Faulkner’s novel; that is, the image of the fish, allied in some way with the
mother, is ultimately a reflection of himself, of his own eyes. All of this is
made more explicit in the entry of August 4, 2015, discussed below.

March 5, 2013

An obscure and digressive entry here, taken from Farro’s lengthy (near
monograph-length) journal entries on Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past,
which he read in 2012-2013. The entry, though, is not entirely irrelevant as
Marcel’s experience at the theater forms an easy parallel with Farro’s
description of his own career through school. The young Marcel, suffering
from an obscure longing to be a writer or artist of some sort while also, at
this moment in the novel, experiencing his first love in Swann’s young
daughter Gilberte, is finally allowed to visit the theater and see the famous
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actress Berma, whose beauty and skill he has dreamed of since his days in
Combray reading the famous French dramas. As the entry makes clear,
Marcel devotes himself entirely to experiencing the pleasure and beauty he
believes is promised him by these highest forms of art. Proust writes, “I
considered theatre, audience, play, and my own body only as an acoustic
medium of no importance save in the degree to which it was favourable to the
inflexions of [Berma’s] voice,”228 (Farro calls this “a suicide of longing”). As
the actress finally arrives on stage, however, Marcel feels that “all my
pleasures had ceased; in vain did I strain towards Berma’s eyes, ears, mind,
so as not to let one morsel escape me of the reasons she would give me of
admiring her, I did not succeed in gleaning a single one.”229 That is, Marcel
suffers one of his first (of many) disappointments, discovering that all he
had hoped he would discover – in art, in writing, in society, in sex – is less
than his fantasies permitted him to expect. The scene recalls Farro’s
sentiments above, regarding education: “I can’t be blamed for wanting the
love of my teachers or for coveting the secrets they seemed to hide. But as
I arrive I find what? There is nothing here.”
The remainder of the entry, which seems to be more about Marcel’s
relationships with Gilberte and Albertine than art, seeks to recover
something from this loss. The prose here is characteristically hyperbolic and
almost delirious (the transmissions of Jupiter?, the violence of bells?); the
only sentiment that escapes this effusion is the claim that “love is that which
takes everything from you so that you might have anything at all.” Perhaps
it is deliberate that Farro places this entry next to the “fuck” entry on the
right – at this point in Thomas’s narrative he seems to realize that his desire
for Mandible is destined for ruin, even as it promises to reveal some essential
truth (“I am everyday progressing on the path to the truth of my place here:
it runs through her.”)
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October 25

The identity between Mandible’s and Sue Ann’s shoes serves as a pivot
point between the two of them. Like the fold bisecting an image into its
symmetrical parts, the shoes are the nexus between Thomas’s objects of
desire, one corresponding to his adult interior self, the other to his apparent
adolescent persona. This small detail about the shoes is Farro’s addition.
Needless to say the following paragraph is also Farro’s, and it expands
on the subtheme of déjà vu. Presque vu – or nearly seen – describes the tip-ofthe-tongue feeling one has when trying to remember some name or phrase
or word. This familiar dilemma is of considerable interest for the sciences
of psychological and cognitive processes, but the most famous instance of
it from analytic literature is of course Freud’s inability to remember the name
Signorelli, which provides him no small amount of material with which to
form psychoanalytic speculations. In “Your Actual Ghost” Farro
summarizes this seminal Freudian moment, emphasizing Freud’s insight that
the forgetting stems from a repression of thoughts relatedly specifically to
death and sexuality. In this way death and sexuality can be seen to be
structuring aspects of speech and memory, at the very least because what
phrases and memory are available to us consciously are a residue or an
agglomeration of associations that have surreptitiously maintained a link to
the original repressed thought, one so frequently rooted in the ideas of death
or sexuality. As Freud puts it in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, the
fragments of language that do remain accessible to him, albeit within the
distortion characteristic of presque vu, “remind me as much of what I wished
to forget as of what I wished to remember.”230
Jamais vu – or never seen, specifically the feeling of having never seen a
particular person or place despite the certainty or knowledge that one knows
the person/place – has a rather important analytic exemplar in Freud’s
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analysis of the short story The Sandman, in which he develops his theory of
the uncanny. Sight and its connection with the eyes innervate the uncanny
effects of this story, which begins with a young boy’s horror at having his
eyes plucked out by the eponymous antagonist (affiliated with the castration
complex). As the story develops, however, the feeling of the uncanny is
more closely allied with the trope of the double: the puppet Olympia is
portrayed as both living and inanimate in the story, and the character of
Coppelius (the original figure of the sandman) is doubled as the optician
Coppola. Obviously the double plays a central role in “Me and Me and Miss
Mandible” as well, on several levels. Not only is Thomas a double of Joseph,
but this main character is a sort of double of himself, at different (yet the
same) periods in his life. We add as well the uncanny authorial doubling that
is occurring between Farro and Barthelme – a doubling which would mystify
any reader who did not have the original text of the story immediately at
hand. We see this bizarre doubling made explicit in a later entry when
Thomas encounters his doppelgänger at a school Halloween party. Freud in his
essay does not miss the opportunity to note the double’s relationship not
only to castration but to death of the ego,231 a death that Thomas seeks to
avoid throughout the story as he insists that his “true” self is 35 despite being
treated otherwise in every dimension of his life. Freud mentions explicitly
that an unavoidable return to places one is trying to escape is another reliable
source of the uncanny, and this of course is Thomas’s essential plight.
The following paragraph is Barthelme’s, however the sentence, “[t]he
theorists fail to realize that everything that is either interesting or lifelike in
the classroom proceeds from what they would probably call interpersonal
relations,” could serve as a generalized but acceptable summary of nearly all
the literature on the relationship between psychoanalysis and education.
“Lifelike,” however, in this scene, connotes something like “animal life,”
given the brutal display of dominance and marking involved, as well as the
vying for a place in the Thomas’s “great, overgrown heart,” which is the
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human substitute or overdetermined symbol of the animalistic legacy of
reproduction. That is, the “lifelike” instincts of competition, survival and
reproduction are filtered through the prism of civilized life and recast as
flirtatious violence (Sue Ann’s kick is like a libidinal outburst) and
competition in the symbolic domain (Mandible’s sarcasm must serve as a
substitute for what might otherwise amount to interspecies murder). Of
course the whole scenario is a bit skewed when considered from this
bioevolutionary perspective by the glaring anomaly of two females fighting
for the right to one male, which is almost unheard of in the animal kingdom
and likely an effect of Thomas’s fantasies distorting his interpretation of the
scene. The repetition, at the end of the entry, of the word “fuck,” indicates
an overflow of libido which justifies the claim that Thomas is likely
experiences illusions of grandeur regarding his desirability.
The repetition, appearing here in the same entry as the introduction of
jamais vu (which as Farro points out is also used to describe the uncanny
feeling one has when a word is repeated so often that it becomes
meaningless as a word), gives the reader a sense of its uncanny aspect, of the
material presence of the word on the page, “fuck,” whose material contours
on the page, as Thomas points out above, have an erotic flair. A feeling of
disorientation sets in as the word hovers between its wordness and its
thingness and, for a moment, the structures that provide language with its
mystical powers quiver.

June 16, 2016

A return here to the “contemporary” entries (i.e. those that Farro seemed
to be writing at the same time as collating the excerpts from previous works),
the reader again confronts the image of the thread, the symbol of
association. These entries tend, at least far more so than any of the others,
to reflect on the style and structure of “Me and Me and Miss Mandible.”
“There is a thread. But who threads it?” This quotation brings a certain
dilemma to light regarding the different positions of the writer and reader as
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they each follow the sway of their associations as they are conjured by the
text; that is, if it is a certain associative line that Farro is trying to follow by
excavating his texts in search of some bedrock of trauma or mystery, what
status does the reader’s own associative excavation have? It is as though the
text projects above it two distinct labyrinths superimposed on one another,
one followed by the reader, the other by the writer. Farro’s question seems
to be one for himself: is it you, the reader, that will discover the line unifying
these fragments; or is it You, my Other, the one whose desire I desire, that
I address?
This question grows more apparent in the following paragraph, in which
Farro address an ambiguous you that might be the other as reader or Other
as locus of desire. Farro seems to be describing his watershed crisis: after
the “masks fell,” – that is, after the structures that orient one’s discourse and
persona became too apparent, too incredible, even – the desire that
coordinated one’s actions, one’s affectations, and one’s discourse likewise
became incredible, uncertain, or simply invisible. When the reader for whom
one presumes one writes appears in its true function, which is as a sort of
idol representing – and serving as representative for – the god beyond, what
happens when this idol is taken as an object and not a portal? Each persona
has its idol: the student has the figure of the teacher, who is the portal to
knowledge; the teacher has the figure of the student, who is the portal to a
confirmation of one’s mastery; the scholar has the figure of the peer or
reader, who is the portal to validation. When these portals close, however,
then, like Kafka’s famous waif at the gates, there seems to be no breaching
them without the secret knowledge that one need only walk through them,
which nevertheless is impossible. Indeed, the final paragraph of the entry is
rather like a retelling or reimagining of Kafka’s “Before the Law,” in which
Farro, like Kafka’s helpless man, desires only for the Law to appear, this
Law that provides order in the chaos of the land, in order to say one must
do this or do that. The “you” of this paragraph, as in that above, vacillates
between the individual reader, whoever that might be, and the Reader, the
Reader for whom one writes when there is no designated recipient, the
Reader from whom one takes all one’s cues as a writer. A literal reader, an
individual, can actually intervene, can actually speak on behalf of a law to
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which they are privy (in the form of acceptance, approval, criticism,
rejection, directives, etc.), but a Reader can never intervene and speak on
behalf of the Law, since this Law has no representative and is only apparent
in its effects and consequences. “These hysterics” of which Farro speaks
seem to be directed at the reader, the one whose gaze Farro seems to want
to direct to the structures that so disorient and distress him, “the desire
beyond the walls.”
The last two sentences of this dense and somewhat mystifying paragraph
change directions significantly, turning the entire crisis of the Other Reader
into an aspect of what Farro considers to be his own working-through,
transpiring through the activity of his writing. All the writing is, of course,
for someone or directed at someone, but, somewhat like an actual
psychoanalysis, silence is the response, as if there is no one else in the room
or on the page.

Then what am I.

October 30

Original entry from Barthelme.

April 9, 2016

The last of the “What are the dead?” cycle, this one focused primarily on
desire – the desire for knowledge. One recalls immediately Farro’s citation
of Cixous’s Three Steps on the Ladder of Writing: “the desire to die is the desire
to know; it is not the desire to disappear, and it is not suicide; it is the desire
to enjoy.” In this entry Farro asks, “What more quickly than a thought of
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the dead brings to light the heart of desire? […] And each of us is here in
the university because there is something we want to know, something we
seek out by occupying a specific position in relation to knowledge. Do the
dead object? Do we imagine that their secrets will fulfill or sustain us?” There
seems to be some conflation here of the dead with the text – neither of
which can respond when addressed. Can the dead/text object to becoming
an object of scholarly scrutiny? If so it is clear that Farro aims to place his
own text beyond the powers of academic insight, at the distant borders
where education and seduction cannot be so easily distinguished.

October 31

This entire scene is Farro’s, and it is perhaps more than fortuitous that
it appears on the same page as the April 9 entry on the dead. Here, in the
elementary school costume parade, the relationship of death to education is
completely ignored. Farro points out how death is avoided as a subject of
actual conversation, which in a room full of fifth graders is obviously
understandable. It is at this moment in the narrative that Farro begins to
gesture toward a fatal culmination of the story, as if the only proper
conclusion to Thomas’s predicament is death, perhaps by suicide. The
surreal procession of children is an image well worth reflecting on – from
an analogical perspective we might take the image as a fitting reflection of
our everyday exhibition of personae, roles we occupy in specific
interpersonal engagements, all of them presumably covering up an essential
or true self. Thomas’s inexplicable decision to dress as his former self despite
how “perverse” a choice it is demonstrates his dependence on his past life
role; that is, given the opportunity to embody anything on Halloween he
can’t come up with anything other than what he has been before. The
observation that, as well, many students have chosen typical costumes
(witches, cats), is another example of the paralysis or confusion one can be
thrown into when faced with the task of embodying a different persona,
even if only for a silly holiday. Moreover, Thomas uncannily confronts his
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identical self – a boy dressed exactly as he is. Instead of a moment of
congress with the boy, or even another episode of déjà vu, Thomas can only
feel a hostile difference between his imagos – instead of confronting a child
who seemed, like Thomas, destined to inhabit the position of insurance
claims adjuster, Thomas confronts the ironic and dismissive image of a
young boy who more or less characterizes Thomas’s former life as a joke.
Thomas, in turn, seems intimidated by the power of the sixth graders,
leading him to his preposterous conclusions that their costumes are
accentuated with real blood.

November 3

Another entry that is entirely Farro’s addition. From his journal entries
it is pretty clear that his observations here are autobiographical. Apart from
its humour, the entry is does little more for the piece than add one more
voice to the chorus of critics who have claimed that the school grows closer
and closer to the prison and the church. From a narrative standpoint, it is
impossible to believe that, given the relative length of all of Thomas’s other
entries in the story, he was able to write all of this during the class’s daily
geography lesson, nor that he would want to unless he had a proverbial axe
to grind. An editor ought to have intervened.

August 14, 2010

Excising the black space, the following entry reads:

[A] boy was captivated by mirrors, abducted by them. After a time
the story is difficult to tell. Sometimes the story ends, a dear gift,
one feared to death, a comet flashing. One thought is always
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struggling to locate myself. The horror to be a horror from the
mirror, faceless face, body animated by words, animated by the
wake of death.

The entry is censored in Farro’s journals, meaning there is no way to recover
the full text of this excerpt. While it is obviously an allusion to the function
of unconscious censorship, it is also an example of the way in which meaning
persists in the face of erasure. Formally the entry is comparable to Jonathan
Safran Foer’s Tree of Codes, a novella-length censoring of Bruno Schulz’s The
Street of Crocodiles. Safran Foer is a persistent influence in Farro’s work, due
primarily to Safran Foer’s typographical experimentation and fascination
with the ways messages can be simultaneously expressed and mutilated.232
On its own the entry is jagged and borderline nonsensical, almost like a
bad translation or a message written by a machine. While in the text itself
we see the usual themes reappear – death, mirrors, words – we are perhaps
more interested in Farro’s decision to censor this exactly and nothing else.
One can presume that approximately 60% of the text is taken out, which
leaves more than enough room for the original text to be vastly different
from the remaining excerpt. I personally have examined the archived
journals in Cheyenne, Wyoming’s Cheney Branch archives of Farro’s work
and found the imprints of the original to be irrecoverable, truly consigning
them to oblivion.
The date of this entry, coincidentally, makes it the earliest of Farro’s
entries. Perhaps there is an element of shame in his earlier work.

One thinks specifically of Oskar’s grandparents’ messages to one another in Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close. His
grandfather, who does not speak except by using his hands upon which are tattooed the words “yes” and “no”, delivers
a message on a touchtone phone that Safran Foer transcribes as an enormous string of numbers. Oskar’s grandmother,
on the other hand, writes so frantically that she ceases to use punctuation and eventually ceases to leave any space
between her words and finally simply writes letters on top of letters, creating a black a mass of illegible text, not unlike
the Commandant in Kafka’s In the Penal Colony.
232
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June 24, 2016

Another episodic and cryptic entry. The central theme is still Farro’s
obsession with the reader (“I know you’re listening – reading”), though the
bulk of the entry depicts his struggle to conjugate his discourse and desire
with the discourse and desires of education as an academic discipline. Farro
seems to leave behind the conventional research approach of sifting through
the “mountains of paper on the subject [of education]” in order to find some
line of coherence, leaving him with no other option than to interrogate the
subject from the perspective of his desire, which of course eludes and
mystifies him. As always, the question of desire is accompanied by the figure
of the Other (“whose approbation are you after, what image are you
struggling to embody?”); the question here seems to be: what compels a
person to want to teach? By prioritizing this question and by examining it
from the perspective of psychoanalysis, Farro recasts the problems of
education in terms of the history and desire of the teacher. The image of
Hamlet – whose inability to act is notorious – exemplifies the forking paths
of education as transmission of knowledge on one hand and education as
attunement to one’s unconscious on the other. If there are any ghosts
haunting Farro’s work, it would be one that compels him to speak on behalf
of knowledge, and another that compels him to speak on behalf of truth.
Indeed.

November 3

This entire entry is Farro’s addition, and, apart from its rather banal
critique of the silliness of elementary school disciplinary measures, it seems
to be mostly a lark.

February 7, 2012
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Excerpt from an essay delivered in Boston in 2012 on the Russian
philosopher and theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. The first paragraph anticipates
many of Farro’s subsequent literary concerns, especially the notion that the
work of art reveals its true value precisely in what it refuses to give us, forcing
the reader or viewer to draw from her own associative or unconscious
resources. Farro’s concluding question, paired with the bizarre and dreamlike image of the jar in Tennessee, reminds one of the central, opaque, and
alluring navel of the dream about which the entire dreamwork coalesces but
which itself, restive and unfathomable, perpetually escapes analysis. It seems,
when one attempts to unify Farro’s thoughts on the matter, that it is the
presence of this navel and the bare fact that learners are also dreamers that
causes him to understand the teaching of literature in such an idiosyncratic
sense. The value of, say, a poem such as Stevens’ “Anecdote of the Jar” does
not at all lie in the meaning of the jar, but rather in the non-meaning of the
jar. But, to go further, this non-meaning is not itself to be taken as the
meaning – i.e. that the jar represents the unrepresentable or is some icon of
différance – but is rather an invitation for the reader to enter into her
associative stream and, precisely there, begin to survey and analyze the
landscape, interrogating it for no purpose other than to draw nearer, perhaps
ever nearer, to her desire.

Is anyone listening.

June 25, 2011

Another early entry, this one from a poem in the notebooks. Purpose
uncertain.
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July 21, 2010

Excerpt from a different poem than the last entry. These two entries
taken together signal a kind of turning point in “Me and Me and Miss
Mandible,” where the entries become more dream-like, more ambiguous,
perhaps more poetic. This increasing disintegration of anything like a theme
or central argument of the essay – which was already quite abstract – mirrors
the manner in which Farro seems to understand teaching literature. That is,
what begins as at least an apparent effort to explicate or address a text by
means of something like argumentation or close reading (after all, the earliest
entries make explicit reference to “Me and Miss Mandible” as well as discuss
the function or even “argument” of the accompanying entries) devolves into
fragmented and mystifying shards of dream images and metaphors, all of
them increasingly personal, increasingly preoccupied with the specter of
Farro’s, and everyone’s, inevitable death and the desires, fantasies, and
words orbiting it.

November 4

Apart from only a few added touches (“…exercising her disciplinary
tones” and “I cannot imagine what Frankie Randolph intends with all this”)
the primary intervention here is the recollection of Brenda, the etymologies,
and the rumination on Sue Ann’s tabloid-driven sexual education. The
conflation of education, curiosity, sexuality, the notion of a cure drives home
the sentiment that the impulse to know can always be viewed from a libidinal
perspective.

June 27, 2016
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An image from what Farro elsewhere refers to as his “ecosystem of
metaphorical production,” which in turn leads to the confession: “[t]here are
readers I am trying to destroy.” Despite its ambiguity, this passage comprises
one of the more succinct explanations of Farro’s motivations behind his
experimentation. By foregoing basically every convention of academic
writing Farro is ultimately asking the reader, or Reader, to speak on behalf
of a Law whose grounds are uncertain, or even mythological. That is, in an
academic setting where critical and original thinking are so highly prized,
Farro attempts to write from his own origin and with an eye toward
providing a critique in the ancient sense: a crisis and a verdict. For Farro, the
stakes of learning, teaching, reading, or writing are not circumscribed
exclusively by the subject at hand, but by the absolute limits of death and
desire. If, after all, the spirit of critique can never rest, then one might say
that Farro attempts to sympathize with and mimic that restlessness, urging
the reader never to forget the desire that motivates her interest in this or
that, an evanescent desire always to be rediscovered.

1935 & June 27, 2016

I will take these entries together, since they are clearly meant to be seen
as a whole. The 1935 entries are excerpts from e.e. cummings’ poem “as if
as” from his collection No Thanks (famously dedicated to all the publishers
who declined to print his work – it is not hard to imagine Farro sympathizing
and identifying with cummings’ difficulties), and the other entries are Farro’s
paracitation of cummings’ poem. cummings’ poetry, like Farro’s scholarship,
derives a great amount of its import from its willingness to extend the
conventions of its practice to extremes in search of new effects of meaning.
cummings’ work, like Farro’s resists traditional methods of reading and
analysis, so it is not surprising that Farro sees cummings as a sort of ally.
Farro adds his specific concerns to cummings’ poem, which itself powerfully
depicts the magical interaction between a mundane fact (“i am alive”) and
the image of fog among the rushes. Farro embellishes this scene with the
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rather incongruous imagery of a pair of weary hands and an idol (one whose
centrality to the whole recalls the jar in Tennessee) upon which is written
the Greek apothegm:  , “gnothi seauton” generally
translated as, “know thyself” and which Farro renders phonetically as “know
thee say aughten”. The punning here complicates the message considerably
as it can be taken to mean both that in order to know oneself one must say
nothing and in order to know the other one must say nothing. Farro’s
second addition imagines the ghosts of cummings’ original poem to be not
tendrils of fog but “windrisen cinders cast dreamfully far,” producing a
rhyme with cummings’ phrase “rush fields dreamfully are.” The
fog/ghost/smoke that on its own makes worlds becomes, in Farro’s added
final stanza, the ambivalent image of dew-soaked ash crowned with sun,
bright as pearls.
This entry is, I believe, a sort of follow-up to the preceding entry (June
27, 2016): cummings’ poem serves as an example precisely of the kind of
language that defies the Law, or at least provokes a response. Farro’s
response is, of course, not didactic or expository but paracitic – it extends
and diversifies the range of meaning for cummings’ original poem while also
providing, by way of allusion almost, a commentary on the original poem.
To the expansive imagery of cummings’ original poem (the reeling fog
pouring over the rush fields, themselves appearing among the fog as if in a
dream) Farro adds the somewhat religious images of the hands and the idol
bearing an inscription that implicates the individual (know thyself), as well
as the collective (the emaciated horde), whereas cummings’ poem makes
little gesture toward the human (he only mentions ghosts – the image of the
fog). In Farro’s additions this horde is taken up by the ancient hands (with
every joint in the cracking fingers cracking) and scattered like ashes into
some impossible distance (dreamfully far). cummings’ final stanza leaves the
reader with an image almost of autochthonous life rising from the
fog/ghost/smoke, whose heartbeat one can almost see emerge in the very
typography of the final line (mmamakmakemakesWwOwoRworLworlD),
the stuttering to life and the systole/diastole of the alternating capital letters.
In cummings’ poem this is a world of life that is orthogonal to human life,
that carries on above or beyond the human world. Farro’s additions
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complicate this image, making it seem as though the new world is not in
addition to the one at hand but rather is a consequence of the human world
coming to an end; the cinders of the horde cast dreamfully far leave beyond
the conflicted image of the glistening ash in the sun.

Can this image speak for itself?

At the end of the entry Farro writes, “[p]ulling this string of words out
and out from my chest and my throat, where does it end?” Again we see a
sort of longing for silence, a longing to be rid of the unending circulation of
discourse, or perhaps a longing to finally have spoken the final word – a
longing for death, perhaps.

November 5

Apart from the dream, this entry is Barthelme’s original.

February 8, 2016

Excerpt from “Paracitation.” Farro’s writing process, in the later part of
his career, became increasingly dominated by single phrases – in his journals
he refers to them as “thorns”; “little ineradicable and immovable thorns in
my brain and heart that don’t block my writing exactly but demand a toll,
and there’s no crossing until it’s paid.” Farro’s willingness to value precisely
these “precious” phrases is what, according to him, distinguishes his
research from more conventional academic work. In part, his insistence that
his “symptom” is an essential part of his work as a scholar serves to
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transmute his writing from out of the realm of the ideally easily circulated
academic discourse and into the realm of hysterical discourse, discourse in
need of an interpretation that is not simply semantic but symbolic. In this
particular excerpt we can see yet again the familiar features of what Barthes
would call Farro’s “image repertoire”: the spirits, the dream, the birds, the
leviathan. The presupposition seems to be that, not unlike in the analyst’s
training, the teacher of literature must herself be aware of the extent to
which her history, her body, her fantasies, etc. influence the manner in which
she reads, writes, teaches, and learns literature. Paracitation itself is an
exercise in following these associative threads, allowing a story or poem to
blossom anew under the influence of one’s unconscious, not only renewing
the landscape of the piece but also touching on the store of unique
metaphorical production that, for the teacher and student of literature, are
an education in and of themselves; an education that, for Farro, need not
replace the conventional methods of reading and teaching literature but
work in tandem with these methods, seeking the fantasy underlying every
myth of education.
Is Farro’s prose “good”? Is it “clear”? One hardly knows what to make
of prose that is so far from the style of the academy, and this is at least in
part the reason Farro employs it. His work is no more indecipherable than,
say, Lacan’s Écrits, which Lacan himself claimed were virtually unreadable.
The difficulty of the prose – if indeed it is difficult – is itself a pedagogical
gesture, one that not only encourages the reader to dwell with the words but,
perhaps more importantly, encourage Farro as a writer to continue to
unleash what in the literary text causes us to be mysteries to ourselves.

Follow him. Try it.

June 27, 2016
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In this brief entry Farro simply highlights what, for him, are the images
that repeat. Why these? Is this question any less valuable or any less
interesting than seeking the meaning of a white whale?

July 4, 2016

Yet another repetition here, this time of the epigraph to “Me and Me and
Miss Mandible.” Farro, in essence, is asking in the subsequent paragraph,
“what compels a reader to value this work and not that one, to be a scholar
of this and not that?” Farro presumes that in seeking the secret of the text
one is ultimately seeking the secret of oneself, never discovered. Is it banal
to inquire as to the value or origin of the conventions that characterize one
discourse as scholarly, another as literary? The teacher of literature,
inundated with the creative forces of so many writers, may write in that same
literary current. This entry is an example of Farro doing so.
There is something in the quality of literary writing that makes summary
pointless, or even a bit violent. Obviously, one can say of these vignettes
that they are about a young boy who builds a bonfire and wonders if the
matches will light. Yet the vignettes are also, from another perspective, not
vignettes at all but arguments, arguments from a scholar who is attempting
to demonstrate the value of dreams in examining texts. From still another
perspective they might be seen as exercises for students to evaluate the
consequences for a piece of writing when an author varies the tone, the
images, the style, the person. Each of these perspectives suggests a different
mode of analysis, and as these modes multiply one begins to see the beating
heart of a literary education – not simply acknowledging that many
interpretations exist and are valid, but in acknowledging the value of saying
yes to some and not others, of committing oneself to a reading that, in the
end, is a choice that lies beyond the presumed desire of the teacher (i.e. a
reading the teacher “wants”) and is a reading the reader wants, an aspect of
her desire.
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This entry also marks yet another turning point in “Me and Me and Miss
Mandible.” The remaining entries are more obscure, unreal. While the
paracitation of “Me and Miss Mandible” plods on rather unremarkably on
the right, the entries on the left become more sweeping, more personal,
more suicidal.

The fires speak of the horror.

March 12, 2021

The first of three impossible entries, whose date has not yet arrived.
Farro is undoubtedly referring to his exodus from his birthplace of
Wyoming, perhaps seeing in it some similarity to his hero Joyce’s exile.
Referring to himself in the second person has the somewhat uncanny effect
of positioning Farro as both reader and writer, while at the same time giving
the reader a feeling of being interrogated, perhaps. The image of the secret
heart appears yet again, this time as a kind of ghost or totem accompanying
Farro throughout his life’s seminal moments. The tone of the entry bears
some resemblance to that of the early versions of Wordsworth’s Prelude, the
poet asking, “—Was it for this that one, the fairest of all Rivers, lov’d to
blend his murmurs with my Nurse’s song, and from his alder shades and
rocky falls, and from his fords and shallows, sent a voice that flow’d along
my dreams?” To the extent that a reader may interpret Wordsworth’s
question here as one of disgust at the inadequacy of his poetry to measure
up to the experiences that inspired it, one can interpret Farro’s resignation
here as a consequence of his permanent distance from the secret heart, its
impenetrable opacity that persists despite Farro’s efforts to seize it in his
writing.
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The image of the light being carried through endless night recalls the
final image of Cormac McCarthy’s No Country for Old Men, a novel Farro
wrote about extensively in his journals. In the novel Sheriff Bell has a dream:
it was like we was both back in older times and I was on horseback goin
through the mountains of a night. Goin through this pass in the
mountains. It was cold and there was snow on the ground and he rode
past me and kept on goin. Never said nothin. He just rode on past and he
has this blanket wrapped around him and he had his head down and when
he rode past I seen he was carryin fire in a horn the way people used to
do and I could see the horn from the light inside of it. About the color of
the moon. And in the dream I knew that he was goin on ahead and that
he was fixin to make a fire somewhere out there in all that dark and all
that cold and I knew that whenever I got there he would be there. And
then I woke up.

In his journals Farro writes, “Something about the whole scene reminds me
of Aeneas meeting his dead father in Hades, who so strangely dismisses his
son through the gate of ivory, not of horn. As if the secret the dead know is
that our waking life is a false dream, not a true one. But a dream in any case.”
The suicidal aspect to Farro’s writing is made explicit here in the final
words of the entry.

He once told me he wanted to destroy himself with sentences.

September 8, 2034

Farro had been in the habit of recording his dreams for many years and
this particular apocalyptic scenario does indeed recur in his dream journals.
It is very rare for any of the entries in these journals not to mention a feeling
of fear or anxiety associated with the dream’s events. Very rarely Farro
appends brief reflections on the dreams after recording them. The unnamed

211

“you” he describes variously as “M, but not M,” “M, but with several faces,”
“W,” “W, alive again,” and twice as “reader.” This particular dream offers a
rather marked contrast with Thomas’s dreams, which are generally more
absurd and light-hearted than this dream of end times, and the foreboding
quality of this dream aligns with the text at the right of the page on déjà vu.
The reader begins to sense that several things are coming to an end.

Such a profound solitude, death.

Q: Clutching your hand, what do I see breathing beyond the planets?

A: Love, the mirror, you exalted.

Reader.

July 6, 2016

A gate only for me, now closed.

August 4, 2015

The father is a cloaked horseman, the father is the keeper of the false
gate, the mother is a mutilated fish, a mirror.
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Hypocrite lecteur, mon semblable.

September 8, 2034
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Migrancies
Paper title: ‘Bleed Out Your Days in the River of Time’

2016

218

University of Western Ontario (Department of Education): 7th
Annual Graduate Research in Education Symposium
Paper title: ‘Psychoanalysis and Education’s First Breath’
University of Toronto (Department of Cinema Studies):
Sight/Site/Cite
Paper title: ‘Parasites’
Cultural Studies Association Annual Conference, Riverside,
California: ‘Another University is Possible’
Paper title: ‘The Aggression of Dialogue, The Resistance to
Learning’
University of Western Ontario (Department of Modern Languages
and Literature): ‘Trans- and Trance’
Paper title: ‘Someone Must Have Traduced Josef K’
Derrida Today Annual Conference, New York City
Paper title: ‘Education Interminable: Derrida and Psychoanalysis’
Technology in Education Symposium, University of Western
Ontario
Paper title: ‘The Eclipse of Technology’
The American Comparative Literature Association Annual
Meeting, New York
Paper title: ‘A Pedagogy of Ignorance and Analysis’
Dalhousie University (Department of English): ‘Dissent’
Paper title: ‘Answer, please: Desire and Dissent in the Classroom’
University of Toronto (Department of English): ‘Repetition, with a
Difference?’
Paper title: ‘Clouds: Quotation as Crucifixion and the Thrown
Stones of Criticism’
University of Western Ontario (Department of Education): 4th
Annual Faculty Research Symposium
Paper title: ‘Robber: Come. An Introduction to Desire in the
Classroom’
University of Western Ontario (Department of Comparative
Literature): ‘Good Laugh, Bad Laugh’
Paper title: ‘A Sparrow with a Machine Gun: Lacan, the Letter,
Enjoyment’
York University (Gender, Feminist, and Women’s Studies):
‘Dynamic Resistances’
Paper title: ‘The Predator and the Prey: Blindness and Theory’
University of Saskatchewan (Department of French): ‘Fascination
des Images’
Paper title: ‘A Death of Life: Baudrillard, Merleau-Ponty and
Photographic Absence’
University of Wyoming (Department of English): ‘Celebration and
Criticism in the Academy’
Paper title: ‘A Thousand Unknown Things: Logic Made Impossible’
Brandeis University (Department of Philosophy): ‘Philosophy and
Language’

2016

2016

2015

2015
2014

2014

2014
2013

2013

2013

2013

2012

2012

2011

2010
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Paper title: ‘War, Responsibility, Language: the Impossibility of
Ethics’
AWARDS
Graduate Student Teaching Award (Nominated), University of Western Ontario
Promoting Intellectual Engagement in the First Year Award, University of Wyoming

2012
2011

LANGUAGES
French (intermediate to advanced)
EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
Member of the Western Network for Digital Education & Research
Reading group organizer: 20th century women’s fiction
Reading group organizer: Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time
Reading group organizer: the novels of Cormac McCarthy
Reading group organizer: Thomas Pynchon’s Against the Day
Reading group organizer: David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest
Reading group organizer: Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus
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2012-2013
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2011

